COPING WITH SYRIA : INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND THE CASE OF LEBANON FROM CIVIL WAR TO INDIRECT RULE (1975-2002)

Taku Osoegawa

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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20 April 2004

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

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ii. I was admitted as a research student in September 1999 and as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in September 2000; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 1999 and 2004. Minor corrections to this thesis were made between February 13 2004 and April 20 2004 by request of the examining committee.

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CONTENTS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of international relations theory and the case of the Lebanese state's relations with Syria between 1975 and 2002. It aims to answer the following questions: (1) Why has Lebanon generally "bandwagoned" with Syria, a country which has managed to intervene in and subdue it at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty? (2) How have Lebanese state officials, along with other political actors, tried to manipulate Syria for their own interests, whether to defend Lebanese sovereignty, to maintain and increase their status, or to contain and appease their rivals and opponents? (3) Parallel to the discussions generated by these two questions, which kinds of theory are relevant to or best explain Lebanese relations with Syria? Specifically this study demonstrates that the behavior of a penetrated weak state, Lebanon, toward a regional middle power, Syria, cannot usefully be explained by simple realism's state-to-state power balancing model. Rather, it is necessary to differentiate the multitude of state (office-holders) and sub-state actors. In addition, their behavior can only be explained by a combination of factors identified in a variety of theories: reaction to an external threat (simple realism) which explain a very few cases; "omni-alignments" against interrelated threats (complex realism) which result from the weaknesses of the Lebanese state and which explain much more; still powerful transstate ties (constructivism) which themselves needed to be understood in terms of the contradiction between sovereignty and identity and which have some impact; and complex interdependence and shared interests (pluralism) which generally exist between Lebanese and Syrian elites.

I. INTRODUCTION : ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This study focuses on current Lebanese-Syrian relations, especially with regard to the Lebanese state's dealings with Syria, and, specifically, on Lebanese political actors' attempts to both use and appease Syria in order to maintain their interests and a measure of autonomy. The aim of this introductory chapter is to lay out the broad perspective reflected in the thesis by briefly surveying the literature on Lebanese-Syrian relations, and by situating this doctoral research conceptually within the fields of international relations theory.

1. BRIEF SURVEY OF PREVIOUS WORKS

There is an abundance of works dealing with Lebanese and Syrian affairs, with the number of studies on Lebanese-Syrian relations dramatically increasing after the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, which saw the beginning of Syria's continuing deep involvement in Lebanon. Most of the literature focuses on Syria's motivations and behaviour. Numerous interpretations of Syrian policy are put forward by a variety of academics and journalists, with analyses falling mainly into one of two categories, according to whether they see Syrian policy toward Lebanon as being based on external or internal factors.

Works representing the former trend are Avi-Ran(1991), Chalala(1985), Dawisha(1980 and 1984), Deeb(1989), Faksh(1992), Harris(1985), Hinnebusch(1986 and 1998), and Seale(1988). Their interpretations are essentially that, while the conflict in Lebanon gave Syria both opportunities and causes for intervening in Lebanon, which allowed it to help its allies in difficult situations and to pacify the country as an arbiter, the turmoil also raised the possibility that it would give Israel an excuse to intervene militarily in Lebanon. Since Lebanon, especially the Biqaa area, is known as the "soft underbelly" of Syria, Syrian policy was determined by the

threat to its national security presented by the civil war, and by the possibility that the resulting partition would open the door to an Israeli presence in Lebanon. As a result, the Syrian intervention aimed mainly to save Lebanon from partition and to stop the conflict, although Damascus sometimes fanned the fighting to its advantage. The Israeli threat continues to be a key factor even now that the conflict has ended.

Works subscribing to the "internal" interpretation include Abukhalil(1994), Lawson(1996), Ma'oz(1988), and Pipes(1990). Among these, a sectarian explanation maintains that Asad's Alawi-dominated regime feared that Muslim, especially Sunni, power and success in Lebanon would affect Sunni behaviour in Syria and ultimately lead to a Sunni rebellion against the Ba'th regime. According to this view, Syrian policy toward Lebanon was shaped by the internal security situation of the regime. An economic explanation, such as that offered by Lawson, argues rather that poor economic conditions, such as capital shortages, led the Asad regime to seek to exploit Lebanese economic assets as a means of maintaining the loyalty of Syrian clients of Lebanese businesses.

There are a number of weaknesses in the latter explanation. First of all, since Asad seized power in 1970, the domestic condition has been stable, except for a few occasions such as the Hama revolt in 1982 and the period of his illness between 1983 and 1984. By subordinating the sub-state groups in Syria, Asad freed his policy from domestic pressures and was thus able to focus on a foreign policy based on national interest, the main thrust of which was to protect Syria from the Israeli threat. This was so even to the extent that Syria aligned with the Maronites in 1976, so as to avoid the possibility of a decisive Muslim-PLO victory inviting Israeli penetration into Lebanon. A second weakness is that, although it is true that there has been a degree of Lebanese-Syrian economic interdependence, with Syrian elites profiting from it mainly through smuggling, economic interest does not seem to offer a major explanation for Asad's behaviour. During the civil war, "the intervention antagonised

his Soviet patron and even when—in the eighties—the Syrian economy was actually in crisis, he continued policies in Lebanon which jeopardised aid from Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states (drives against the PLO and Maronites) and then from Iran (conflict with Hizbollah)."[1] During the post-civil war period, Syria has continued to support Hizbollah's military activities in the South, although it has occasionally constricted the group lest Israel intervene militarily. If Syria were to force the group to cease military activity against Israel, it could gain economically in terms both of American and European investment and aid. In the long run, Syrian behaviour and motivations seem mainly to be formed by its security concerns with regard to Israel. Since Syria has tended to favour the status-quo and tried to stabilise Lebanon, the Lebanese government has generally taken a positive view of Syria, which could explain the Lebanese bandwagoning vis-à-vis Syria.

In a number of works which focus on Lebanese political and economic dynamics during the civil war, representatives of which are Abul-Husn(1998), Deeb(1980), Dessouki(1988), Koury(1976), Hanf(1993), Petran(1987), Rabinovich(1985), and Sirreiyeh(1989), there are certainly references to Syrian factors. Since Syria in particular was one of the states which were deeply involved in the Lebanese conflict by using transstate ties with Lebanese sub-state groups, the interplay between domestic and external factors was decisive in shaping the conflict; and both sets of factors were so interconnected as to be scarcely distinguishable, as has been maintained in many studies, such as Day(1986), Gordon(1983), and Haddad(1985).

There have only been a few studies, such as Hitti(1989), Salame(1988), and Salem (1994), which focus on the Lebanese state and its foreign policy. This is because, unlike the countries "where foreign policy remains insulated from the influence of domestic politics and well guarded by the regime in power, the demarcation line

[1] Hinnebusch (1998) p.142.

between foreign and domestic politics is blurred in Lebanon."[2] It is indeed very difficult to trace the foreign policy of the divided and penetrated Lebanese state. "What is foreign policy and what is domestic policy in a country thoroughly dominated by foreign forces?"[3] Salame asks whether it is possible that the polarised and dominated Lebanese state even has a foreign policy at all. To answer these questions, Salem's following statement seems suggestive. "With most of the country under domination by outside powers and the state having virtually no area of uncontested jurisdiction, all policy, even that which would otherwise be considered domestic, must be negotiated and cleared through outside channels. In a sense, all policy is foreign policy."[4] All of these explanations place great emphasis on the dominance over Lebanon of external power, especially that of Syria, and Lebanon's ability to influence or react to Syrian hegemony has been neglected. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature.

Have Lebanon and its elites been simple puppets of Syria? This study argues not. It took Syria years to assert hegemony over the fracturous Lebanese factions and it could only do so by striking alliances with Lebanese elites and movements which, in principle, required it to make concessions to their interests and concede them a modicum of autonomy. The post civil war period may be one of Syrian hegemony, but rule from Damascus is very much indirect through Lebanese clients who have their own interests.

Since the same difficulties in distinguishing between domestic and foreign policy can be seen in the case of post-war Japan under the "indirect rule" of US occupation, it is worth considering the extent to which the Lebanese experience during the post-war period is analogous to the experience of Japan, referring to the discussion of

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[2] Hitti (1989) p.3.
[3] Salem (1994) p.69.
[4] Salem (1994) p.69.

Japanese "diplomacy" under the GHQ/SCAP[5] occupation after the Second World War (from 1945 to 1951). Iokibe maintains that there was no Japanese "diplomacy" in a formal sense, but there was a de facto diplomacy between the Japanese government and the GHQ/SCAP within Tokyo. In other words, although Japanese sovereignty was restricted and the relationship was not based on equality, the Japanese government continued a daily and close form of diplomacy with the GHQ/SCAP in order to secure the incorporation of its opinions in GHQ/SCAP policies and also in order to be able to implement these policies.[6]

It therefore seems meaningful to talk about the Lebanese state and its "diplomacy" under the foreign power, Syria. This study aims, by focusing on how the Lebanese state has coped with Syrian power since the outbreak of Lebanese civil war, to answer the following questions:

(1) Why has Lebanon generally "bandwagoned" with Syria, a country which has managed to intervene in and subdue it at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty?

(2) How have Lebanese state officials, along with other political actors, tried to manipulate Syria for their own interests, whether to defend Lebanese sovereignty, to maintain and increase their status, or to contain and appease their rivals and opponents?

(3) Parallel to the discussions generated by these two questions, which kinds of theory are relevant to or best explain Lebanese relations with Syria?

The following section offers a conceptualisation of Lebanese and Syrian policy and behaviour, and of relations between the two countries.

2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THEORIES RELEVANT TO THIS STUDY

[5] GHQ/SCAP means General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

[6] For the details of this discussion, see Iokibe (1997 and 1999).

The classic paradigm of interstate politics, that of "simple realism", focuses on states' interactions. Interstate politics is conceptually distinguished from, although linked indirectly to, domestic politics. States are the agencies through which sub-state actors deal with each other. In other words, *transnational interactions*, the movement of material or non-material items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a state or an interstate organisation, are neglected. This classic paradigm is illustrated in Figure I .



Figure I

The additional lines drawn in Figure II indicate transnational interactions. Transnational relations are those networks, associations or interactions which cut across national societies, creating linkages between individuals, groups, organisations, and communities within and between different states. A distinguishing feature of transnational relations is that they by-pass states, because they operate within the social domain and beyond direct state control (Figure II) .[7]



Figure II

This study will argue that Lebanese relations with Syria are best conceptualised by

[7] These two models were constructed based on Nye and Keohane (1972) and Mcgrue (1992).

the latter model. In this regard, it is important to recognise that Lebanon has not been a unitary actor and that powerful sub-state actors in Lebanon have in most cases kept trans-state ties with Syria. In effect, the state-centric and state-to-state power balancing approach, which is the backbone of what might be called "simple realism", seems not to be generally applicable to Lebanese-Syrian case. Rather, a modified or "complex" version of realism which includes domestic threats, and some theoretical rivals of realism such as constructivism (identity) and pluralism (shared interests between elites) seem to be more relevant to this case. The combination of these three theories, complex realism, constructivism, and pluralism, allows a better understanding of the complex dimensions of Lebanese-Syrian relations.

Simple realism assumes that, as a government represents the whole of society, its chief foreign policy concern is security threats, and that as threats are external, the state elite behaves as a rational actor trying to manage the international scene. This assumption seems applicable to Syria where Asad consolidated his power and tried to maximise the autonomy and security of the state in regional arenas by exploiting the great powers. But, is it applicable to Lebanon threatened by both Israel and Syria? Were simple realism to adequately model Lebanese behaviour, we would expect Lebanon to find support against these threats in great powers, particularly the USA or its traditional Western ally, France. It could appease Israel and the USA as a counter-balance to Syria, or it could appease Syria as a counter-balance to Israel. In fact, except in a few cases where Lebanon has allied with Israel and the USA against Syria, it has generally appeased and "bandwagoned" with Syria. Simple realism does not explain this policy, particularly why it tends to appease rather than balance against Syria, the most sustained threat to its sovereignty.

Let us turn to complex realism to see if it provides a better key to explaining Lebanese behaviour. Complex realism assumes that unstable governments in the Third World states are threatened not only externally but also by groups within their

own societies, and that these external and internal threats are interrelated. Lebanese sub-state groups are traditionally powerful and able to form ties with outside powers which threaten Lebanese autonomy or security, thereby constituting a threat to the Lebanese state. In this theory, Lebanese elites could bandwagon with Syria, as a lesser threat, in order to deal with a perceived greater internal threat; alternatively, it could align itself with domestic groups, clients of Israel or the West, to balance against Syria. In general, the latter case has been rare, but complex realism cannot fully tell us why this type of policy has not predominated, especially given Syria's on-going violations of Lebanese sovereignty since the outbreak of civil war. Other explanations such as identity issues and shared interests are neglected by realism, and we must therefore resort to other theoretical approaches which do take account of them.

"Constructivists insist that interstate relations are contingent on the way *identity* is constructed; in the Middle East, sub- and suprastate identities compete with state identity, inspire transstate movements, and constrain purely state-centric behaviour."[8] If the identity of Lebanese sub-state groups can be said to be one that is transstate Arab, the Lebanese state cannot readily align against Syria without violating deep-rooted norms. If, however, these groups see their identity as being primarily sovereign Lebanese, the state is in a position where it can align itself against Syria. Until recently, Muslim Lebanese and some Christian Lebanese, a majority of the population, seem to have placed more emphasis on Arab identity than on Lebanese identity. However, it is impossible not to notice that identity is changing. Considering the current Lebanese debate over the Syrian presence, in which both Christians and Muslims participate, the unequal Syrian-Lebanese relationship seems to have encouraged the widespread propagation of a Lebanese-

[8] Hinnebusch (2002a) p.2.

first sense of identity. Is this situation likely to result in a change in the behaviour of Lebanese state officials toward Syria?

To answer this question we will find that the theoretical approach of pluralism is relevant. "For pluralists, Middle East states are not unitary and impermeable, as (simple) realism assumes, but fragmented and penetrated and hence less capable of pursuing realist 'reason of state'."[9] Pluralism also alerts the analyst to the potential of transstate economic ties to generate shared interests and "complex interdependence" which can account for interstate cooperation, reduce conflict, and supersede threats as the main determinant of relations. In the case of Lebanon, the dynamics of power among key politicians has generated an interdependence between Lebanese and Syrian elites.

In the following sections, each of these theories and its relevance to the Lebanese-Syrian case will be discussed in detail. Finally, based on this discussion, a brief explanation will be put forward of the main phases in the evolution of the dynamics of Lebanese state and sub-state complexes, and Syrian behaviour.

3. SIMPLE REALISM : THE STATE AS A RATIONAL ACTOR AMIDST SYSTEMIC THREATS

In "classic" or "simple" realist accounts, the behaviour of small powers, such as Syria and Lebanon, is intimately shaped by the chronic intervention of great powers in the region. Historically, the broad motivation for the great powers to have penetrated into the Middle East has been its strategic transit location between the East and the West, its vast oil reserves, and the protection of Israel. On the one hand, they have tried to prevent any Middle Eastern state or group of states from achieving regional hegemony and from forming a Middle East system opposed to

[9] Hinnebusch (2002a) p.2.

their presence. On the other hand, Middle Eastern states and also sub-state groups within them have tried to exploit the resources and leverage of the global powers to their advantage.[10] Since the Middle East has been continuously penetrated by the great powers for about two hundreds years, Brown has categorised the Middle East as a "penetrated system".[11]

"Global penetration does not mean that the region lacks all autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy."[12] Since it is generally impossible for even the great powers to fully control regional issues, regional autonomy may manifest itself in the issues to which they do not pay much attention or have a vital interest. This was especially so during the Cold War period, when superpower rivalry forced the great powers to support the interests of client states on regional issues, especially where "the client's vital interests were more at stake than those of the global patron."[13] In effect, the Cold War made it possible for local states to maintain their autonomy. As will be seen, bi-polarity presented Syria opportunities to intervene in Lebanon, and Lebanon chances to resist.

The behaviour of local states was also influenced by the regional environment, as will be shown here. In the Middle East, as simple realism claims, the built-in feature of a state system, anarchy, has generated a profound insecurity and a continuous power struggle. In fact, the Arab-Israeli and the Gulf arenas, among the most enduring and intense conflict centres in the world, are of course located in the Middle East.[14] According to simple realism, threats lead states to create a counter-balance to them, or (more rarely but more likely in the case of weak states) to bandwagon with or appease powerful threatening states. Situations of this kind have led to states

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[10] Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p.9.
[11] Brown (1984) pp.3-5.
[12] Hinnebusch (2002a) pp.4-5.
[13] Hinnebusch (2002a) p.5.
[14] Hinnebusch (2002a) p.1.

creating alliances or building up their military power. There is one regional middle power[15] which could be said to behave as simple realism predicts: Syria.

Once Syria became a central force in the Arab-Israeli arena, how did this regional middle power behave? After Hafez Asad consolidated his authoritarian rule[16], the Syrian regime has, by subordinating and restricting sub-state group activities, generally enjoyed the internal stability, which made it possible for a state to conduct its foreign policy relatively free from domestic constraints. This enabled Syria, as realism holds, to behave as a rational actor, effectively coping with external threats from Israel by accommodating its foreign policy to the changing regional circumstance. Thus, although Syria aligned with the USSR to increase its military capabilities in a bipolar world, Asad sought, in the face of US backing of Israel, to put pressure on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories by exploiting US fears of instability in the Middle East. While the Reagan administration treated Syria as a Soviet surrogate, Asad tried to retain a degree of independence by refusing to sign a friendship treaty with the USSR, though he reluctantly ended up doing so.[17]

These domestic and external conditions affected Syrian behaviour in the regional sphere, especially with regard to Lebanon. Israel has been Syria's main enemy and security preoccupation, because it was constituted at the expense of historic Syria, in

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[15] The concept of regional middle powers suggests states which play key roles in their regional arena, but which should be treated as middle powers on the global scene. It is said that they have following characteristics. Firstly, while their regional behavioral pattern is similar to that of great powers, their goals and spheres of influence are more limited than those of great powers, and they mainly focus on regional affairs. Secondly, regional middle powers, in general, have leaders who are enjoying extra-regional influence and aspiration. Thirdly, while these powers are dependent on great powers, especially for economic and technological assistance, they hope to maximise autonomy by diversifying their economic links and by balancing the regional impact of great powers. Fourthly, regional middle powers need to possess enough resources which are basis of their power. [Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp.7-9.]

[16] For the concept of authoritarian rule and the Syrian case, see Hinnebusch (1990).

1967 seized Syria's natural defence against it, the Golan Heights, and has enjoyed permanent military and economic security as well as the potential to outflank Syria through Jordan and Lebanon. Calculating both military and economic capabilities rationally, the Asad regime pursued ambitious but realistic goals vis-à-vis Israel: recovering the occupied lands (above all the Golan Heights) and achieving Palestinian rights, notably in the West Bank and Gaza, as part of a comprehensive peace under UN Resolution 242. In this context, Israel has also been Syria's main competitor for influence in Greater Syria (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestine area) which Asad considered his natural sphere of influence and over which Syria defined itself as a "parent state" with special rights and responsibilities. Following Jordan's repression of the Palestinian fedayeen in "Black September" of 1970 Jordan became a stable country, and the Syrian-Israeli conflict was displaced from its borders to Lebanon, with Lebanese permeability and turmoil creating the likelihood of direct Syrian-Israeli military confrontation in Lebanon. Syria sought the power to balance against the threat from Israel.[18] This effort inevitably affected Syrian policy toward Lebanon, where Syria developed a "deterrence relationship"[19] with Israel and alliances with various Lebanese sub-state groups to increase its security.

What, in contrast to a regional middle power like Syria, is the behavioural pattern of a weak state such as Lebanon? As Handel pointed out, weak states "form the largest class of states and have the most diverse membership", which make it "difficult to assign them any common denominator other than their relative weakness."[20] In this regard, Hey's suggestion that the concept of "weakness" is comparable to that of "strength" seems to be relevant.[21] "Whereas one of the most

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[17] Hinnebusch (2002b) pp.147-153.
[18] Hinnebusch (2002b) pp.143-144.
[19] For the details of this concept, see Evron (1987).
[20] Handel (1981) p.30.
[21] Hey (1995) p.203.

important characteristics of the great powers is their military strength and capacity for self-defence, the weak states are continually preoccupied with the question of survival. They have difficulty in defending themselves against the great and middle powers, against a coalition of weak states, or even against a single weak state."[22] Such defence may take the form of balancing against threats but more often involves bandwagoning with them. In general, weak states must appease and at most take defensive positions against the great and super powers. Occasionally, however, a weak state may defy a great or super power with a certain degree of success.[23]

As for Lebanon, it occasionally exaggerated the "communist threat" and portrayed itself as a barrier to defend the "capitalist world" in the Middle East in order to win Western support against threats from its stronger Soviet-surrogate Arab neighbours, such as Syria. Using this rhetoric, Amin Jumayiel allied with Israel and the USA against Syria during the first half of 1980s, a rare case of "balancing" against a threat.

However, this picture of USA-USSR confrontation in the Middle East should not be exaggerated: both states managed, sometimes exercising restraint, to ensure that their rivalry there would not escalate, making it harder for small states to acquire their protection.[24] Thus, in 1976, Lebanese territory was tacitly divided into Israeli and Syrian spheres of influence, since their patrons, the USA and the USSR, did not want the conflict in Lebanon to invite a direct confrontation between them. In other words, Lebanon had become a victim in the name of prevention of future superpower military conflict. Under such conditions, Lebanon's only option as a weak state was usually to bandwagon with—appease—its more powerful neighbours, Israel and Syria.

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[22] Handel (1981) p.36.
[23] Handel (1981) p.39.
[24] Halliday (1997) p.9.

The end of the Cold War in the global arena, especially the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of American military hegemony, has had profound regional effects; but it has not yet much affected Lebanon's options. For many regional states in the Middle East, the bipolarity which made it possible for the USSR to put a check on US power there and which also made it possible for regional states and sub-state groups to use superpower rivalry to their advantage provided favourable circumstances for the maintenance of regional autonomy. Under the current USA-dominated global military hegemony, economic conflicts among the capitalist core states may give regional states the opportunity to exploit their differences, but this phenomenon appears differently from region to region. It seems that for the Middle East the world is now effectively unipolar, since the USA has replaced the former USSR power after defeating the Iraqi attempt to reshape the regional system against it and no other power contests its hegemony in the region.[25]

This situation has reduced the autonomy of many regional states in the Middle East and forced them into a greater dependency on the USA, though some have tried to counter the American hegemony by reinforcing their ties with potentially countervailing powers. For Syria, constraints have increased. On the one hand, Syria, aiming to dilute US hegemony, has been cultivating ties with China, North Korea, and Russia in the military field, and with Europe, Japan, and South Korea in the economic field.[26] While doing this Syria has to take carefully into consideration US interests in the Middle East, lest the Syrian presence in Lebanon be questioned by the American government. On the other hand, though Lebanon lost its strategic value as a defender of capitalist world in the region, the Hariri government has tried to maintain close relations with the USA to contain Syrian power, and has also been cultivating ties with Europe, especially France (Lebanon's traditional patron), as

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[25] Etheshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p.11. /Hinnebusch (2002a) p.6.
[26] Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p.11.

well as Japan and South Korea. Though these relations are mainly limited to the realm of economics, Lebanon anticipates that these forces could play a more active role in the political field, thereby putting pressure on Syria.

Overall, simple realism seems to be explanatory of Syrian foreign policy behaviour but of only a few Lebanese episodes such as the manoeuvres of Jumayiel and Hariri, which seem to partially fit this theory.

4. COMPLEX REALISM : INTERRELATED EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREATS

In simple realism, there are, traditionally, two explanations for a state's alignment decisions. The twin notions of balance of power and balance of threat, along with their bandwagoning versions, emphasise the constraints and opportunities that exist external to a state. In contrast, society-centred approaches such as pluralism view alignment decisions as being primarily driven by internal political incentives and risks. The work of David represents a bridge between that of theorists who focus on external factors and the work of those who emphasise internal factors. David expects that when the primary threat is internal (coup, revolution, and/or insurgency), the political leader of a state may seek an international alignment that promises to protect the regime from this internal threat, even if this state is also viewed as an external threat, but when this external threat is deemed secondary to the internal one. His work is based on the assumption that in many countries the political process lacks legitimacy for a majority of the population, and thus internal threats to the state elite may be more urgent than external threats.[27]

This complex realism, which sees primary internal threats as an explanatory factor, has influenced the omnialignment theory advocated by Harknett and Vandenberg.

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[27] David (1991) pp.233-256. /Harknett and Vandenberg (1997) pp.117-118.

However, in their analysis, reactions to interrelated threats—the presence of mutually reinforcing external and internal security challenges—are theoretically different from responses to a primarily external or a primarily internal threat. Reactions to interrelated threats require a state elite to take the behavioural pattern of "omnialignments—international alignments that use a combined strategy to deal with internal and external challenges that feed off one another."[28]

Interrelated threats generally occur when conditions that foster internal instability[29] are present along with an external power that represents an immediate security challenge. This creates a condition in which both international and domestic factors led to the creation and the potential suppression of threats.[30] In this situation, alignments require state leaders to cope with multiple threats from different directions. These threats are often concerned with the situation where external rival states support internal opposition movements or insurrection.[31] In the Lebanese-Syrian case, interrelated threats mean that state officials in Lebanon have to respond simultaneously to both state level and sub-state level influence from Syria.

There are two basic responses to both external and internal threats: "balancing is alignment driven by the desire to find security in resisting or defeating one's most pressing threats; bandwagoning is alignment driven by the desire to find security in appeasing one's most pressing threats."[32] As a result, it is convenient to use the following schematic diagram for omnialignment in the presence of interrelated

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[28] Harknett and Vandenberg (1997) p.119.
[29] Three conditions contribute to the presence of internal threats: (1) diversion of identity; people identify with transnational and/or suprastate identity other than with their own state. (2) lack of regime's legitimacy; a regime's power base is narrow and thus the legitimacy is questioned at the national level. (3) a state apparatus actually controls the predominant source of power and wealth in society. [Harknett and Vandenberg (1997) pp.121-122.]
[30] Harknett and Vandenberg (1997) p.122.
[31] Harknett and Vandenberg (1997) p.123.
[32] Harknett and Vandenberg (1997) p.124.

threats.[33]

		Strategy Toward Internal Threats	
		Balance	Bandwagon
Strategy	Balance	I	II
Toward External Threats	Bandwagon	III	IV

The strategies of state officials in Lebanon toward Syria will, except in few instances, generally fall into category III, with Lebanese political elites using Syrian help to threaten or repress internal opposition, or category IV, with Lebanese officials winning support from Lebanese sub-state groups with transstate ties to Syria by supporting Syria against Israel.

The reason why Lebanese state officials normally align with Syria seems to be largely due to Syrian status-quo behaviour. Since the Lebanese state has had, traditionally and in common with many Third World states, little power to regulate social relations, there has been rampant manoeuvrability of strong sub-state actors which have kept transnational ties with other states, especially Syria. It therefore seems impossible for Lebanese state officials to ignore the effects of interstate penetration: manipulation of the Lebanese domestic political system by Syria. In general, penetration is more effective in open societies like Lebanon, and the success of penetration is also dependent on the intention of the penetrating state. If a state seeks to establish or *strengthen an alliance* with a targeted state by manipulating public and elite attitudes, this behaviour is unlikely to be viewed as a grave threat to state independence. However, if a state seeks alignment by *subverting the regime* of the other state, the targeted regime will probably take a hostile attitude toward the state conducting the campaign.[34] Since the Syrian case is generally of the former category, Lebanese state officials have generally found it worthwhile to cooperate

[33] Harknett and Vandenberg (1997) p.127.
[34] Walt (1987) pp.47-48.

with and appease the Syrian regime so as to be able to deal with strong sub-state groups.

These interrelated threats are especially sensitive to Maronite officials who emphasise Lebanese sovereignty. However, since they generally recognise Syrian status-quo behaviour toward Lebanon, they, reluctantly or not, tend to choose to bandwagon, except for the staunchest anti-Syrian figures. In the sections which follow there is a discussion of the possibility that identity and shared interests factors could also explain the Lebanese bandwagoning toward Syria.

5. CONSTRUCTIVISM : SOVEREIGNTY VS TRANSSTATE IDENTITY

The Middle East state system is characterised by an uneasy relation between identity and state sovereignty. Indeed, the process of consolidating its own "nation-state" in the region was a demanding task for each state elite. Borders were not established through a process of domestic consolidation and external war, and the power of state over society, divided generally along ethnic, religious, tribal, and/or linguistic lines, has consequently been limited. States have frequently been challenged from both inside and outside. Western colonial states, in fact, drew boundaries without paying attention to the hopes and history of local people in the Middle East. As the boundaries of Lebanon and Syria were indeed drawn on the basis of imperial calculations, the resulting division of the two countries with arbitrary Lebanese-Syrian border and the tension between state and national identities have led to a situation in which loyalty to the individual states has been contested by both sub-state (sectarian) and supra-state (Arabism, Islam) identities. Irredentist feelings have been historically preserved. In other words, Middle Eastern politics, particularly politics of the Levant, has been characterised by separatist movements, border disputes, and supra-state ideology advocating the dissolution of

existing states and the establishment of a larger entity in the region.[35]

These trends were strongly connected with and also influenced by pan-Arabism which was at its peak in 1950s and 1960s under Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser. In the years before 1967, when Egypt was a centre of pan-Arab influence, his appeal for widespread Arab "unity of ranks", backed by his enormous popularity in the Middle East, mobilised a number of Arab states and people under his banner. However, Egypt's overwhelming defeat in 1967, the death of Nasser in 1970, and the dramatic changes of Egyptian foreign and domestic policies (infitah) severely damaged the prestige and appeal of this movement, and reduced its ability to shape and lead opinion in other Arab states. The relative weakening of Egyptian power had important repercussions for individual states and thus for the overall pattern of relationships between states within the system.[36]

Since the decline in Egyptian activity and influence throughout the region decreased the major source of regional systemic pressure, other Arab governments gained more latitude to decide their own policy. In addition, Egyptian inability to dominate events on the basis of pan-Arabism provided opportunities for other major Arab states to play a greater role in the affairs of the system and to develop their own local spheres of influences. In the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia surfaced as the predominant power by using financial aid and religious (Islamic) ties. In the Levant, Syria was successful in establishing a modified sphere of influence with arms supplies from the Soviet Union and financial support from the oil-producing Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia.[37]

Barnett cites three indicators in support of the claim that Arab states came to respect each other's sovereignty and norms for diplomatic activity. There were the

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[35] Gause (1997) pp.201-203. /Hinnebusch (2002a) p.7.
[36] Noble (1984) pp.56-59.
[37] Noble (1984) pp.57-59.

decrease of attempts to unite Arab states, the shift at Arab summit meetings away from debates over political unification, and the little success of Arab leaders in identifying themselves as champions of pan-Arabism.[38]

The consolidation of state sovereignty in the Arab world required an increase of state control over the societies in the region, and Syria under Hafez Asad reflected this process. However, the consolidation of state sovereignty did not completely free Arab states from the pressure of pan-Arabism identity. Since state identity did not fully replace pan-Arab identity in most Arab states, the legitimacy of a regime is still dependent on its being seen to act for Arab interests, albeit nominally in most cases.[39] In the case of Syrian intervention in Lebanon, pan-Arab sentiments and Syrian ties with both Lebanese state and sub-state groups, not all necessarily based on pan-Arabism, gave Syria a motivation to intervene, justified its intervention, and further helped legitimate its actions to other states in the Arab world.[40] On the other hand, "Syria has been most careful to maintain the forms of Lebanese sovereignty while consolidating its protectorate over (Lebanon)."[41] In sum, although most Arab states, including Syria, still take into consideration the symbols of pan-Arabism, their policies are performed in the ways that are consistent with the states' sovereignty and which assume that the building of spheres of influence is a legitimate pursuit.

In contrast, it was Lebanon which was the noteworthy exception to the process of consolidating state sovereignty in the Arab region. While state control over society was consolidated in other Arab states, the Lebanese state was not only shattered but the society was still subjected to penetration by outside powers from which sub-state Lebanese groups sought support and assistance.[42] In Lebanon, there are two

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[38] For the details, see Barnett (1995) pp.506-507.
[39] Hinnebusch (2002a) pp.9-10.
[40] Gause (1997) p.208.
[41] Gause (1992) p.466.
[42] Gause (1992) p.461.

significant socio-political phenomena that have reflected as well as reinforced loyalty to the sectarian community rather than to the state. One is the fact that most political parties in Lebanon have not been nationally based. Few political parties have been integrative and representative of the country as a whole, and they have represented and derived their support from their own communities. In addition, parliamentary seats as well as ministerial and bureaucratic posts have been allocated along sectarian lines. Another is that since the central government has been generally weak, private interests have tended to dominate over public interests, with sectarian identities having the ability to meet the material, security, and status needs of their members. In effect, sectarian affiliations seem to continue to be the most important basis for Lebanese identities, and, consequently, of sub-state groups in Lebanon being formed by sectarian affiliations; but equally important, these sects also hold to supra or transstate loyalties or identities which compromise their loyalty to the Lebanese state. Lebanon has traditionally had four major sectarian communities: Maronites, Sunnis, Shi'ites, and Druzes, and Muslim and a few Christian groups have maintained Arab sentiment, whether strongly or not, and thus also ties with their Syrian counterparts. When the Lebanese government ignored this feeling and attempted to establish a counter-balance to Syria, as in the case of Jumayiel's conclusion of the May 17 Agreement with Israel in 1983, government legitimacy was called into question with disastrous results.

In relation to this, Walt writes, "when weak or unstable regimes rely on ideological arguments to bolster their legitimacy, this reliance affects their alliance choices. In particular, weak regimes may try to enhance their popularity by seeking membership in a large and popular movement (such as identifying with pan-Arabism). By aligning with a larger group, a weak regime may hope to convince its

citizens that it is pursuing worthy and widely accepted aims."[43] Since the sub-state groups have generally had the power to influence Lebanese state officials, they have needed to take into account of pan-Arab tendencies held by the major communities. In other words, the actors at state level have found it difficult to ignore their pan-Arab identity and as a result Lebanese sovereignty has been weakened.

However, the long history of unequal relations between Lebanon and Syria seem to be weakening pan-Arab identity and strengthening a sense of Lebanon-first identity among the Lebanese people, including Muslims. One example is that influential Muslims have joined in the recent discussions over the Syrian presence, and some have indeed demanded that Syria show greater respect for Lebanese sovereignty, while admitting that there are special bonds between Lebanon and Syria. However, the Lebanese state still bandwagons with Syria, except in a few cases. It is at this point that it is useful to consider the explanatory power of pluralism.

6. PLURALISM : COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE AND SHARED INTERESTS

Pluralism can shed light on a variety of non-state forces relevant to international relations: actors that can be called suprastate (international organisation), transstate (transnational corporations), and nonstate (professional associations and social movements). Pluralism also focuses on the complex interdependence created by their participation in international relations. According to Keohane and Nye, complex interdependence has three main characteristics: the participation of actors other than states; an agenda of interstate relations consisting of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy; and ineffectiveness of the use of military force as regards certain issues, notably economic relations. In addition, they distinguish between the two dimensions of *sensitivity* and *vulnerability* as keys to an

[43] Walt (1987) p.39.

understanding of power in complex interdependence. Interdependence makes countries sensitive to what happens in the other country and vulnerable to high risks and costs if they attempt to severe their connection with the country in question.[44]

In the case of Lebanese-Syrian relations, the Lebanese state has not been unitary and Lebanese sub-state groups have had close connections with Syria. In effect, there have been some cooperative dimensions between the two countries, and not only multiple transnational and interstate economic ties, as interdependence theory maintains, but also shared political interests.

One example of economic interdependency can be found in relations between Beirut's financial community and the Syrians. Under a "Pax-Syriana" in the fall of 1976, the Lebanese banking sector was able to resume its activities, and Syrian enterprises were given an opportunity to once again use Lebanese investment capital.[45] After the Asad regime openly encouraged the private sector to play a greater role in Syria by introducing the Investment Law 10 in 1991, Lebanese banks, with other Lebanese entrepreneurs, have been able to operate in Syria benefiting from their geographical proximity. Syrian officials and politicians also have had economic interests in Lebanon, and it seems that these economic ties have increased the interest in cooperation with Syria among Lebanese state officials.

Their shared political interests mean that some Lebanese politicians on the one hand have exploited Syrian power to their advantage, for example maintaining their status and containing the power of their rivals, while Syria on the other hand has used these leaders to justify its presence in Lebanon. If one applies the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability to the political field, to the extent that Lebanese state officials rely heavily on Syria as their power base their *sensitivity* is high. In contrast,

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[44] Keohane and Nye (1977) pp.11-29.
[45] Lawson (1996) p.95.

if they also rely on other states and thereby diversify their power base, their *vulnerability* will decrease. However, since these political and economic interests seem to become vested interests, Lebanese state officials do not seem to give them up, and arguably continue their bandwagoning with regard to Syria. Indeed, these relations have become institutionalised in a form of indirect rule (discussed on pgs.27—34). Though there was recently a mounting trend among Lebanese to reconsider Lebanese-Syrian relations, a trend which might in future result in Lebanese officials being less attached to these interests, it ended in their vested interests still predominating.

In summary, state officials in Lebanon, though they have had differing perceptions of the Syrians, either positive or negative have had reason to choose to bandwagon with Syria.

7. LEBANESE STATE AND SUB-STATE COMPLEXES AND SYRIAN BEHAVIOUR

(1) Introduction

The interactions between Syrian and Lebanese actors explained by realism, complex realism, constructivism, and pluralism took place within two quite different structural contexts. From 1975—1989, it could be described as semi-anarchy and from 1989—, a model of indirect rule is more appropriate.

(2) Lebanon under Semi-Anarchy : From 1975 to 1989

During this period, since the function of most state structures came close to collapse, a system of "semi-anarchy" emerged. Since the mistrust between or within fighting groups generated ever smaller groups, and the conflict raged not only between sectarian groups but also within sectarian groups, the country became ever more fragmented. The multicommunal and open society in Lebanon provided a ready-

made arena for external powers to penetrate and to exploit the rival minority community fears in order to play a role inside the multicommunal state.

Indeed, the escalation of the Lebanese civil war had sprung not just from domestic factors but also from the triangular relationship between the three main non-Lebanese actors: Syria, Israel, and the PLO. According to Azar and Haddad, these actors undertook "strategic interventionism". The strategic interventionists, in seeking long-term influence, sought to control Lebanese institutions. Moreover, to ensure control over sub-state groups, they fanned not only inter-group conflict but also intra-group rivalries. In addition to this strategic interventionism, the USA, France, Libya, and Iran undertook "tactical interventionism", which means that (by contrast to strategic interventionists) they did not command enduring influence in Lebanese domestic affairs.[46]

Zartman subdivided internal conflicts with a substantial international dimension into the following types: internal rebellions which necessarily reflect regional conflicts because of transstate ties between populations; internal conflicts in which the fragile state identity breaks down and the sub-state groups rely on their "brothers" in neighbouring countries for support and assistance; internal conflicts in which the search for external resources of power has turned into proxy wars between external powers; and a residual group of internal conflicts in which one or both sub-state groups have enjoyed sanctuary and/or support from outside. Zartman classified the Lebanese case as the second type,[47] but it also had features of the other types. Nevertheless, the divided Lebanese identity played an important role in the outbreak of conflict, and Lebanese sub-state actors exploited the Syrians to their advantage.

Given the complex interplay between domestic and external factors in a

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[46] Azar and Haddad (1986) pp.1347-1348.
[47] Zartman (1995) p.4.

fragmented society, "semi-anarchy" could be defined as a model having the following characteristics. While government lacks a monopoly of the means of violence or legitimacy and while sub-state groups are armed and struggling for power, in most cases backed by external actors (these two features are generally shared with a condition of "full anarchy"), government continues to formally exist and sustains efforts to restore order, unlike in "full anarchy". In fact, it was surprising that the Lebanese government continued to formally exist. It nevertheless did, and its office holders remained actors, and to some extent continued to attempt to restore order and to defend Lebanon's sovereignty. This is why the civil war period can be called a system of only "semi-anarchy", not "full anarchy".

This study is concerned with the dynamics of relations between the remaining Lebanese government, the Lebanese sub-state actors, and Syria. In fact, the government in this "semi-anarchy" system took a number of measures to restore a "normal" state system, while exploiting or being exploited by foreign powers, especially Israel and Syria. These measures included several reconciliation efforts and the formation of governments. Theoretically, there are three types of cabinet which could have contributed to a restoration of order: a salvation cabinet in which every important sub-state community leader participated, especially zuama (plural of za'im)[48]; a technocrat cabinet focusing mainly on economic reconstruction; and a military cabinet formed mainly by military officers. While the latter two might have promoted the state interests against fragmenting forces, the increased zuama power, which resulted from the dependence of people on zuama to protect their lives and interests especially in civil war times, sometimes forced the government to choose the first option. The other government actions were associated with attempts at

[48] The three main criteria identified by Hottinger in delimiting the category of za'im are as follows: "local limitation of the group; tendency toward heredity of function;(and) exchange of economic support given to the clients against political

reunification of the Lebanese army and several economic reconstruction efforts.

Although the state made some attempts to recover order by these political, military, and economic strategies, sub-state and external actors had significant power, and when a state policy went against zuama and/or Syrian interests, the effort generally ended in failure. In addition, it was generally not until foreign intervention that talks for reconciliation were arranged. This was applicable to most cases of reconciliation efforts and, finally, the Ta'if Agreement in 1989, arranged mainly by Syria and Saudi Arabia.

(3) Lebanon after the Civil War and under Reconstructed Indirect Rule : Since 1989

Since 1989, as a result of the end of the Lebanese civil war, a normal political system has gradually been restored. Before presenting a framework for understanding the current political situation in Lebanon, it seems essential to consider a model for the "termination of civil war", the question of why and how the civil war ended, because this affected the post-Ta'if political situation in Lebanon.

There are a number of factors which can lead to the end of a civil war. Firstly, politicians and military planners generally assume that the shape of the post-war settlement in a civil war is a function of the military situation on the battlefield. From this viewpoint, a war ends when one or both sides have the will to accept the situation on the battlefield as a basis for peace. This stage might be reached when one side removes its adversary's will or ability to continue fighting, when one side gains its objectives, or when both sides calculate that the future costs of continuing the war, politically, militarily, and/or economically, exceed the potential benefits.[49] As a result, there are two theoretical possibilities from the viewpoint of a balance of

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loyalty coming from the clients." [Hottinger (1966) p.104.]

[49] King (1997) p.35.

power calculation by the protagonists. On the one hand, a civil war may end with one side's overwhelming military victory over the other, with the winner forcing the loser to accept a peace agreement.[50] On the other hand, a civil war may end in a stalemate, with no single group having a hope of victory, because power is equally balanced. In this case the parties lose interest in continuing the civil war.

A second set of factors, external influences, can also have profound effects on the course of the war and on the mediation process. Generally, foreign countries, particularly states bordering war zones, are not only influenced by the development of the internal war, but they also try to influence its conduct. For bordering countries, a protracted war incurs economic costs and the security threat of refugees flooding across the frontiers. On the positive side, they can profit from the selling of weapons and from smuggling. Broadly speaking, as long as a civil war continues, they are easily able to find reasons for intervention, such as the restoration of peace and the prevention of disaster. Therefore, in considering how a cease-fire has come into being and what its effects are, one needs to take into consideration the interests and behaviour of an external state.

In 1989, conflict in Lebanon was rampant, not only between sectarian groups but also within such groups, and no single leader had any hope of dominating the whole of the country. Externally, the Arab states had tolerated the continuation of the conflict, apparently calculating that the cost of toleration was lower than the cost of mediating to stop it. However, this situation was not to last. An increased Iraqi involvement in Lebanon in the form of the supply of arms to General Michael Awn, who claimed to be prime minister in place of Salim Hoss, as well as the continued support of the Lebanese Forces by Baghdad following the end of Iran-Iraq War, raised the dangerous possibility of a direct confrontation between Iraq and Syria in

[50] King (1997) p.12.

Lebanon. Most importantly, with the aborted 1988 presidential election bringing about the end of the pretence of a unified government, the division of Lebanon became a matter of urgency.[51] Had this occurred the situation would have been dangerous for both Syria and other Arab states, because the collapse of the Lebanese state would not only have created a cause for Israeli intervention in Lebanon but would also have had a spill-over impact on the whole Arab state system.

It was under these circumstances that Syria and Saudi Arabia mediated to bring about the Ta'if Agreement (The Document of National Accord), a settlement in which neither side was able to declare victory. The agreement only modified the "rules of the games" of the Lebanese First Republic, without altering its basic character, that of a confessional system. This was because zuama had generally increased their power during the civil war and Syria had an interest in continuing to mediate and manipulate the system's built-in rivalries.

This means that post-war Lebanon may, in form, be a "consociational democracy", but it is necessary to add some qualifications if the current Lebanese political system is to be judged from the point of the standard of "democracy" advocated by Dahl. He suggested that two axis are needed to assess democratisation: liberalisation (public contestation) and inclusiveness (participation).[52] In terms of inclusiveness, universal suffrage is formally guaranteed to all Lebanese, but there are some limitations with regard to liberalisation.

This "semi-democracy" situation is closely connected with Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. According to the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination in May 1991, the Lebanese government must "consult" with Syria in the field of politics, economics, security, science, and culture.[53] This writer's viewpoint is that this means

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[51] Norton (1991) p.460.
[52] Dahl (1971) p.7.
[53] Deegan (1993) pp.116-117.

that the current Lebanese state and sub-state complexes and Syrian behaviour are susceptible to analysis according to an "indirect rule" model. Though there have historically been many cases of indirect rule, it seems worthwhile referring to Japan under the indirect rule of the GHQ/SCAP after the Second World War. This is a good example of indirect rule and is useful for this discussion of Lebanon, for the following reasons. Firstly, both countries are strategically located. Japan was important for the USA strategy toward the Soviet Union and China (communist movement), and Lebanon is crucial for Syrian strategy toward Israel. Thus, both dominant states had to contain threats from and/or through subordinate states towards them. In other words, Lebanon can be said to be a buffer in a "Cold War" situation between Israel and Syria, as Japan was at that time. Secondly, the societies of both countries were and are permeable and open. As in Lebanon, Japanese society was divided over USA-USSR rivalries and was strongly influenced by the communist movement. Thirdly, both cases assumed "semi-democracy" after war and under occupation.

This model operates according to the following framework. Firstly, the dominant power tends to intervene in the political process, including parliamentary elections, to serve its interests. In Japan, the reestablishment of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) was made possible by the direct GHQ/SCAP intervention, since the GHQ/SCAP initially pushed for a thorough democratisation in Japan. After this occurred, the first post-war general elections were held in April 1946. Moreover, the GHQ/SCAP intended these elections to serve as a plebiscite on the issue of constitutional revision in general and on the GHQ/SCAP draft of the revision in particular, and so scheduled the elections to serve that purpose. Furthermore, the electoral processes are also influenced by the change of the dominant state's policy. In Japan, the candidates from the JCP were virtually wiped out by the "Red Purge",

winning no seats in 1952.[54] In the Lebanese 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections, the Syrians, on the one hand, frequently changed the electoral laws and showed interest in the formation of electoral lists to favour pro-Syrian candidates. The Lebanese candidates, on the other hand, tried to exploit Syrian power to their advantage, for such purposes as containing a rival's power.

The second aspect of this model is that the dominant power manages to carry out its policy by means of the state apparatus of the subordinate power. In Japan, the GHQ/SCAP made use of Japanese statesmen and the Japanese bureaucracy to implement its policy. In Lebanon, Syrian influence rests mainly on its ability to manipulate three leading political figures (or "Troika") to its advantage: the president, the prime minister, and the speaker of parliament.[55] Against this, officials of the subordinate state tend to maintain a balance between the intentions of the dominant power and those of its own people in order to protect their status. They also try to have their views taken into consideration in the dominant power's policies, and also to increase their interests and status by exploiting the dominant power.

Thirdly, the model assumes that it is generally impossible for a subordinate state to conduct its own security interest and diplomacy when this is against the dominant state's will, which effectively means a restriction of the subordinate state's sovereignty. In Japan, although the government tried to establish relations with communist countries, these activities were strictly constrained by the GHQ/SCAP, especially after the eruption of the Cold War. In Lebanon, the government has had to coordinate its policy toward Hizbollah and the Middle East Peace process with the Syrians, although Hariri tried several times to carry out his own policy and to maintain sovereignty in these affairs, mainly by means of his connections with the USA, France, and the Gulf states.

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[54] Fukui (1988) pp.164-165.
[55] Hudson (1999) p.31.

The model's fourth premise is that an economy-oriented leadership is required to rebuild the state following a state of war. Also, under indirect rule, it is essential that the leadership has close connections with the dominant power in order for its economic policies to be effected smoothly. In Japan, cabinets were formed under pro-Western Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara and Shigeru Yoshida. Since 1992 in Lebanon there have been, except for two years under Hoss, technocrat cabinets oriented toward economic reconstruction under Rafiq Hariri, who has generally been mindful of Syrian interests. An additional feature of a government of this type is that it tends, in the interests of efficient development, to centralise power and to emphasise specific economic departments. In Lebanon, Hariri has promoted economic development by emphasising construction, and this has been associated with considerable nepotism.

A fifth characteristic, according to the model, is that social freedoms are generally curtailed by dominant interests under the pretext of maintaining order. In Japan, the initial GHQ/SCAP policy aimed to facilitate a thorough democratisation by being clearly pro-labour, and a memorandum in October 1945 explicitly directed the Japanese government to encourage the organisation of labour unions. Nevertheless, it was the GHQ/SCAP that forced the public service general strike planned in February 1947 to be called off, the main reason for this being that the GHQ/SCAP feared that the strike would spill over into criticism of its presence.[56] In Lebanon, preceding parliamentary elections, the government made public order its top priority, at the expense of civil liberties for similar reasons.[57]

Since the press and electronic mass media play a considerable role in creating public opinion, which is inevitably sometimes critical, the dominant power cannot but be sensitive to the activities of media and attempts to impose censorship. In

[56] Fukui (1988) pp.174-176.
[57] Harik (1998) p.145.

Japan, the mass media were under tight control by the SCAP/GHQ throughout the period of indirect rule. At the beginning of this period, a system of control was established for both press and radio through the enforcement of rigid rules known as the "press and radio code". The strict adherence to these codes was ensured by informal guidance and direction from the CIE of the GHQ/SCAP, and by the CCD's pre-publication censorship of the CIS.[58] "Dissemination of information about the censorship system itself also was strictly controlled."[59] In Lebanon, the Hariri government, presumably backed by Syria, curtailed freedom and pluralism, and decided to reduce the number of authorised television stations in 1996, the policies of which were dominated by leading pro-regime figure's interests.

The model's sixth and final assumption is that, as time passes, discussion by ordinary people in the subordinate state of the presence of the dominant state tends to mount. In Japan, demands for the GHQ/SCAP to end the occupation began to increase in 1948, with this desire finally being realised in 1951. In Lebanon, after Israel evacuated from the so-called "security zone" in May 2000, many groups to discuss the Syrian presence have been formed, resulting in the formation of a number of different groups. This has had some influence on the attitude of state officials toward Syria, and also led to the partial withdrawal of Syrian troops. In the Japanese case, the indirect rule succeeded in forging an establishment that has permanently been pro-American. In the Syrian case, the indirect rule will be successful, since it both established the institutionalised interdependence between Lebanese and Syrian political elites and also Syria stripped Lebanese opposition groups of their power by withdrawing, although not completely.

If one looks at the overall process of what has happened in Lebanon one has to

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[58] CIE means Civil Information and Education Section, CCD means Civil Censorship Department, and CIS means Civil Intelligence Section.
[59] Fukui (1988) p.167.

conclude that, while Lebanon after the civil war aimed at "democracy" as stipulated in the Ta'if Agreement, this goal has not been reached. As has been pointed out in the discussion above, this outcome is closely related to Syrian indirect rule. In other words, applying Dahl's model, the Lebanese situation can be classified as a "mixed regime", which comprises two sub-types. A mixed regime allows for more public competition or more participation than a hegemonic regime, but is not a fully polyarchic system ("full polyarchy") where both full competition and participation are guaranteed, hence could be defined as a "near polyarchy". A "near polyarchy" is either inclusive in terms of the scope of society, although there are more restrictions on public competition than a "full polyarchy", or somewhat less inclusive in groups included while coming close to providing the greater latitude for public competition of a "full polyarchy".[60] The Lebanese situation is arguably a "near polyarchy", with all groups included, but restrictions on competition.

8. PLAN OF THIS STUDY

To answer the three questions raised above (see p.5), chapter II briefly explains the relevant Syrian and Lebanese historic background. Chapters III and IV, after mentioning the external and internal situations surrounding Lebanese state behaviour toward Syria, separately examine the dynamics of Lebanese state and sub-state groups complexes, as well as the role and behaviour of Syria in Lebanon during the civil war and post-war period. The hypothesis of this study is based on multi-level models: mainly simple and complex realism, constructivism, and pluralism. Specifically it is based on the assumption that the Lebanese state's dealings with Syrian power must be understood in terms of (1) reaction to an external threat, a simple realist model which could explain a very few episodes; (2)

[60] Dahl (1975) p.122 and pp.127-129.

interrelated external and internal threats which result from the weaknesses of the Lebanese state and which explain much more; (3) still powerful transstate ties, which themselves need to be understood in terms of the contradiction between sovereignty and identity and which have some impact; and (4) complex interdependencies and shared interests between Lebanese and Syrian elites. Finally, chapter V draws some conclusions about the nature of Lebanese relations with Syria and the validity of these models.

Ⅱ. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter will survey the historical background necessary in order to understand Lebanese-Syrian relations since 1975. The survey will take the form first of a brief look at the formations of the two states of Lebanon and Syria and at their relations until 1970. This will be followed by an examination of the situation for both countries in the first half of the 1970's, when the paralysis of the Lebanese state function and the transformation of Syria under Asad into a regional middle power together made it possible for Syria to play a more active role in Lebanese affairs.

1. THE FORMATION OF THE STATES OF LEBANON AND SYRIA, AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM (1920−1970)

(1) Introduction

The sovereign state system in the Middle East, as is the case in many parts of the Third World, was imposed by Western imperialist states. Without taking sufficient account of local history, they tended to draw state boundaries, which, to an even greater extent in the Middle East than in Africa and Asia, resulted in mismatches between state and national identities. With only Iran and Egypt having historically been political entities, the states in the Eastern Arab region, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, were established as states on the basis of their convenience for Western imperialist power.[1] The section that follows will detail how this was manifested in the cases of Lebanon and Syria.

In the last days of the Ottoman Empire, "Syria", or "Greater Syria" became the center of pan-Arabism. Arab nationalists conceived of Greater Syria as

[1] Gause (1997) p.202.

roughly encompassing the territorial expanse of present-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. However, after the end of the First World War, the victorious allies, Britain and France, were not prepared to honor their wartime promises to the Arabs of independence and a united Arab state, and agreed, in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, to divide Greater Syria between them. In exchange for an acceptance of a French mandate in Syria and Lebanon, Britain asserted control of the territories of Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan.

The postwar settlement caused resentment among the Sunnis in Syria, most of whom were cut off from their co-religionists in Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine. The French "mandate" government controlling the rump, present-day Syria, further fragmented the country into provinces based on sectarian concentrations: Jabel Druze, Damascus, Aleppo, and Latakiya. The French also created Greater Lebanon, which was to be ruled as a separate mandate consisting of the previously autonomous Maronite-domoinated province of Mount Lebanon and some other Muslim areas having transstate ties with Syria: Beirut, coastal areas from Tripoli to Sidon, and the Beqqa Valley. The Maronites had been pushing for a French mandate over Greater Lebanon, and had dispatched a mission to the Paris Peace Conference representing the Maronite Patriarch Elias Huwayyik.[2] Not surprisingly, therefore, the Syrian Arab nationalists and the Muslims in the provinces attached to Mount Lebanon did not accept the reality of Greater Lebanon, and saw the separation of Lebanon from Syria as an arbitrary imposition on them by Western colonial powers.[3] The French policy of "divide and rule" did nothing to mitigate this attitude, tending instead to increase communal differences and to further encourage separatist tendencies. The following sections discuss in detail the history of the two states and their

[2] Goria (1985) pp.18-19.

relations with one another until 1970, which saw the election of Suliman Franjieh to the Lebanese presidency and Hafez Asad's final victory in the power struggle which had been taking place in Syria.

(2) Lebanon

France's creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 resulted in political institutions being formed on the basis of confessionalism, an organization of the government according to religious divisions. This principle was reflected in the newly created Representative Council which later served as a Constituent Assembly; and the debates of the Assembly's committee for drafting of the constitution were strongly influenced by France. The Lebanese constitution was finally proclaimed in 1926, against the protests of the leaders of the Sunni community, who were calling for unification with Syria. Their main objections were that the constitution stipulated that the boundaries of Greater Lebanon were permanent and that the French had the right to supervise Lebanese foreign relations and to close down the Lebanese parliament without consulting Lebanese deputies.[4] The creation of Greater Lebanon did not diminish this pan-Arabist feeling among the Sunnis, and during the 1920s and 1930s there were thus two basic trends in Lebanon: a Maronite-dominated Lebanism and a Sunni-dominated Arabism. This bipolarization necessitated a political arrangement to establish the common parameters of the newly independent Lebanese state declared by the treaty with France in 1936.

Maronite-Sunni agreement on the basic character and policies of Lebanon—on shaping and sharing the positions of power and on dividing the power resources of the state—was finally reached by leaders of the Maronite and

[3] Avi-Ran (1991) pp.4-5.

Sunni communities, Bishara Khuri and Riyad Solh at their meeting in September 1943. Later known as the National Pact, it was a "gentlemen's agreement", but has nevertheless constituted the backbone of Lebanese politics and foreign policy. The main features of the pact were as follows. Firstly, positions of power and influence between the various Lebanese communities were to be allocated in proportion to the 1932 national census. As a result, the presidency was to be reserved for the Maronites, the premiership for the Sunnis, and the speaker of parliament for the Shi'ites, with the power of the president being stronger than that of the other two. In addition, the parliament would be formed on the basis of a consociational formula with a ratio of six Christians to five Muslims. Secondly, Lebanon was to belong to the Arab world and would cooperate with other Arab states; it would have the right to defend its sovereignty, its independence, and its unique character of traditional ties with the West, especially France, unless such ties would make Lebanon a gateway for Western penetration into the Middle East.[5] In sum, it stipulated that the Christians refrain from asking help for France, and that the Muslims, in turn, promise not to call for unification with Syria.

One of the important achievements of the newly formed Solh government in consolidating Lebanese sovereignty was the abrogation of the mandatory restrictions which France had placed on the 1926 constitution. In November 1943, French High Commissioner, Jean Helleu, retaliated against this action by arresting Khuri, Solh, Abdul Hamid Karami and three important members of cabinet: Camille Chamoun, Salim Takla, and Adel Usayran. After the six men were imprisoned, Helleu nullified the decision by the Solh government, suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament, and stated that the pro-French Emile Edde should be president. Against these

[4] Weinberger (1976) p.55.

French actions, the Lebanese reacted swiftly and with powerful unanimity. Even the members of Pierre Jumayiel's Maronite-dominated Phalange Party, founded in 1936 with the determination to preserve and strengthen the Lebanese political entity against pan-Arab and/or pan-Syrian orientations, joined forces with its Muslim counterpart, the Najaddeh, which had been founded by a journalist called Muhieddine Nsouli as a youth group in 1936. Nationwide strikes were organized and large-scale riots occurred. France, strongly pressured by Britain, changed its policy, and the release of Khouri, Solh, and their colleagues marked the end of the French rule in Lebanon and the emergence of Lebanon's full independence which was finally realized in 1946.[6]

Although the 1943 crisis generated cross-sectarian solidarity among the Lebanese, the Lebanon-first identity did not continue to prevail: the National Pact had preserved to some extent a tradition of pluralism, but it had produced a weak state. In Lebanon, communally-based sub-state groups, among them Muslims having pan-Arab identities, were still powerful. Since the zuama power was dependent on ensuring the security and interests of local people, they generally prevented the emergence of a strong central government. These factors further eroded both loyalty toward the state and identification with it. The Lebanese state was destined to be challenged from both within (by sub-state identities) and from outside (by supra-state identities, as with pan-Arabism).[7]

After its independence, the color of Lebanon's politics was dominated by rivalry between the Constitutional Bloc led by Khuri and the National Bloc led by Edde. Khuri's enormous popularity, which was on the basis of the fact that he led Lebanon to independence, meant that the Constitutional Bloc

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[5] Zisser (2000) pp.57-59.
[6] Goria (1985) pp.25-26. /Hudson (1985a) p.142 and p.175.
[7] Zisser (2000) p.66.

was initially overwhelmingly powerful. However, his amendment of the Lebanese constitution in 1947, which made it possible for him to secure for himself a second presidential term, antagonized former colleagues. This was especially true of Chamoun, who had hoped to succeed Khuri as president. Chamoun later aligned with Edde and was finally elected to the presidency in 1952.[8]

During the 1950s, when Nasser's leadership of the pan-Arab movement was exerting a strong influence on Lebanese Muslims, there was growing opposition to Chamoun's pro-Western foreign policies, such as his support for the Eisenhower Doctrine. Muslim dissatisfaction with Chamoun's domestic politics, changes to electoral laws in favor the Maronites in 1957, and the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) with the merging of Egypt and Syria, which had different meanings for Christians and Muslims and consequently split Lebanese society along sectarian lines, finally led to the outbreak of a short-lived civil war in 1958.[9]

The 1958 crisis was resolved with the election to the Lebanese presidency of General Fuad Shihab, whose reputation for having remained "neutral" during the civil war stemmed from his not ordering the army to intervene on behalf of the government. He attempted to overcome one of the weaknesses of the consociational democracy in Lebanon: its inability to cope with the demands of radicals for social justice. In his view this would be a key to the prevention of future turmoil in Lebanon. He expanded the government's bureaucratic powers as a means to dilute power possessed by al-zuama who were mainly interested in the distribution of power under the consociational formula and were generally opposed to extending the functions of the state, since to do so threatened to deprive them of such political resources. Although he introduced a number of reform and development projects that

[8] Harris (1996) pp.138-140.

aimed to narrow the gap between sects and/or regions, his term expired in 1964 before his policy could bear fruit. Since his successor, Charles Helou, lacked his strong mind and popularity, Shihabism began to lose its power to make use of the Lebanese army and the Deuxieme Bureau, special security forces, to overcome the opposition of traditional leaders to centralizing policies. In effect, the 1968 parliamentary elections signaled the resurgence of traditional political trends in Lebanon, and the Tripartite Alliance (hilf) composed of three Maronite factions of — Camille Chamoun's National Liberal Party, Pierre Jumayiel's Phalange Party, and Raymond Edde's National Bloc — defeated the Shihabist Bloc (nahj) which were led by Maronite Shihabists in the army, Rashid Karami and a loose coalition of groups supporting social reforms. The restoration process was finalized in 1970 when Shihabist Elias Sarkis was defeated by Suleiman Franjieh supported by the hilf.[10]

Another weaknesses of Lebanese consociational democracy which affected the legitimacy of the Lebanese parliament was its vulnerability to demographic trends. The National Pact that placed Maronites and Sunnis in top governmental posts relied for its legitimacy on the 1932 census. However, Lebanese acceptance of those arrangements had been dramatically decreased, because of rises both in Christian overseas emigration and in the Muslim birth rate, especially in the case of Shi'ites, whose community seemed to become the largest single sect, though it remained politically and socially deprived.[11]

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[9] Hudson (1976) p.116. /Kalawoun (2000) pp.23-64.
[10] Hudson (1985b) pp.282-283. /Zamir (1980) pp.49-50.
[11] Official public statistics do not exist, but according to one private source in 1975, it was said that 60 percent of the population in Lebanon was occupied by Muslims and 40 percent by Christians. The details are that the Shi'tes constituted 27 percent, the Sunnis 26 percent, and the Maronites 23 percent.

Since the Lebanese political system did not address radicals' demands for social justice of these demographic trends, an increase in ideological movements outside the government and parliament, focusing mainly on developing inequalities in Lebanon, continued after the 1950s. Kamal Jumblatt, the Druze chieftain and founder of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), which was established in 1949 and whose ideology represented a mixture of French socialism, Gandhian pacifism, and Druze factionalism, demanded strongly that the Lebanese government adopt policies of social justice and welfare. After the retreat of the Shihabist reform trend at the end of the 1960s, the issue of development and social justice was taken up by a new Shi'ite populist leader, Imam Musa Sadr, who mobilized mass demonstrations in southern Lebanon and south of Beirut against the neglect by the government of Shi'ites, and who was elected as the head of Higher Shi'ite Council.[12] At the same time, Jumblatt also formed the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), which aimed to destroy the discriminative and pro-status quo consociational system which did not reflect the increased power of the ideological movements. The LNM was composed mainly of his PSP, the Independent Nasserist Movement led by Ibrahim Qulailat, the Lebanese Communist Party led by Niqula Shawi, the Ba'th Party led by Asim Qansu, and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party led by In'am Ra'd. [13]

The evolution of these mass movements was also influenced by the outcome of the 1968 parliamentary election, which, allowing for an overlap in occupations, resulted in the elections of 10 landlords, 44 lawyers, 17 businessmen, and 28 professionals. This figure means that the parliament did not represent the socially deprived classes, such as peasants and workers. The composition of parliament also excluded from representation

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[Hudson (1985b) p.281.]

[12] Ajami (1986) pp.123-158. /Hudson (1985b) pp.281-283.

[13] For the details of composition of the LNM, see Deeb (1980) pp.60-69.

ideologically-oriented radical parties.[14]

In the long run, since the parliament did not incorporate those radical groups whose power had increased in the late 1960s under Sadr and Jumblatt, they questioned its legitimacy and resorted to extra-parliamentary activities, sometimes collaborating with the Palestinians.

(3) Syria

From the beginning, the French mandate faced severe opposition from the Syrian Arab nationalists. Their sense of betrayal and disillusionment laid the ground for anti-French movements, and their bitterness was further fueled by French suppression of political activities and human rights, the division of Greater Syria into smaller units, and the French objections to the granting of independence to Syria. Indeed, the French authorities had not only done their best to prevent the spread of ideas and movements associated with Syrian unity, but had actively encouraged sectarian tensions, by granting Alawi and Druze "states" full domestic autonomy and also by differentiating educational systems from region to region.[15] Syrians, with their grievances against harsh French rule, were attracted to the pan-Arabist aim of uniting all the regions in the Arab world into a single nation-state, and the famous early advocates of this movement were indeed Syrians themselves. Though the unity of the entire Arab region was a final goal for pan-Arabists, their first priority, especially for those who resided in Syria, was to unite all parts of Greater Syria.[16]

In 1925, a nationalist revolt, which began with a rebellion by the Druzes, spread fiercely throughout the country, only to be crushed by the French authorities in 1927. Though France still took a provocative attitude toward

[14] Gordon (1983) pp.82-83.
[15] Ma'oz (1986) pp.10-15.

nationalists after the rebellion, their followers increased. The fifth High Commissioner, Henri Ponsot, in 1928 took the conciliatory step of allowing elections for a chamber of deputies to produce a draft for a Syrian constitution. However, since article 2 declared Syrian unity and independence, Ponsot dissolved the chamber and imposed on them a version which altered the wording of article 2 and was less offensive to the French.[17]

After the constitution came into effect in 1932, the Syrians demanded an acceptable treaty with France. This treaty, which was concluded with the left-wing French government under Leon Blum in September 1936 and which stipulated that the prerogatives of sovereignty over Alawi and Druze "states" would be transferred to the Syrian government, was unanimously approved by the chamber in December 1936.[18] Even though it did not reunite Lebanon with Syria, some Syrian politicians were apparently willing to settle for a "Little Syria". Though it was never ratified by France, Syria finally became fully independent in 1946 after the evacuation, under strong British pressure, of French forces.

Since Greater Syria was not realized, many political leaders in Syria considered it to be an artificial and Western-imposed entity, and their frustrations with its identity continued to manifest themselves in Syrian politics and foreign policy. The Syrian perception that their state was detached from its natural Arab environment, and especially from Greater Syria, meant that any Syrian regime had to rely on pan-Arabism in order to be perceived as legitimate. In effect, Damascus became one of the core centers of pan-Arabism, and actually formed a union with Egypt in 1958. However, there were bitter experiences associated with this union that increased the gap between the ideal pan-Arabism and pan-Arab reality, and

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[16] Weinberger (1976) p.51.
[17] Tibawi (1969) pp.348-349. /Longrigg (1958) pp.187-188.
[18] Longrigg (1958) pp.222-224. /Tibawi (1969) p.352

even pan-Arabists started to adopt a Syrian-centric view of Arabism. In addition, the existence of the state of Israel in Greater Syria, which was due in large part to the help given by Western countries, prevented Syrian nationalist aspirations from being realized. Syrian irredentist feeling was clearly manifested in the late 1960s, when the regime under radical wing of the Ba'th Party set out to make Damascus the center of a war of Palestinian liberation. This led to the disastrous defeat of the Arab states in 1967, and to an expansion of Israeli control into Arab lands, including the Golan Heights in Syria which was now occupied. The struggle with Israel now became a more urgent policy problem for Syria, which placed the recovery of its lost territory at the top of its agenda and engendered a more "realistic" policy orientation. Since Syria's strategy gradually moved from the complete realization of its irredentist goals to the more limited goal of recovery of the Syrian territory which had been lost, the meaning of pan-Arabism itself was changed from that of a cause which required Syrian sacrifice at the expense of its sovereignty to that of ensuring its own security against Israel.[19] After Hafez Asad seized power in 1970, he gave more attention to the recapture of the Golan and, unlike the previous regimes which had unconditionally supported the Palestinian causes, began to regulate the activities of the Palestinians in Lebanon so as to serve Syrian security needs.

(4) Transstate Relations between Lebanon and Syria

Despite French determination to prevent the unity of Greater Syria, transstate ties between Lebanon and Syria were preserved, with all the main sectarian groups having "cousins" on both sides of the Lebanese-Syrian border. The 1925-1927 Druze rebellion spread not only within the Syrian region, but also into some areas of southern Lebanon. The leader, Sultan

[19] Hinnebusch (2001) pp.139-140.

Atrash, recruited hundreds of Druze followers not only in the Syrian Druze "state" but also in the Mount Lebanon region.[20]

Transstate ties between the Lebanese pan-Arabists who advocated unity with Syria and the Syrian pan-Arabists who advocated the unity of all parts of Greater Syria were maintained during the 1930s. Syrian pan-Arabists had followers in Lebanon, especially among the Sunnis. In 1936, when the Syrian National Bloc called a general strike whose main slogan was the unity and independence of Greater Syria, many shops in Beirut were shut to show sympathy, and a number of demonstrations were organized in Sidon and Tripoli. During the Second World War, there appeared in each country an increasing number of state-nationalist, as opposed to Arab nationalist, leaders. They emphasized the termination of French colonial rule rather than the unity of between Lebanon and Syria, encouraged consultation between political leaders, and replaced close relations between opposition elements in both countries. This new phase was strongly influenced by the French betrayal of its promises of independence.[21] These state-nationalist trends were further reinforced when both countries became founding members of the Leagues of Arab States. In order to secure Lebanese participation in the organization, a clause affirming general respect for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its present borders was inserted in the Alexandria Protocol; it aimed particularly to assuage the feelings of the Lebanese Maronites, who were generally suspicious of pan-Arabism.[22] Both the Lebanese and Syrian states had in effect resigned themselves to not being united, although they were in so doing destined to suffer from the ill fit between state and national identities resulting from the arbitrary French-imposed Lebanese-Syrian borders and the difficulties these

[20] Longrigg (1958) pp.154-169.
[21] Weinberger (1976) pp.56-57.
[22] Longrigg (1958) pp.351-352.

caused in their state-building projects.

However, during their first years of independence, a significant portion of the Lebanese population, especially those who in the past had wanted union with Syria, looked to this country with respect as an ideological and political model. In Syria, a considerable portion of the population was pan-Arabist and still regarded Lebanon as a natural part of Syria, which had been deliberately detached from the fatherland in the interests of the French imperialism.[23] Under these circumstances, by contrast to Syrian elites which advocated the pan-Arabism, Lebanese elites, especially the Maronites, had an interest in restricting transstate aspirations since these had the potential to jeopardize their sovereignty and independence.

In July 1949, when Antun Sa'ada, the founder of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) which firmly declared Lebanon to be a mere part of Greater Syria, clashed with the Lebanese government by calling for an armed uprising and was forced to take refuge in Syria, the Lebanese government swiftly moved to contain his influence and the threat he posed. Several factors influenced its behavior. On the one hand, Sa'ada's alignment with Jumblatt and Chamoun, the main opponents to President Khoury, had reinforced the government's negative perception of him. The argument that the Arab defeat in the 1948 War was a sign of the failure of pan-Arabism had led to an increase in the membership of the SSNP, and among those who now joined were many Sunnis, notable among whom was the famous pan-Arabist and supporter of Prime Minister Solh, Muhammad Ba'albaki. This apparently led Solh to recognize Sa'ada as a threat to his power among the Sunnis, though Sa'ada himself was a Greek Orthodox. In effect, Sa'ada's alliance with opposition figures and his increased popularity caused both

[23] Zisser (2000) p.164.

Khoury and Solh to see him as an enemy of the government.[24] On the other hand, Syrian President Husni Za'im initially encouraged Sa'ada to revolt against Solh, a close friend of his rival former President Shukri Quwatli, whom he suspected of plotting his overthrow, and provided Sa'ada with both fighters and arms. However, Egyptian pressure and the conclusion in the same month of a partial agreement with Lebanon on economic issues may have influenced Za'im to show goodwill toward the Lebanese government.[25] Eventually Za'im handed over Sa'ada to the Solh government, which sentenced him and his followers to death. Though the leaders of the Lebanese government were largely motivated by personal concerns, they nevertheless defended the state's sovereignty, and Syria finally cooperated with them.

In other respects the states also went their own ways, with consequent clashes of interests. The Lebanese commercial-financial elites favored a laissez-faire and free trade system, while influential Syrian industrialists and farmers as well as nationalistic politicians and military officers favored protectionist and state interventionist economy.[26] These differences in state economic orientation precipitated the dissolution of the Syro-Lebanese Customs Union in 1950 which had been founded during the period of the French mandate. When Syria demanded the unification of their economic systems in March, the Lebanese government, one power base of which was rooted in the merchant and financier classes, feared that the demand would lead to economic protectionism and state interventionism and decided to dissolve the union. This was despite a report from the government's foreign advisor that the severance would be costly for Lebanon.[27] In other words,

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[24] Goria (1985) pp.33-34. /Zisser (2000) pp.176-189.
[25] Seale (1965) pp.70-71.
[26] Gate (1993) p.76.
[27] Gate (1993) pp.77-79.

although the Lebanese government put the economic interests of merchants and financiers first, it nevertheless protected its sovereignty at the expense of overall economic benefit.

However, transstate ties continued to play an important role and were used as a tool of policy, especially in crisis situations. During the 1958 civil war, the UAR government, aiming mainly to change Chamoun's pro-Western foreign policy orientation, supported opposition parties and political leaders against him, the majority of whom were Muslims. These were armed by Syria and helped by Syrian fighters. Syrian intelligence gave financial aid to the opposition leaders, Rashid Karami, Sa'eb Salame, and Kamal Jumblatt.[28] In the late 1960s, when Palestinian guerilla activities in Lebanon intensified and the Palestinian groups clashed with the Lebanese army, Syria helped them. It used its ties with various Palestinian groups, especially Saiqa[29] to exercise leverage over Lebanon, though it officially stated that Saiqa's activities in Lebanon were not supervised by Damascus, when the first major clash between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians occurred in April 1969.[30] The clash led the Lebanese government to try to persuade Syrian President Nureddin Attasi to contain Saiqa's activities in Lebanon. Since this attempt ended in failure, Lebanese President Helou asked Nasser to

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[28] Johnson (1986) p.134. /Kalawoun (2000) pp.66-67.

[29] After the 1967 War, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was dominated by two major political factions: Arafat's Fatah organisation and several smaller groups linked to radical Arab regimes such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya. In Lebanon, Fatah was the most dominant organisation which set the pace of war and peace with the Lebanese government. Other smaller radical Palestinian groups were composed of the Syrian-sponsored Saiqa, George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Nayih Hawatmeh's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Ahmad Jibril's the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and were more hostile to the Lebanese authorities.

[30] *FCO* 17/833 no.86, May 3, 1969. /*SWB* May 3, 1969.

mediate.[31] An unofficial agreement (the May 9 Agreement) was finally concluded, whereby Syria, under the still powerful pressure exerted by Nasser, was forced to promise to contain Saiqa's activities in Lebanon, although no restrictions were placed on the behavior of Fatah and other Palestinian organizations.[32]

In the long run, despite the attempts by the Maronite-dominated Lebanese government to secure its sovereignty and to contain transstate ties, these were to remain instruments by which Syria could influence Lebanese politics, as illustrated in the 1958 crisis period and in the Palestinian problems of the late 1960s. However, Syrian success came only with Egyptian backing, which in the latter case the Egyptians actually imposed restrictions on Syrian-sponsored activities themselves. With Egypt the dominant power in the Arab world and domestic instability in Syria, the transstate ties of the Syrian regime were insufficient to enable it to exert a controlling influence over Lebanese affairs.

2. CONTRASTING POLITICAL SITUATIONS IN LEBANON AND SYRIA, AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES (1970−1975)

(1) Gradual Paralysis of the Consociational Democracy in Lebanon

The consociational democracy in Lebanon moved gradually toward paralysis during this period. Palestinian guerilla activities on Lebanese soil were a major contributing factor to the dysfunction of the Lebanese state, although they had already been problematic for the authorities. The continuous clashes between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians during 1969 led to the Cairo Agreement in November, which aimed to accommodate Palestinian guerrilla activities along the Lebanese-Israeli border with

[31] Petran (1987) p.102.

Lebanese sovereignty. However, a further influx of the Palestinians after the 1970 "Black September" in Jordan, with the transfer of PLO headquarters from Amman to Beirut, made it harder for the Lebanese government to implement the agreement.[33] The Palestinian refugee camps with 150,000 inhabitants became a "state within state" beyond Lebanese authorities control, and their guerrilla activities against Israel from southern Lebanon invited Israeli heavy retaliations, a dramatic manifestion of which was an Israeli commando attack in the heart of Beirut in April 1973 which killed three Palestinian leaders.[34]

Also the increased power of the Palestinians encouraged the radicalisation of the mass movements led by Jumblatt and Sadr, and their common aim of destroying the Maronite-dominated Lebanese political system provoked reactions from the Maronite militias, which led to the frequent violent clashes between them. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon disrupted the consociational formula, and actually constituted a major factor leading to the outbreak of the civil war in 1975 by "weakening the central government's authority, escalating armed conflict, arming Lebanese revolutionaries, and provoking the Christians."[35] However, the Palestinians were not fully responsible for the chaos in Lebanon, which was also influenced by "domestic" political factors. As Syria was concerned about the Palestinian activities in Lebanon from the viewpoints of its national security against Israel, they will be discussed more in the part of Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs (pgs.58-66). Thus, this part will primarily pay attention to the "domestic" factors contributing to the eruption of the conflict.

After his election to the presidency, Franjieh destroyed the cooperative

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[32] Khazen (2000) pp.155-156.
[33] For the details of the Cairo Agreement and of its implementation, see Brynen (1990) pp.48-63.
[34] Rubin (1994) pp.43-45.

relationship between the president, representing Christian interests, and the prime minister representing those of Muslims, which had been the backbone of stability in the Lebanese political system. He first appointed Sa'eb Salem, a Sunni za'im, as prime minister. However, both Franjieh and Salem had strong views on the extent of their respective powers, and discord between them set in when Franjieh began to concentrate governmental power in his own hands. He also withheld full support for many of Salem's policies, and the split between the two was fully exposed after the Israeli raid on the Palestinian headquarters in April 1973. Salem tried to fire Iskander Ghanem, the Maronite army commander and close friend of the president, but Franjieh backed his friend and replaced the powerful Salem with the second-rank Sunni politician, Amin Hafez.[36]

Amin Hafez neither enjoyed the full support of the Sunni establishment nor had any influence on the Muslim community as a whole, and his selection was seen by the Sunni establishment as an attempt to further strip them of power, just when their own popularity was declining in the face of the rising power of the mass movements led mainly by Jumblatt, Sadr, and of the Palestinians. After Hafez was forced to resign in the face of strong Muslim opposition, the president proceeded to appoint, one after the other, two second-rank figures as prime ministers: both Takieddin Solh and Rashid Solh had little support from the Muslim community.[37]

Although it was Franjieh who was largely responsible for the paralysis of the coalition politics between the Maronite president and the Sunni prime minister which had characterized Lebanese politics since its independence, this paralysis was also brought about by Jumblatt's behavior and his influence on Franjieh. In fact, Franjieh's election to the presidency in 1970

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[35] Rubin (1994) p.49.
[36] Hudson (1985) p.203. / Zamir (1980) pp.63-64.
[37] Harris (1996) pp.155-159.

was largely due to Jumblatt, who voted for Franjieh with another three deputies from his party in the final ballot, since he strongly resented the use of the Lebanese army and Deuxieme Bureau by the Shihabist presidents to threaten opposition figures and was concerned that the election of another Shihabist would give more power to these institutions.[38]

In effect, Jumblatt managed to influence Franjieh's policies, the most notable outcome of this being Franjieh's selection of Rashid Solh in November 1974. Solh was a Jumblatt ally in the Sunni community, and received some assistance from Jumblatt when he was elected from Beirut's second constituency in the 1972 parliamentary elections. Opposing Franjieh and Jumblatt were Salem and Rashid Karami, who shared concerns about the increasing strength of the Jumblatt-led LNM, and whose alliance was further consolidated by Salem's bitter experience with Franjieh during his premiership, as well as by Karami's traditional political rivalry with Franjieh in northern Lebanon.[39] In personal terms, Jumblatt saw Solh as the best candidate to be the next prime minister.

However, one should not overlook the fact that Solh was also desirable for Franjieh in that he had no real power base to challenge the president's cabinet colleagues and for Jumblatt in that he was too weak to confront the growing power of the LNM. In regards to the latter, it should be understood that since the results of the 1972 parliamentary election again showed a comparable majority for the traditional and conservative groups, the radical opposition groups, represented in the parliament only by Jumblatt's bloc, complained that the electoral system discriminated against them. For example, although Mount Lebanon contained no more than 20 percent of the population, it still held 30 percent of the parliamentary seats, a situation

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[38] *The Times*, August 18, 1970 and August 19, 1970. /Zamir (1980) pp.49-59.
[39] Goria (1985) p.168. /Johnson (1986) p.164, p.169.

which favored the Maronites.[40] With the exclusion of most radical groups from the parliament and his ouster from the newly formed Salem cabinet after the election, Jumblatt increasingly leaned toward extra-parliamentary activities, and sometimes collaborated with the Palestinians. Because he favored second-rank figures as prime minister he can be said to be partly responsible for the dysfunction of consociational democracy in Lebanon, although he should be considered less responsible in this respect than Franjieh.

The extra-parliament activities which began in the late 1960s intensified in the first half of 1970s. Sadr created the Movement of Disinherited as a mass Shi'ite organization which appealed to the government to address social and political needs by various forms of mobilization, such as mass rallies, religious celebrations, political actions, sit-ins, strikes, and the observation of national solidarity days. The membership was mainly composed of dispossessed urban migrants in the suburbs of Beirut, who strongly resented the government's neglect of their miserable conditions, and of members of the growing new bourgeoisie which had insufficient parliamentary representation. First appearing in public in 1973 with the submission of a memorandum to the government, the movement was largely independent. However, it was also a part of the general mobilization and sectarian conflict that characterized the period. In practice, it sometimes cooperated with the Palestinians and the LNM. Relations with the Palestinians were initially very close, and the latter began to provide training bases and arms to the movement's military organization, Amal, in 1975.[41]

In the face of the increased power of radical movements and of the Palestinians, the Maronites were concerned that the sovereignty of the Lebanese state was under threat; but since Franjieh had dismantled the

[40] Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg (1999) pp.88-90. /Hudson (1985) p.283.

Deuxieme Bureau in 1970, the Lebanese state and army were increasingly incapable of dealing with the problem. The Phalange Party activated its militias and conducted street confrontations with the PLO and the radicals, especially after the failure by the army to prevent the Palestinians from taking over parts of suburban Beirut in May 1973.[42] In the long run, extra-parliamentary activities by both Christians and Muslims, which was largely connected with the Palestinian presence, stripped the parliament of its legitimacy and, along with these activities, key politician's sectarian-based behavior contributed to the state of dysfunctional consociational democracy in Lebanon.

(2) The Transformation of Syria into a Regional Middle Power

While Lebanon had been generally stable after independence except for the eruption of the civil war in 1958, Syria's experience until Asad consolidated his power in 1970 was entirely different. There had been a succession of military coups, and the artificiality of the Syrian borders and its strong pan-Arabism were exploited by neighboring countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan. Since their clients in Syria relied on them for protection, patron states had opportunities to give aid to their clients in the form of financial support or the provision of arms. Since Syrian state officials faced both external and internal threats, they generally had to take into consideration domestic factors in shaping foreign policy, which precluded a "realistic" approach, even to the point of the very existence of the state being threatened in 1967, when a radical faction of the Ba'th Party provoked a war with Israel for the liberation of Palestine.[43]

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[41] Nasr (1985) p.12
[42] Harris (1996) p.157. /Stoakes (1975) p.220. /*SWB* May 4, 1973. /Rabinovich (1985) p.63.
[43] Hinnebusch (2001) pp.143-147.

In contrast, the consolidation of the Syrian regime under Asad made it possible for the state to conduct foreign policy on the basis of its national interest: the protection of Syria from Israeli threats. Asad's efforts were focused on stabilizing the domestic situation in order to maximize power and resources for the struggle with Israel. In the domestic security apparatus he established his jama'a, a core of largely Alawi personal followers, in order to enhance authority over both the Ba'th Party and the army, two pillars of the Ba'thist state since 1963. On the other hand, he appeased the private bourgeoisie, primarily consisting of Sunnis, through a limited liberalization and created a new bourgeoisie controlled by the state.[44] The radical Ba'th had already managed to strip Syria's great feudal lords of their powers by means of land reforms that enhanced state capabilities in the rural regions.[45] Externally, Asad set up new alliances with the Gulf oil states by halting the ideologically-based verbal attacks against them, and thus received financial assistance which was desperately needed in order to rebuild and expand military capabilities and in order to co-opt, appease, or subdue elements of the Sunni bourgeoisie who had contested the legitimacy of the Alawi-dominated Asad regime. He also maintained close relations with the USSR in order to secure a supply of arms.[46]

Asad's success in creating a "presidential monarchy"[47] that both subordinated sub-state groups and played them off each other allowed him to pursue a foreign policy that was relatively unconstrained by domestic concerns. Under Asad, Syria changed from being a victim into a regional player, and this new status made it possible for him "to effectively adapt

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[44] Hinnebusch (2002b) p.148.
[45] Hinnebusch (2001) pp.115-125.
[46] Hinnebusch (2001) pp.147-149.
[47] For the concept of "presidential monarchy", see Hinnebusch (2001) pp.67-69.

foreign policy to the changing geopolitical power balance."[48] Syria improved its relations with Egypt, and the pragmatic trend in Arab politics which had started after the 1967 War was reflected in the foreign policies of both Asad and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. They aligned with King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, in effect, forming Riyadh-Damascus-Cairo. Though their relations were worsened by Sadat's unilateral conclusion of the first Sinai agreement with Israel and the premature lifting of the oil embargo by the Gulf oil states, this axis was the dominant power in the region until Sadat concluded the second disengagement agreement with Israel in September 1975 (Sinai II).[49] Since the enhancement of Syrian power by both domestic and external means made Syria less permeable to transstate penetration and made it possible for Asad to be deeply involved in and to play a more active role inside Lebanon, Lebanese-Syrian relations became increasingly asymmetrical.

(3) Syrian Involvement in Lebanese Affairs

While Asad was in the process of consolidating his power, the stability of the Lebanese state was beginning to be shaken by both internal and external factors. Since Asad understood that the turmoil in Lebanon would give Israel cause for intervention in Lebanon, he was forced to take measures to prevent this happening, and the process of his maximizing Syrian power was inextricably linked with the need to "orchestrate" the Lebanese situation. His first steps to obtain influence over Lebanese affairs in general and the Palestinian problems in particular were to establish or strengthen ties with sub-state groups there. He tried whenever possible to secure good relations with most of the factions and individuals involved.

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[48] Hinnebusch (2002b) p.148.
[49] Hinnebusch (2001) pp.153-154. /Taylor (1982) pp.51-52.

Asad already had good relations with Suleiman Franjieh that dated back to 1957, when Franjieh fled to Syria and received sanctuary in his home after clashing with the Duwayhi clan over influence in Zgharta, northern Lebanon.[50] In addition, he also managed to improve relations with the Phalange Party which, faced with the shattered situations in Lebanon resulting from the Palestinian armed presence, desperately needed to convince other Arab governments, including Syria, that the spill-over impact on the Arab world which would result from the disintegration of the Lebanese state made it a matter of vital interest for them to preserve Lebanese sovereignty and independence.[51] For Asad himself the establishment of ties with the party was necessary as a means for Syria to play a balancing role between Maronites and Muslims, especially with regard to Palestinian affairs. Their improved relations proved to be an important asset following the outbreak of civil war in 1975.

Changes in regional circumstance also gave Asad opportunities to strengthen ties with Muslim sects in Lebanon. While Nasser was alive, Muslim leaders had considered him as their patron, but his death resulted in a weakening of Egyptian influence and left a vacuum that enabled Asad to replace Egyptian guidance and support with his own.[52] Asad needed to maintain good relations with the Sunnis in Lebanon to show goodwill to its Sunni population. As for traditional Sunni zuama, Syria's relations with Sa'eb Salem worsened, but its ties with Rashid Karami were generally stable and became the basis for Karami's position with Damascus during the civil war. Sa'eb Salem was disliked because he had failed to constrain the activities of the pro-Iraqi Ba'thists in Lebanon when he was a prime minister and was a Beirut rival of Rashid Solh who had been favored by President

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[50] Harris (1996) p.112.
[51] Stoakes (1975) p.233.
[52] Weinberger (1986) p.114.

Franjieh, one of Asad's close allies in Lebanon.[53] Asad also needed to establish ties with Nasserists, since their influence was increasing as a result of their joining in the LNM and aligning with the Palestinians. In December 1971 the Lebanese government arrested Nasserists Najah Wakim and Kamal Shatila for publishing an illegal journal, but Syria succeeded in pressuring the government to release them. Wakim later won a parliamentary seat in the 1972 election, and Shatila was at the time Secretary-General of the Nasserist Union, of which both he and Wakim were founding members.[54]

Syrian-Shi'ite relations were based on mutual self-interest, and Asad calculated that if Lebanon's Shi'ite leader acknowledged the Alawis as part of the Shi'ite sect, it would help him to control the majority Sunnis at home, who had deep misgivings about the Alawi-dominated Asad regime.[55] After the anti-Ba'th Sunni disturbances in 1973, Musa Sadr, then the head of the Higher Shi'ite Council in Lebanon, responded to Asad's need by issuing a religious sanction (fatwa) stating that the Alawis constituted a community of Shi'ites.[56] Asad, for his part, acknowledged the increasing power of the Shi'ites in Lebanon under Sadr and was able to meet Sadr's need for a strong external patron as a means to further consolidate his power.

Syrian-Druze relations were further strengthened, after Jumblatt supported the election of Franjieh to the presidency in 1970. The fact that he had retained his position as interior minister until 1972[57] and was

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[53] Goria (1985) p.136. /Johnson (1986) pp.47-50.
[54] Johnson (1986) p.180. /Salibi (1976) pp.61-62.
[55] Rabinovich (1985) p.37.
[56] Ajami (1986) p.174.
[57] The newly-formed cabinet led by Salem after the 1972 parliamentary elections ousted Jumblatt, because of worsening relations between them. Salem actually tried to contain Jumblatt's power during the elections, in fear of latter's increasing popularity among the Muslims. [Khazen (2000) p. 203.]

responsible for regulating Palestinian guerilla activities, his closeness to the Palestinians, and the increasing power of the LNM led Asad to maintain close relations with him. Jumblatt, on the other hand, understood that the Palestinian activities in Lebanon relied largely on the supply of arms from Syria and that this supply and Lebanon-based operations against Israel could be jeopardized or impeded by a deterioration in Lebanese-Syrian relations. Furthermore, such a development could weaken his power and threaten his position, since the LNM was aligned with the Palestinians in a common struggle against the sectarian-based Lebanese state.[58]

Besides these Lebanese sub-state groups, Syria used its ties with a number of Palestinian groups in Lebanon as a means to secure its own national security and its political and economic interests in Lebanon. Initially, Syrian relations with Fatah were poor, because, at the time of Black September in 1970, Asad, who was then Commander of the Syrian Air Force, had declined to provide air cover for the armed forces entering Jordan on the side of the Palestinians, a refusal which resulted in the slaughter of Palestinians by Jordanian troops.[59] In contrast, relations with radical Palestinian groups were fairly good.[60] In fact, Syria gained a position to exert influence over them until 1973.[61] The balance was tipped toward Syria in mid-1974, when it was able to get its client organization, Saiqa, to soften its radicalism. Being thus dissociated from radicalism, Syria showed Kissinger its acceptance of his diplomatic approach toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.[62]

In the long run, Asad, in parallel with his gradual consolidation of power, was successful in establishing good relations with Lebanese sub-state groups

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[58] Goria (1985) pp.106-107.
[59] Ma'oz and Yaniv (1986) pp.195-196.
[60] Cobban (1984) p.144. /Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch (1973) pp.62-63. / Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna (1981) p.34.
[61] Khazen (2000) p.214.
[62] Khazen (2000) p.223.

and the Palestinians, except for a few cases, and, by using these ties, he came to be directly involved in Lebanese affairs. In fact, Syria exerted pressure in order to prevent the selection of Sa'eb Salem as successor to Takieddin Solh by using its close ties with Jumblatt and Franjieh.[63] However, Syria's main concerns were the Palestinian guerrilla activities in Lebanon; and their effect on its security position in Lebanon along with its political and economic stakes there. Syrian attitude and behavior toward the Palestine cause were also affected by Asad's recognition of Palestine as a part of Greater Syria and of the Syrian state as heart and champion of the pan-Arabism.

As for the PLO, the heavy losses inflicted on it by the events of Black September in 1970 was a major factor in determining Fatah's cautious approach in Lebanon. Yet, while the PLO spokesman officially announced the continuation of a temporary freeze on its guerilla activities in southern Lebanon, the PLO leadership sometimes found it difficult to ensure that this order was carried out, since it was opposed by the radical PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, and some Fatah field commanders. In fact there were a number of small incidents between the guerillas and the Lebanese army, but the real peak came in April 1973, when an Israeli commando raid in the heart of Beirut left three major Palestinian figures dead. The failure of the Lebanese army to intercept the raiders caused a storm of protest from the Palestinians and the LNM forces.[64]

In May, a Palestinian takeover of parts of suburban Beirut and provocations of the Lebanese army by radical Palestinian groups, such as the PFLP, the DFLP, the PFLP-GC, and Saiqa, all associated with the LNM, forced Franjieh to take action. When the DFLP kidnapped several Lebanese soldiers at the beginning of May, the army, in its largest operation against

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[63] Goria (1985) p.168. /Harris (1996) pp.155-156, p.159. /Khazen (2000) p.231.

the Palestinians since 1969, surrounded the refugee camps in Beirut, and Arafat's Fatah was quickly involved.[65] Despite a succession of cease-fire agreements, clashes between the army and the commandos continued for over two weeks, spreading from Beirut to other parts of the country.[66] The climax in these confrontations was the use of the Lebanese air force against the commandos.[67]

However, the air raids were quickly brought to a halt following the considerable pressure exerted on Franjieh by Syria and other Arab regimes. Egypt and Syria, which were planning what would become the October 1973 War, were especially anxious not to escalate the situation, and brought great pressure to bear on the Lebanese government. Syria closed the Lebanese-Syrian border on May 8, and ordered Fatah and Saiqa forces to move from Syria into Lebanese territory.[68] Although relations between Franjieh and Asad were seriously aggravated by the crisis, the fact that they had long had a close relationship helped to make it possible for them to reach an accommodation. Egyptian interest in containing the conflict also contributed to the halting of Lebanese air raids on the Palestinian camps.[69] Within two weeks, Franjieh responded to the request of his friend in Damascus, suspended army operations, and made an accord with the PLO in mid-May (the Melkart Agreement) which was based on the principles of the Cairo Agreement.[70] The closure of the border was the same form of pressure that

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[64] Brynen (1990) pp.61-62. /Khazen (2000) pp.196-206.
[65] Harris (1996) p.157. /Khazen (2000) p.206. /*SWB* May 4, 1973.
[66] Salibi (1976) p.68.
[67] *SWB* May 9, 1973.
[68] Brynen (1990) p.62.
[69] Goria (1985) p.144.
[70] Though the Melkart Agreement was more comprehensive and detailed than the Cairo Agreement, their backbone of contents was that while Lebanon acknowledged the PLO supremacy in the refugee camps, the Palestinians should respect Lebanese sovereignty and accommodate their activities not to violate it.[Brynen (1990) pp.50-51. /Harris (1996) pp.153-154.

had led to the conclusion of the 1969 Cairo Agreement.[71] Its success this time as well as the decline of Egyptian power after the death of Nasser and Asad's rising power regionally and domestically enabled him to link the negotiations to reopen the border with other issues to do with Syria's political and economic stakes in Lebanon.

With a lower standard of living in Syria than in Lebanon, thousands of Syrians went to Lebanon in search of employment, which in itself created tensions of a sort: their wages were lower than those of their Lebanese counterparts, and Lebanese employers generally preferred to hire Syrians, who were not accorded social security entitlements by Lebanese law.[72] Syrian Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam demanded that their working conditions and health insurance be fully in accordance with Lebanese labour law. The response of the Lebanese Foreign Minister, Fouad Naffah, was to stress that although working conditions could be discussed in principle, to offer health coverage to thousands of Syrian workers, at a time when even most Lebanese workers were not covered, was virtually impossible. With regard to political issues, Syria demanded that the Lebanese government control anti-Syrian movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni fundamentalist organization that had originated in Egypt and whose leader Issam Attar was now based in Lebanon. It also asked the government to censor anti-Syrian articles in the Lebanese press.[73] Syria's demands reflected its concern that although Asad's power was increasing, he still had to be careful not to arouse anti-government feeling among Sunnis in Syria. There was a potential transstate influence running from Lebanon to Syria. Syria was in fact still somewhat permeable, and the Asad regime was actually

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/Khazen (2000) pp.208-211. /*SWB* May 21, 1973.]

[71] *FCO* 17/835 no.259, November 1 and *FCO* 17/835 no.280, November 7, 1969.

[72] Gordon (1980) p.91.

struck by Sunni rebellions in 1973 and later in 1977-1980 which however it managed to appease or repress.

As the border negotiations and other political and economic negotiations progressed, differing views on each issue led to a worsening of relations between the two countries. However, after Franjieh sent his son, Tony, to Damascus, Syria dropped its demands and restored normal relations by reopening the borders. Syria may also have been satisfied by the Lebanese government's acknowledgement of Damascus as a key power broker.[74] This accommodation between Franjieh and Asad set the stage for the cooperative behavior between Lebanon and Syria during the October War in 1973: when Israeli and Syrian fighters clashed over Lebanese air-space over the Beqaa and southern Lebanon, the Lebanese government agreed to allow Syria to make use of Lebanon's radar systems.[75]

After the end of the October War, Israel continued to carry out military attacks, particularly against southern Lebanon. The fighting between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians accordingly intensified during 1974, and the Lebanese government banned the carrying and use of arms in public.[76] Against this, Syria, through Saiqa's chairman Zuhair Muhsin, stated that it would not support a ban on firearms among commandos in the South.[77] On the other hand, the Lebanese Prime Minister, Rashid Solh, tried to buy Soviet-made SAM missiles to use against Israel's air raids, and discussed this issue with Asad.[78] While Syria opposed the restrictions on the Palestinian armed struggle in Lebanon from the point of view of pan-Arabism, it took a supportive attitude toward Lebanon's effort to defend

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[73] Khazen (2000) pp.212-214.
[74] Khazen (2000) pp.213-214.
[75] Goria (1985) p.160.
[76] *SWB* September 21 and September 23, 1974.
[77] Goria (1985) p.167.
[78] *SWB* December 18, December 19, and December 21, 1974.

itself from the Israeli threat by strengthening its military capability.

In the long run, Kisssinger's "step-by-step" diplomatic approach after the October 1973 War did little to lessen tensions in Lebanon. As Kissinger's diplomacy progressed, the Arab unity evident in the October War began to fall apart. Syria was fearful of being isolated by Kissinger's negotiations with Egypt and Israel, and began to suspect that Egypt was moving toward a separate peace with Israel. This led it to pay more attention to the situation of its neighboring countries, particularly Lebanon which could be a point of vulnerability Israel could exploit as Egypt disengaged from the Arab-Israeli power balance. The Palestinians also became increasingly worried that the road was being prepared for an unsatisfactory settlement in which their national rights to "Palestine" would be compromised. Maronite leaders were concerned that a situation was developing in which Lebanon would become the sole state hosting Palestinian activities, and that this threatened its sovereignty; their militias increasingly clashed with the Palestinians.[79] Under these destabilizing domestic and external circumstances surrounding the Lebanese state, civil war finally erupted in April 1975.

[79] Brynen (1990) pp.76-78.

Ⅲ. THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR AND SYRIAN INTERVENTION (1975－1989)

During the state of "semi-anarchy" of the civil war, what was left of the Lebanese government tried to restore internal order by political, military, and economic means. These included several reconciliation efforts and the formation of cross-sectarian coalition cabinets, attempts at reunification of the Lebanese army, and several economic reconstruction programs. In so doing the Lebanese state had to be mindful of Syria's role and actions, since this country had become the most dominant influence on Lebanese soil. Since Syrian policy toward Lebanon, which was largely a reflection of the regional dynamics of the Middle East, was characterised by its use not only of diplomatic ties with the Lebanese state but also of transstate ties with Lebanese sub-state groups, Lebanese state officials were forced to react concurrently to both state level and sub-state level influence from Syria, while at the same time keeping an eye on regional circumstances. Therefore, before discussing the political, military, and economic dimensions of Lebanese state dealings with Syria, it will be helpful first to discuss the external and internal contexts of relations between the two countries.

1. HOW THE DYNAMICS OF MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AFFECTED LEBANON AND SYRIA

(1) Introduction

The international and regional arenas inevitably had a major impact on Syria, Lebanon, their relations, and even the interests and actions of Lebanon's sub-state actors. A series of inter-Arab struggles, which fragmented the Arab world, affected Syrian behaviour in Lebanon and were

reproduced inside Lebanon, notably the Egypt-Syria conflict over Sadat's separate diplomacy with Israel and the Iraq-Syria struggle after the Iran-Iraq War. However, at the same time efforts through the Arab League and typically led by Saudi Arabia to mediate inter-Arab struggles and conflict in Lebanon were made. Also regional struggles such as the Israeli-Syrian struggle and the Iran-Iraq War impacted on Lebanon. Finally, at the international level the Soviet-American Cold War was played out in the region and specifically in Lebanon as the USA intervened in the Middle East and Lebanese conflicts, often on the Israeli side, but occasionally to support Maronite actors, while the USSR gave some support to Syria.

(2) Egypt's Separate Diplomacy toward Israel and Syrian Concern

When the civil war erupted in Lebanon on April 13, 1975, relations between Syria and Egypt were poor. Their discord had originated in Sadat's decision during the October War not to further pursue the campaign in Sinai after pushing the Israeli forces back from the Suez Canal, which allowed Israel to concentrate on the northern border and led to Syrian reverses.[1] At the same time Saudi Arabia took the initiative on relations between Syria and Egypt, with its attempts to reconcile the differences between them. In mid-April 1975 the Saudis convened a trilateral conference in Riyadh that led to a reconciliation, albeit partial and temporary, between Egypt and Syria. Later, the Interim Sinai Agreement in September 1975 (Sinai Ⅱ) was to lead to a further deterioration in Egyptian-Syrian relations. Since the agreement did not refer to the situation in the Golan Heights and made Syria more vulnerable to Israel while at the same time securing Egyptian-Israeli border, the Asad regime seemed to interpret it as a further and complete betrayal by

[1] Taylor (1982) p.68.

Egypt.[2]

It is this that led Syria to focus serious attention on Lebanon. The Egypt-Syria conflict spilled over into Lebanon with each having local proxies. Moreover, Syria was vulnerable to an Israeli attack via Lebanese territory since the Lebanese border stretched across the whole western part of southern Syria, thus offering access to Damascus and central Syria. Although Lebanon was a "confrontational state" only in the 1948 War, Syria had long recognised its neighbour's potential military significance in view of its geostrategic location.[3] Given Syria's increased vulnerability to Israel as Egypt withdrew from the Arab-Israeli power balance, Asad gave increased attention to Lebanon and attempted to dampen the civil war, as the turmoil potentially gave Israel a cause for intervention in Lebanon. Over time, Syria's initial mediatory activities and indirect intervention through proxy forces were stepped up to the level of direct military intervention.[4]

(3) The US and Israeli Roles in Syria's Intervention

At the same time, this increased Syrian involvement in Lebanon caused considerable Israeli concern. In 1976, when the escalation of the Lebanese conflict threatened to bring about a direct military confrontation between Syria and Israel over Lebanon, the "Red Line" Agreement, the aim of which was to prevent this happening by guaranteeing respect for mutual security needs, was arranged with the support of the United States.[5] Kissinger recognised that Asad's fear of an Israeli intervention in Lebanon to save the Christians forced him to attempt to keep the LNM and Palestinians under control and to avoid their placing the Maronites in a corner. Since such a

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[2] Taylor (1982) pp.66-68.
[3] Sirriyeh (1989) pp.37-38. /Weinberger (1986) p.271. /Petran (1975) p.8.
[4] For the details of Syrian involvement, see Avi-Ran (1991) pp.19-48.
[5] Gerges (1997) p.94.

Syrian attempt to pacify Lebanon was beneficial to the Israelis, Israel made this secret agreement, allowing the entry of a small number of Syrian troops into the northern part of Lebanon.[6] The agreement also "entailed Asad's renewed commitment to join in the peace process under American supervision with the aim of reaching an agreement with Israel on ending the state of war in return for its withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders."[7] Since Syria expected "Golan II" to be the eventual outcome, it needed to show the USA that its activity in Lebanon was moderate and that it did not pose a threat to Israel. The "Red Line" Agreement stimulated a Syrian-Maronite alliance, and the Syrian policy of taking the side of the Maronites gave a favourable opportunity to President Franjieh. Since he had been heavily handicapped by the powerful LNM-Palestinian coalition, he managed to deal with the coalition by aligning with Syria during the spring and summer of 1976.

(4) Saudi Intervention and Creation of the ADF

While Syria aligned with the Maronites, Egypt had been supporting the LNM and the Palestinians. As a result, tensions between Syria and Egypt were at their worst. This situation heightened Saudi Arabian concerns and led to Riyadh's efforts to resolve both the Lebanese conflict and the Egyptian-Syrian discord. On the one hand, Egypt had traditionally opposed attempts to unify the Eastern Arab region, and it interpreted Asad's behaviour toward Lebanon as a move in this direction. On the other hand, Syria, by the end of September 1976, had gained a sufficiently dominant position in Lebanon to impose its own settlement by military force.

However, Asad's calculation led him to conclude that the inter-Arab solution

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[6] Seale (1988) pp.278-280.
[7] Sela (1998) p.181.

which Saudi Arabia was beginning to sponsor would be more advantageous, because of the costs, in both political and financial terms, of dominating Lebanon. Asad also had to worry about backlash against his alignment against the Palestinians and the Muslims, which was de-legitimised in the Arab world and in Syria. He thus needed to get out of the anti-PLO and Muslim conflict. Since Saudi-Egyptian relations were still good, Saudi Arabia succeeded in convening a preliminary meeting in Riyadh in mid-October, and a week later an Arab League conference was held in Cairo.[8]

Syria's and Egypt's cooperative behaviour in both meetings led to some positive measures to end the Lebanese conflict. In fact, the symbolic Arab Security Force (ASF) of 2,500 troops, which had been created on the basis of resolutions at an Arab League conference in Cairo on June 8, and whose aim was largely to replace the Syrian army which had already entered Lebanon on June 1, was expanded to the 30,000-strong Arab Deterrent Force (ADF). The ADF's mandate was to implement a cease-fire, to assist the Lebanese government in reestablishing its authority over public affairs, and to supervise the withdrawal of all armed forces to the positions they had held before the start of the civil war. Though this decision by the Arab League might have intended, as in the creation of the ASF, to contain the Syrian role in Lebanon, it led to the legitimising of the Syrian presence under the ADF banner.

Since the Arab states could not reach agreement on the sizes of national contingents of the ADF, the Arab League left this issue to the newly-elected Lebanese President, Elias Sarkis. His own election to the presidency having been due to Syrian help, he determined that the ADF should be comprised of up to 25,000 Syrian troops, despite the PLO demand that the number should

[8] Taylor (1982) p.64, pp.68-69.

not exceed 10,000.[9]

(5) Sadat's Trip to Jerusalem and Israeli Aggression under the Likud Government

After the creation of the ADF, the Lebanese situation was relatively calm in the first half of 1977. However, Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977, the Camp David Accords in 1978, and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979 had a profound impact on inter-Arab politics as well as, by extension, on the Syrian and Lebanese situations. Asad's vulnerability increased considerably since he was forced to stand alone against the Israeli threat.[10] In addition, the establishment in 1977 of the aggressive Likud government, led by Menachem Begin, increased his concern, since this government aimed to expel Syria and the PLO from Lebanon by upgrading its alliance with the Maronites, which dated back to early 1976 when Israel had supplied them with weapons and trained their militias. Prime Minister Begin ordered the Litani Operation on southern Lebanon in 1978, the beginning of an Israeli aggression which would culminate in the massive operation on Lebanon in June 1982. Due to Egypt's expulsion from the Arab world and the resulting major Arab-Israeli power imbalance, Israel was able to overtly support the Maronites, both militarily and politically. These circumstances led Asad to shift his alliance from the Maronites to the Muslims and the Palestinians—his traditional allies in Lebanon—in order to contain the Israeli threat. Since Syria had no hope of recovering the Golan through USA mediation after the Camp David Accords, it had no need to show that its policy toward Lebanon was moderate by facilitating a calming of the Lebanese-Israeli border.

Despite this shift of Syrian policy which opened the possibility of increased

[9] Pogany (1987) pp.108-109. /Thompson (2002) pp.75-76.

turmoil in Lebanon, Lebanese President Sarkis generally refrained from taking any action which could be provocative to the Syrians and instead attempted to solicit Arab intervention.[11] Sarkis tried to solicit some Arab and international backing for Lebanese sovereignty and to get some autonomy of Syria without antagonising it. After the failure of short-lived international efforts in the fall of 1979 by France and the USA (the latter sent former Under-Secretary of State Philip Habib) to resolve the Lebanese turmoil, Sarkis gave more emphasis to an inter-Arab settlement for the South. Since the PLO's military presence there was also a headache for Sarkis's Sunni counterpart, Prime Minister Salim Hoss, who had been nominated by Sarkis in December 1976 and was grappling with economic reconstruction, Sarkis gained Hoss's backing to adopt a strong stand at the 1979 Arab League summit of Tunis. However, the distance between the Palestinian and Lebanese positions led to a heated debate between Arafat and Sarkis. Since Syria needed an armed Palestinian presence in the South to counter the increased pressure from both Israel and the Maronite Lebanese Front[12], the Syrian attitude during the conference was passive. Eventually the conference rejected a Lebanese plan calling for, among other things, the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon south of the Litani, and the summit session devoted to the South was finally abandoned without a final public communiqué.[13]

Since the situation in the South continued to be perilous, the Lebanese government instructed its representative at the Arab League as early as July 1981 to ask for an Arab summit that would focus especially on the issue of southern Lebanon. When the Fez summit was convened in November to

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[10] Sela (1998) p.195.
[11] Hitti (1989) p.20. /Sela (1998) p.195. /Zamir (1999) p.121.
[12] As for the details of this coalition, see the section of the Maronites and Syria (pp.104-105).

discuss the peace plan proposed by Fahd, Lebanon submitted a paper on the South and managed, in spite of disagreements over the Fahd Plan, to obtain an unanimous resolution concerning the South. However, the effecting of this resolution was impeded by a polarisation between the moderate and hard-line Arab states and by confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Syria mainly deriving from the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq War in which Syria backed Iran.[14]

(6) The Fragmentation in the Arab World and the Alliance between Syria and Iran

The Iran-Iraq War brought about a new and immediate fragmentation in the Arab world which manifested itself in two distinct blocs. On the one hand there was an Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian axis which became increasingly viable, the focus of a powerful alignment within the Arab system in the first half of 1980s. On the other hand there emerged a Syrian-Libyan axis resulting from the isolation of these countries. Syria was excluded from the Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian axis because of the collapse of its brief unity talks with Iraq in 1979, its support for Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, and the worsened relations that came with these. At the same time, Syria and Iran were driven into a close alliance by their common hostility or vulnerability to Iraq and Israel. Libya was isolated by its leader Mu'ammur Quadhafi's many adventures and destructive activities with regard to neighbouring countries.[15]

As a result, the relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia, which were important for Syria's position in Lebanon, became strained. At the same time, Syria's alliance with Iran had repercussions in Lebanon, and made Israel's military operation in Lebanon increasingly costly. With Syrian agreement,

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[13] Brynen (1990) pp.146-148. /*MEI* November 23, 1979.
[14] Haddad (1985) pp.68-69. /*MEI* November 27, 1981.

Iran sent Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon during the Israeli invasion in the summer of 1982.[16] The alliance led Syria to allow Iranian sponcership of Hizbollah in 1982. While Iran supported Islamic movements such as the Islamic Unification Movement in Tripoli and Islamic Amal in the Beqaa, its main pillar in Lebanon was Hizbollah.[17]

Under the establishment of Israeli hegemony in Lebanon as a result of its 1982 invasion, the alliance between Syria and Iran made it possible for Hizbollah to attack Israeli forces and the Amin Jumayiel administration (who was elected in September 1982 under Israeli supervision after his elder brother's assassination) seen by the group as a Western surrogate. In October 1983, Hizbollah pursued twin-suicide attacks against the American and French army bases in the Multi National Forces (MNF), with the aim of expelling Western power from Lebanon and shaking Jumayiel's regime. These attacks actually contributed to the MNF's withdrawal in February 1984, the abrogation of the May 17 Agreement (which was concluded in 1983 between Israel and Syria under American guidance and was a virtual "separate" peace treaty) in March 1984, and the resulting recovery of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon.[18]

However, Iran's support for the radical Hizbollah was later at odds with Syria's well-calculated and cautious policy toward Lebanon, and Syria was specifically concerned about Hizbollah's activities such as hijacking and kidnapping Westerners.[19] In effect, the Damascus-Tehran axis became strained, and the most important example of such tensions was the conflict between the Syrian-supported Amal and Hizbollah that took place in the

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[16] Taylor (1982) pp.81-91.
[17] Hanf (1993) p.280.
[18] Sirriyeh (1989) p.44.
[19] Ranstorp (1997) pp.116-117.
[19] For the details of Hizbollah's these activities, see Ranstorp (1997) pp.60-78.

latter part of the 1980s. Following these confrontations between their respective clients, Syria and Iran eventually managed to rein in their rivalry and to keep their alliance intact by forming the Damascus Agreement in January 1989.[20]

(7) The USA-USSR Rivalry and the Israeli Hegemony in Lebanon

Since the détente between the superpowers was ended by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and by the subsequent coming to power of President Ronald Reagan in 1980, the Middle East, as usual in the Third World, became an arena for superpower rivalry and surrogate conflict. Israel and its Lebanese allies, especially the Maronites, exploited the new situation to contain Syrian-Muslim-Palestinian advances in Lebanon and to create an Israeli-dominated order. They realised that the Reagan administration tended to see issues in the Third World as extensions of the Cold War, and thus articulated their own causes in terms of the USA-USSR confrontation.

In fact, Lebanese President Amin Jumayiel, who was elected in September 1982 under Israeli hegemony in Lebanon as a result of its massive invasion during the summer, made the May 17 Agreement with Israel under the pretext of defending the Middle East from "communist threats". He may also have calculated that encouraging the USA to look at Lebanon in Cold War terms might result in Lebanon being able to negotiate more equally with both Syria and Israel.[21]

During the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, the Amin Jumayiel administration considered a peace treaty with Israel as out of the question since that would risk further domestic conflict and outside intervention,

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[20] Ellis (1999) p.14. /Sela (1998) p.240. /For the details of Syrian-Iranian rivalry and cooperation over the Shi'ites, see the part of Shi'ites and Syria in the section 2 (dealing with sub-state groups) of this chapter.
[21] Gerges (1997) pp.95-97.

especially from Syria. But Israel hoped, as the price for its withdrawal from Lebanon, to conclude a peace treaty, normalise relations, and isolate Syria, and it became clear that the USA had no intention of pressuring Israel to change this position.[22] Lebanese-Israeli negotiations reached a stalemate, and it was the shuttle diplomacy between Israel and Lebanon of Secretary of State George Shultz that helped them to complete a draft agreement which was finally signed by both Lebanon and Israel on May 17, 1983 (the May 17 Agreement). However, Shultz, despite his earlier pro-Arab stance, did not assume the role of impartial mediator, surrendered to the powerful pro-Israeli lobby in the USA, and ignored Syrian interests : the agreement was, in spite of Lebanese objections, a virtual "separate" peace treaty. The Lebanese government was disappointed with the USA.[23]

In fact the agreement would have imposed Israeli hegemony in Lebanon by opening Lebanon to Israeli armed forces and products, and by banning Arab forces on Lebanese land, with the simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian forces being stipulated as a condition for Israel's withdrawal. Though the USA and Israel calculated that a militarily weakened Syria had no choice but to accept these terms, Syria refused to withdraw from Lebanon on the basis of this agreement and demanded its complete abrogation.[24] This demand was based firstly on Syria's assertion that the agreement violated Lebanese sovereignty and that it would strengthen Israeli-Maronite ties. In this regard Syria objected particularly to the formation of Lebanese-Israeli Joint Supervisory Teams, which were to be under the control of Israeli military officers and whose role was to patrol the Lebanese-Israeli border. Secondly, Syria considered the agreement as a threat to its own national security since it accorded considerable control to Israel over the whole of the south,

[22] Salem (1992) p.20.
[23] Seale (1988) pp.405-409.

prohibited any opposition on its territory to Israel, and banned the passage through Lebanon or its air space of troops, weapons, and equipment to or from any state not having diplomatic relations with Israel. Thirdly, as a self-proclaimed champion of the Palestinian and Arab cause, Syria calculated that any step-by-step arrangement with Israel would weaken Palestinian leverage, not to mention its own leverage in bargaining over the Golan. It dismissed the agreement as the second "Camp David" accord.[25]

Syria in the end refused to withdraw from Lebanon on the basis of the agreement, and its initiatives to promote Lebanese opposition to the agreement resulted in the National Salvation Front (NSF). Syria and the NSF confronted the Israeli forces and its allies in Lebanon, notably the Jumayiel administration and the Maronites in the Shuf during the summer and autumn of 1983, so-called the "Shuf War". Though Jumayiel relied on Israel and the USA to contain the Syrian-backed NSF forces, Israel suffered large numbers of casualties and, mindful of the risks that would follow a confrontation with Syrian forces that were reinforced by Soviet aid, chose in September to withdraw from the Shuf to the Awali river in the South.[26] Based on a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union which Syria had concluded in October 1980, negotiations between the two countries had led the USSR in late 1982 and early 1983 to send some 5000 military advisors to Syria, together with SAM-5 missiles, thus providing Asad with enough power to confront the Israeli forces and to destroy the May 17 Agreement between Israel and Lebanon which would have dragged Lebanon into Israel's orbit.[27] In addition, a succession of fierce Shi'ite attacks against the US presence in Lebanon—the April bombing of its embassy and

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[24] Hinnebusch (1998) p.143. /Seale (1988) pp.408-409. /Thompson (2002) p.78.
[25] Haddad (1985) pp.94-95. /Petran (1987) p.311.
[26] Hinnebusch (1998) p.144. /Seale (1988) p.414.
[27] Seale (1997) pp.70-72.

the October bombings of MNF facilities including the US Marine Corps barracks—had an impact on the Reagan administration, and the USA finally decided in February 1984 to withdraw its MNF troops.[28] Jumayiel's leaning toward the USA and Israel evoked disapproval in Muslim circles supported by Syria and Iran and also led to huge and violent uprisings, resulting, in March 1984, in the Lebanese abrogation of the May 17 Agreement. Having lost his two patrons, Jumayiel now attempted without much success to reestablish close relations with Syria.[29]

(8) Arab Intervention in the Lebanese Conflict : Road to the Ta'if Agreement

With Israeli hegemony in Lebanon decreasing, Syrian began to rebuild its hegemony there. However, Lebanon continued to be in a dangerous condition during the latter part of 1980s, since Syria and its client force Amal were in confrontation with the Arafat-led PLO and Hizbollah in the battle of Palestinian refugee camps, the so-called "Camps War". Initially, Arab countries had left Lebanese affairs in Syrian hands. However, the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 led to the redirection of Arab attention from the Gulf region to the Levant, the other areas of unrest in the region. In addition, Egypt's return to the Arab fold in 1987 reversed the fragmentation within the Arab system. As a result, Arab countries began early in 1989 to show more interest in the Lebanese conflict and to take responsibility for resolving the conflict. An Arab League committee criticised Syria for a lack of cooperation in its mediation efforts and Iraq, whose attention was now free of the Iran-Iraq War, called for an Arab emergency summit to discuss the crisis in Lebanon arising from the failure to elect a successor to Jumayiel whose

[28] Seale (1988) pp.405-418.
[29] Salem (1994) p.75.

term was expired in September 1988, and which brought about the collapse of government unity. Iraqi-Syrian rivalry played out in Lebanon led to heavy conflict there, thus stimulating increased Arab involvement in attempts to settle it. Iraq supplied arms to the Lebanese Forces and supported the government led by General Michael Awn, whom Jumayiel had nominated as prime minister, whereas Syria declared that the government led by Salim Hoss continued to be the legitimate government.[30] In September 1989, Saudi Arabia, backed by the USA and other Arab states, finally succeeded in persuading Syria, which had been putting up a tough fight against the Iraqi-backed Lebanese forces, into accepting the Arab peace plan for Lebanon (the Ta'if Agreement), which became the basis for the formation of post-war Lebanon and also stipulated the "special" relationship between Lebanon and Syria. The reason why the Saudis were able to play an important role in making the Ta'if Agreement was that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) established in May 1981, which consisted of Oman, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, and which was led by Saudi Arabia, served to considerably increase Saudi power in the regional arena.[31]

(9) Brief Summary

In sum, it could be said that Lebanon's collapsed and penetrated condition was affected by the international/regional rivalries in the Middle East. This was true particularly in terms of the inter-Arab struggles between Syria and Egypt and between Syria and Iraq; the regional struggles, manifestations of which being the conflict between Syria and Israel and the Iran-Iraq War; and a dimension of USA-USSR Cold War confrontation in the Third World. While

[30] Sirriyeh (1989) pp.45-46.
[31] Barnett (1998) p.201. /Ismael (1986) p.61.

Saudi Arabia and the Arab League tried to contain regional rivalries and to stabilise Lebanon through the introduction of the ADF and the formation of the Ta'if Agreement, these Arab and Saudi efforts tended to end up legitimising Syria's role in Lebanon.

2. THE BASIC INTERESTS OF LEBANESE SUB-STATE GROUPS AND SYRIA, AND A BRIEF SURVEY OF THEIR RELATIONS

(1) Introduction

The state of "semi-anarchy" in Lebanon allowed sub-state actors to increase their activities and to become more or less organised and armed militias. The main groups, such as the Maronites, the Sunnis, the Shi'ites, the Druzes, and the Palestinians, all had relations in one form or another with Syria. These relations were largely determined by Syria's position as a regional middle power in the Middle East, by Syrian domestic circumstances, and by the calculations of the sub-state groups in Lebanon. On the one hand Syria used these sub-state groups to serve its own national interests, acting as a balancer, aggressor, and patron during the conflict. Syria also tried to minimise its reliance on any single group or identification with a particular side in the conflict for purposes of legitimising its presence in Lebanon, even though Abukhalil's characterisation of Syrian policy as one of drawing a distinction between friends and foes at particular junctures seems valid.[32] For their part, the Lebanese sub-state actors saw Syrian involvement as an opportunity for them to pursue or protect their own interests, and their behaviour was mainly determined by a combination of power calculations and the identity of each group. This section will briefly focus on the behaviour of the sub-state groups in Lebanon and on their relations with

[32] Abulhalil (1994) pp.128-130.

Syria.

(2) The Maronites and Syria

The three main parties with a Christian-Maronite orientation, and their militias, constituted the political and military pillars of the Maronite community. They were Pierre Jumayiel's Phalange Party, Camille Chamoun's National Liberal Party, and Suleiman Franjieh's group. Maronite identity would, other things being equal, have made them opponents of Syrian influence in Lebanon; but power calculations could either reinforce or dilute this orientation, depending on the context. The Phalange Party initially took a position between Franjieh's cooperative attitude toward Syria and Chamoun's long-term distrust and hostility toward it, which had its origin in the 1958 civil war, and Jumayiel actually visited Damascus in December 1975. Despite their different points of view, Jumayiel and Chamoun formed in January 1976 the "Front for Liberty and Man" (later known as the Lebanese Front), with Chamoun as president and with Jumayiel leading the Lebanese Forces as a joint militia against the powerful Muslim-PLO forces. In addition to these groups, there were "moderate" Christian leaders who had flexible views on power sharing with the Muslims in the Lebanese political system, and who attempted to find a modus vivendi with the Palestinians that would still preserve Lebanese sovereignty. After the spring of 1975 Elias Sarkis, the former Shihabist statesman, became the most prominent representative of this trend.[33] Maronite relations with Syria changed dramatically as their needs and circumstances altered.

Fearing that the Lebanese Forces would not be able to withstand the heavy offensive by the LNM-PLO coalition, Franjieh and Jumayiel requested Syria in May 1976 to send its army into Lebanon. The conditions of the deal were

[33] Deeb (1980) pp.21-59. /Rabinovich (1985) pp.60-74.

that Syria would protect the Maronites from the coalition and implement a political solution based on the "Constitutional Documents" which had been formed under Syrian supervision in February and which stipulated the preservation of confessional system, and that the Maronites in turn would agree to a Syrian "special role" in Lebanon. However, once the Maronites were free from the threat of military and political defeat, they gradually came to oppose Syria, partly because Syria was renewing its alliances with the Muslims and the Palestinians. However, they also understood that to expel the Syrians would be more difficult than it had been to invite them into Lebanon, and that they had to some extent surrendered their freedom of action.[34]

After 1976 there emerged three types of attitude toward Syria among the Maronite leaders. Franjieh, who had maintained close ties with the Syrians and particularly with the Asad families, and who also owed the prevention of his earlier ouster from the presidency to Syrian help, advocated that close relations with Syria be maintained. President Sarkis accepted Syrian influence as a dominant force in Lebanon, but sought to contain it with the help of the United States and other Arab countries. A third, but prevailing, Maronite attitude toward Syria advocated by the Lebanese Front sought the recovery of Maronite political and military power against Syria by seeking a strategic alliance with Israel, and took the form of the Lebanese Forces (LF) leading an armed struggle against the Syrian-led ADF in Lebanon. Aware that the Maronites could not restore their hegemony over Lebanon, the Lebanese Front also sought a Christian mini-state as part of a "canonisation" of Lebanon which provoked strong Syrian opposition, since it would lead to an increased Israeli role in Lebanon.[35]

In addition to the above hostile attitude toward Syria, the Lebanese Front

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[34] Zamir (1999) pp.119-120.

also sought leverage over Syria by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood which inflicted severe blows on the Asad regime during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Though Syria accused the Phalange Party of facilitating the brotherhood's movement in Lebanon and of being involved with it inside Syria, Syria hoped to put an end to this alleged involvement by improving relations with the Lebanese Front. In addition, Syria was keen on terminating the new relations between the Lebanese Front and its hostile neighbour Iraq after Chamoun stated that Iraq should play a more effective role in Lebanon.[36]

After the assassination of Bashir Jumayiel by an alleged Syrian agent, the Maronites realised that their alliance with Israel had become too costly and a threat to Maronite solidarity, as it split the community between pro-Israeli and pro-Syrian figures. In May 1983, Franjieh joined the National Salvation Front (NSF) with Karami and Jumblatt, which was formed at Syria's initiative and mediation between the three leaders, and which aimed to abrogate the May 17 Agreement with Israel.[37] Maronite solidarity was also shattered by internal conflict. Faced with younger militia leaders such as Elie Hubayka and Samir Ja'ja, who had consolidated their power through armed conflict and by challenging the traditional leadership, the ageing Camille Chamoun and Pierre Jumayiel began to lose the power they had once possessed within the community.[38] The death of Pierre Jumayiel in August 1984 had a particularly strong impact on the solidarity of the Maronite community. In February 1985 the Lebanese Forces, led by the pro-Israeli Ja'ja, revolted against the Phalange Party and its leaders. He objected especially to Amin Jumayiel seeking terms with Syria and declared

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[35] Zamir (1999) pp.120-121.
[36] *FBIS*, June 25 and June 26, 1980.
[37] Petran (1987) pp.313-314.
[38] Salem (1995) p.176.

the LF's independence of the party in the areas of security, politics, finance, and information.[39]

However, perceptions within the Lebanese Forces changed, and the idea of reaching an accommodation with Damascus, which had been advocated by the intelligence chief, Hubayka, began to gain support within the group. This was due to the Israeli army's withdrawal in stages between January and June 1985 from most of southern Lebanon and the southern Beqqa to a "security zone" along Israel's northern border, and to the heavy defeat of the LF by the NSF in Sidon, for which Ja'ja had been responsible.[40] However, since his cooperative attitude toward Syria was largely based on his desire to contain Ja'ja's power and to consolidate his position within the Lebanese Forces by using recovered Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, Hubayka's policy did not receive much support within the Maronite community. After he signed the "Tripartite Agreement" with Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt in December 1985 to stabilise Lebanon under Syrian hegemony, the Lebanese Forces splintered. Ja'ja, backed by strong Maronite opposition to the agreement stemming partly from offence taken at Syria's disregard for and by-passing of the Jumayiel's presidency, and also supported by a majority in the Lebanese army command and anti-Syrian Maronites, managed to have Hubayka and his followers ousted to Syrian-controlled Beqqa.[41] After this, Maronite-Syrian relations remained poor and Syria was not successful in finding reliable leaders in the community other than Franjieh.

(3) The Sunnis and Syria

Among the Sunnis in Lebanon the major actors were the "traditional"

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[39] Petran (1987) pp.358-359.
[40] Harris (1996) pp.192-193.
[41] Hanf (1993) pp.306-310. /Harris (1996) pp.193-201. /Petran (1987) pp.368-369.

leaders (zuama), the "moderate" political leaders, the Nasserist organisations, and the Sunni fundamentalists. From a Syrian point of view the Sunnis were a natural ally because of their Arab-oriented identity. Syria also needed to maintain good relations with the Sunnis, since the Alawi-dominated and secular-oriented Asad regime was seen with suspicion by the Sunnis in Syria, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Asad regime was engaged in military confrontations with the Sunni fundamentalist group, the Muslim Brotherhood. Also, since the Sunnis controlled the premiership in Lebanon, cooperation with them was necessary if Syria was to put its Lebanese policy into effect smoothly. On the other hand, because the Sunnis in Lebanon lacked military forces, apart from the relatively weak Nasserist organisations, the community needed the protection of Syrian military and political power. Although they could conceivably have relied on other Arab states to compensate for their decreasing relative power during the civil war, it seems that geographical proximity with Syria played an important role in making it their natural protector.

Syria relied on Sunni zuama power to counter the powerful LNM-PLO coalition and also, in particular, to confront the Israeli-backed Maronite forces, though the power of zuama had diminished during the conflict because of the rising power of the so-called "radical" groups in the Muslim community such as the LNM and Hizbollah. Along with Jumblatt and Franjieh, Rashid Karami participated in the NSF, which was formed to counter the May 17 Agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Sa'eb Salem was initially reluctant to ally himself with the Syrian-backed NSF, even though he condemned Amin Jumayiel's election to the presidency. However, once it was clear to him that the Jumayiel administration had failed to restore security in West Beirut, the seat of his own power base, he associated

himself more closely with the NSF.[42]

Syria relied for its reconstruction efforts mainly on the "moderate" Sunni political leadership. Both Salim Hoss and Shafiq Wazzen were prime ministers under the Sarkis presidency who tried to pacify the country in cooperation with Syria.[43] But Syrian relations with Nasserist organisations such as the Independent Nasserist Movement and its militia, Murabitun, remained strained, except during the first phase of the civil war when Syria supported the LNM-PLO forces. These organisations demanded the abolition of the confessional system, tried to drive the Maronties into a corner, and attempted to further fortify Lebanon as a power base for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel. Syria was concerned about their behaviour since it would provide a base for Syrian dissidents and a pretext for Israeli penetration into Lebanon. Syrian relations with Muslim fundamentalists in Tripoli were also poor, since many Muslim Brotherhood members were flowing into the city and finding protection there, especially after the Hama massacre in 1982.[44]

(4) The Shi'ites and Syria

The Shi'ites community had two main political groups. One was Amal, led by Nabih Berri and calling for a moderate reform of the Lebanese political system. The other was Hizbollah (the Party of God), fronted by its "spiritual leader", Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadhallah, and taking a more radical stance that sometimes brought about clashes with the Syrians.[45] Although both groups had connections with Syria, Amal was the closer ally.

Amal benefited in a number of ways from its relations with Syria. After the

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[42] Johnson (1986) pp.203-210.
[43] Johnson (1986) p.198 and pp.210-211.
[44] Petran (1987) pp.352-353.
[45] For the details of each group, see Deeb (1988) pp.683-698.

disappearance of Musa Sadr, the leadership of Amal, Hussein Husseini from 1978 to 1980, and that of his successor Nabih Berri, ensured that there were good relations with Syria. Having become a dominant force in the Shi'ite community, Amal decided to break ranks with the LNM-PLO coalition since the latter controlled the Shi'ite areas in southern Lebanon using harsh measures, including torture, and this led to an antagonistic Shi'ite attitude toward the coalition. Thus, Amal became one of a small number of pro-Syrian organisations when Syria aligned in June 1976 with the Maronites to contain the LNM-PLO forces. This was perceived by most Muslims as a Syrian betrayal, and in return Syria thereafter treated Amal as one of its most reliable allies in Lebanon. Syrian was motivated in so doing not only by the rising Shi'ite political, military, and demographic power in Lebanon, but also by its need to have a Muslim force in Lebanon to counterbalance the Sunni community, especially when the Muslim Brotherhood attacked the Asad regime. In fact, Amal had a reliable militia, and its strong sympathy toward Asad dated back to 1973, when the then head of the Higher Shi'ite Council in Lebanon, Musa Sadr, issued a fatwa declaring that the Alawis were a Shi'ite Islamic community. Asad also needed Amal as support for his regional policies. Since the penetrated and fragmented Lebanese state was an arena for regional power rivalries, Amal was able to serve as a proxy for Syria's anti-Iraqi activities. Indeed, in the pre-1982 period many pro-Iraqi Ba'th leaders were assassinated by Amal, which was against Saddam Hussein's war on Shi'ite Iran.[46]

After the Israeli invasion, the Iranian-backed Hizbollah increased its power in Lebanon, and Amal emerged as an important means by which Syria could prevent Iran from dominating the Shi'ites in Lebanon. Syrian relations with Amal temporarily worsened as a result of Amal's initial tacit collaboration

[46] Abukhalil (1990) pp.10-12. /Ajami (1986) pp.174-175. /Deeb (1988) p.687.

with the Israeli invasion of 1982, its initial hesitation to join in the NSF, and its attempt to balance and mediate between the NSF and the Jumayiel government. However, their relations were soon improved since Jumayiel's refusal to discuss even the moderate reforms which the Shi'ites requested drove Amal into the opposition and made the NSF more powerful. Amal was subsequently a pillar of the 1985 "Tripartite Agreement" brokered by Syria among the leaders of the three main Marontie, Druze, and Shi'ite militias. In addition, Syria and Amal had a shared interest in preventing the resettlement of Arafat's PLO forces in Amal-based southern Lebanon, as it risked bringing about an Israeli retaliation that might result in the massive destruction of infrastructure, as had taken place in 1982. Amal needed both a patron and arms in order to support this goal, and Syria supplied the movement with large amounts of weapons and ammunition.

As a result, their coinciding interests meant that Amal could play a pivotal role in the attack on the PLO during the "Camps War" by which Amal sought to prevent a resurgence of Arafat's presence in Lebanon in the late 1980s. However, Berri's alignment against Palestinian forces cost the movement its unity.[47] Amal's earlier dynamism was also affected by its growing inefficiency, corruption, and poor leadership. However Amal still retained a broad power base, especially in the villages of the South, while Hizbollah supplanted Amal in southern Beirut.[48] Since Syria recognised and supported Amal's intentions and actions to prevent the reemergence of Palestinian power in Lebanon, their relations continued to be close until the end of the Syria-PLO conflict.

Syrian relations with Hizbollah were more problematic, and Asad had to walk a tight-rope in his dealings with the Shi'ite fundamentalist movement.

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[47] Abukhalil (1990) p.12. /Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp.121-122 and pp.130-132. /Petran (1987) pp.313-316.
[48] Norton (1998) p.151.

Firstly, Hizbollah was ideologically opposed to the Asad regime's advocacy of secular pan-Arabism. Secondly, its "extreme" activities, such as Western hostage-takings and suicide bombings, which were risky for the ever-cautious and calculating Asad, were detrimental to the image of his regime. Since Iran had a powerful influence over Hizbollah, relations between Hizbollah and Syria reflected Asad's balancing between his stake in the Syrian-Iranian alliances and Syrian interests in Lebanon. What happened, in effect, was that when Syrian and Iranian interests converged, Syria and Hizbollah were able to coordinate their efforts. In the early 1980s, Hizbollah supported Syrian struggles against the Israeli presence in Lebanon and against the MNF. Their coordination contributed to the political climate which forced President Jumayiel to abrogate the May 17 Agreement with Israel. Hizbollah played an important role in reestablishing Syrian influence as a dominant force in Lebanon, after a brief diminution of its role in the wake of the Israeli invasion in 1982.[49]

However, in the late 1980s, the alliance between Iran and Syria became strained by the "Camps War". Iran, which was trying to create a Palestinian-Shi'ite alliance against Israel, demanded that Syria stop Amal's attacks on the PLO. In addition, Hizbollah was opposed to Amal's attempt to calm the southern border with Israel and continued to side with PLO forces. Amal-Hizbollah clashes were frequent, with Hizbollah insisting that it should have positions and freedom of activities against Israeli forces in the South, while Amal rejected these demands. Syria was forced to enter into West Beirut to save Amal from Hizbollah advances, and February 1987 saw the most significant confrontation between Syrian troops and Hizbollah take place, resulting in the massacre of 23 members of Hizbollah.[50]

Afterwards, Syrian relations with Hizbollah, and by extension with Iran,

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[49] Abukhalil (1990) pp.13-15. /Ranstorp (1997) pp.40-49 and pp.110-119.

deteriorated seriously, aggravated by the treatment of Western hostages. When Ayatollah Montazeri rejected Asad's appeal to release the American Colonel, William Higgins, Asad ordered Amal to crack down on Hizbollah, a decision which enraged "radical" figures in the Iranian government. Iran's attempt to mediate the confrontation between Amal and Hizbollah failed because the Iranian leadership itself was split. Since the "radical" Ali Akbar Mohtashemi backed Hizbollah, and the "moderate" Hashemi Rafsanjani blamed both sides equally, a reflection of the Iranian power struggle could be seen in the Lebanese situation. However, as soon as the dual President Rafsanjani-Ayatollah Khameni leadership became consolidated in Iran, it worked to contain the Amal-Hizbollah clashes and cooperated with Syria to form the Damascus Agreement in January 1989, by which Syria permitted a Hizbollah presence in southern Lebanon on condition that Hizbollah would restrain its operations against Israel so as not to invite massive Israeli retaliation. Now that Syria had finally secured good relations with both Amal and Hizbollah, it was in a position to balance and mediate the two main groups of the Shi'ite community. This became an important asset for Syria in the implementation of its post-Ta'if Lebanese policies.[51]

(5) The Druzes and Syria

During this period, the leadership position within the Druze community was occupied by the Jumblatt family in the Shuf. After the outbreak of civil war, relations between the LNM and the Syrians were initially good because of their mutual interest in containing Maronite power. However, their relations soon deteriorated dramatically since Kamal Jumblatt's demands for thorough reforms of the Lebanese political system were not acceptable to

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[50] Abukhalil (1990) p.16. /Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp.131-133.
[51] Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp.133-135. /*MEI* February 3, 1989. /Ranstorp (1997) pp.100-103 and pp.119-133.

Syria which hoped for moderate reforms and whose intention was manifested in the "Constitutional Documents" published in February 1976. Jumblatt claimed that the "Constitutional Documents" would not change the confessional character of the political system which prevented the Druzes from occupying top governmental posts such as president, prime minister, and speaker of parliament.[52] He was not satisfied with the Syrian proposal, and sought to force Syria to take a more radical stand for political change in Lebanon, since the LNM was at that time militarily superior to the Lebanese Forces. To achieve this aim, the LNM renewed hostilities and engaged in attacks against the presidential palace and the Lebanese Forces, which led Syrian-supported President Franjieh and Pierre Jumayiel to ask for the entry of Syrian army into Lebanon.[53]

Jumblatt's rejection of the Syrian reform plan, and his refusal to cooperate with Asad's pragmatic strategy toward Lebanon, led to a bitter conflict between them during the summer of 1976, and he was finally defeated by Syria both militarily and politically. Syria succeeded both in assuming a dominant role in Lebanon and in persuading other Arab states to accept its role. After Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated, possibly by a Syrian agent, his son, Walid, and his followers improved relations with Syria.[54] It seems that the weakened LNM, especially after the assassination of its leader, had no choice but to accept Syrian hegemony in Lebanon.

This restoration of its alliances benefited the Asad regime, especially when it fought against the Israeli armed presence in Lebanon and against the Jumayiel administration in the 1980s. The Druzes were a reliable pillar of Syrian support, and Walid Jumblatt joined in the NSF in 1983 and later in the "Tripartite Agreement" in 1985. The improved relations with Syria made

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[52] Rabinovich (1985) pp.76-77.
[53] Ma'oz and Yaniv (1986) p.198.
[54] Rabinovich (1985) pp.77-78. /Seale (1988) pp.288-289.

it possible for the Lebanese Druzes to receive financial assistance, weapons, and munitions from Syria.[55]

However, during the late 1980s Jumblatt confronted Syria over its strategy with regard to the "Camps War". Though he fought with Berri against Jumayiel and the Israeli forces during the "Shuf War" in order to abrogate the May 17 Agreement, his force did not align with Berri against the Palestinians during the "Camps War". One reason is that the Palestinians constituted a substantial part of Jumblatt's military forces. Another is that sympathy for the Palestinians remained among the Druze community in Lebanon. This was his father's legacy, and he refused to be seen as going against the Palestinians. In defiance of Syrian pressure, his militias blocked the coastal highway to prevent Amal reinforcements from reaching the camps, and assisted in bringing supplies to the camps. In addition, he allowed the radical Palestinian forces, Abu Musa group and the DFLP, to launch artillery and rocket barrages from the Shuf that inflicted heavy damage on Amal positions, so as to relieve the pressure on the Palestinian camps.[56]

Relations between the Druzes and Syria were decisively worsened in February 1987, when Syria deployed its army in West Beirut to save Amal, and when Jumblatt tried to establish a strong foothold there. Jumblatt's goal was not only to make it easier to provide support to Palestinian forces, but also to increase his power among the Muslims. However, Syria now made it a top priority to weaken the Druze forces, calculating that stripping the pro-Palestinian groups outside the camps of their power would badly affect the PLO's military operations. The attacks on Jumblatt, which took the form of forcing him to hand over a senior aide to the Syrians and of purge his command in favour of a composition acceptable to Damascus, incurred bitter

[55] Petran (1987) p.319.

resentment of the Syrians among the Druzes.[57]

(6) The Palestinians and Syria

Since Israel could potentially attack Syria through Lebanon, Asad sought both to control PLO military activities against Israel on Lebanese soil during the civil war and to avoid Israeli penetration into Lebanon. In pursuit of this end, Syria changed its relations with the Palestinians dramatically during this period. Syria initially supported the LNM-PLO coalition, and when the Maronite militias launched a heavy offensive in January 1976 aimed at partitioning Lebanon and establishing a mini-state, thereby risking an Israeli invasion, Asad ordered the dispatch of units of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) into Lebanon to prevent the Maronites from realizing their goal.[58] However, Palestinian-Syrian relations soon deteriorated over the "Constitutional Documents", as a result of which the PLO finally decided to align with Jumblatt.[59] Ultimately, the Syrian army invaded Lebanon, siding with the Maronites in June 1976 and aiming to prevent the radicalisation of Lebanon by the LNM-PLO coalition since this situation threatened to give Israel a pretext to invade Lebanon and thus would endanger the Syrian state itself.[60]

After the Likud government upgraded its alliances with the Maronites as a consequence of the Egyptian withdrawal from the Arab-Israel power balance, Asad tried to contain the Israeli aggression toward Lebanon by resuming ties with the Palestinians. However, his renewed relations with the PLO were

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[56] Petran (1987) pp.362-363.
[57] Harris (1996) pp.215-217.
[58] Hinnebusch (1986) pp.3-5. /Rabinovich (1985) pp.49-50.
[59] The main reason for Arafat's aligning with the LNM, under the pressure on him by Asad that he should choose between Syria and Jumblatt, was that Jumblatt generally respected the freedom of the Palestinians.
[Joumblatt (1982) pp.64-69. /Ma'oz (1986) p.129.]

not firm. During the Litani Operation in 1978 and the Israeli invasion in 1982, Syria remained rather inactive and allowed the Palestinians to be attacked by the Israeli forces. The PLO realised that Syrian devotion to the Palestinian cause was suspect and that Syria would not risk its own security for the sake of the PLO.[61] After 1982, although Syria supported guerrilla operations against the Israeli forces in Lebanon, it had no intention to confront Israel directly by allowing the PLO to engage in open military action. In fact, Syria restricted the Palestinian activities in the Beqaa.[62] Although Syria claimed to be a patron of the PLO, it did not fulfil the responsibilities attached to this self-assumed role.[63]

Despite this Syrian claim, the PLO had no intention of ceding its autonomy to Syria. On the contrary, Arafat and his Fatah organisation tried to maximise their freedom of action, while Asad sought to weaken Arafat by installing a leadership more subject to Syria, or at least by reducing the independence of the PLO from Syrian influence. Syria supported several challenges to Arafat from dissidents within the PLO and from its own Palestine organisations or allies.[64] After the PLO withdrew from Beirut in September 1982, splits within the PLO forces occurred mainly over differing attitudes toward the "Reagan Plan": a version of Camp David-style autonomy for the West Bank, and over the relations with Jordan. Believing that Syria had no right to a protectorate over the PLO because of its failure to defend the Palestinians in 1978 and 1982 and with much reduced options after the PLO's expulsion from Lebanon, Arafat gave the plan serious consideration and began to consult with Jordan over it. In addition, Arafat kept pace with King Hussein in proposing negotiations with Israel over the

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[60] Hinnebusch (1986) pp.5-6.
[61] Ma'oz and Yaniv (1986) p.202.
[62] Brynen (1990) pp.183-184.
[63] Hinnebusch (1986) p.11.

issue of the West Bank.[65]

His actions were not acceptable to the Syrians, and when rebellions against Arafat actually broke out within the PLO, Syria exploited the inner discord, trying to oust him and to reshape a pro-Syrian PLO. In 1983, the Syrian-backed Palestinian forces launched heavy offensives against Arafat, which led to his eventual evacuation from Tripoli. Later during the "Camps War", Syria sponsored the Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF), which, though it was composed of anti-Arafat factions, did not give Syria a reliable alternative to Arafat's PLO.[66]

However, despite its desire to control and its willingness to actually militarily attack the PLO, Syria was caught in a dilemma. Since the Asad regime assumed a self-imaged role as the champion of Arab nationalism and at the same time continued open conflict with the PLO, symbol of the Arab cause, there was danger of damage to Syria's credibility. Therefore Syria generally used the tactics of negotiation and dialogue to accompany its pressure on the Palestinians and never actually severed relations with them during this period.

(7) Brief Summary

Overall, the identity of each sub-state actor shaped an underlying predisposition in their relations with Syria: the relations between Muslim and Palestinian groups and Syria were generally better than those between the Maronites and Syria, and the Asad regime, in terms of Arab nationalism, did not want to confront the Muslims and Palestinians. However, as clearly seen in 1976 by the alliance between the Maronites and Syria as well as the

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[64] Mclaurin (1989) p.19.
[65] Brynen (1990) pp.185-191. /Hinnebusch (1986) pp.14-17. /Hinnebusch (1998) p.144.
[66] Hinnebusch (1986) pp.13-17.

conflict between the LNM-PLO coalition and the Syrian army, and also seen in the late 1980s by the clashes between Hizbollah-backed Palestinian forces and Syrian-supported Amal during the "Camps War", Lebanese and Syrian power calculations were sometimes a decisive factor for their relations. In addition, there was interdependence between Syria and Lebanese sub-state groups. The former used these groups to consolidate its hegemony and the latter exploited Syrian power to increase their own interests and status.

3. POLITICAL DIMENSIONS : RECONCILIATION EFFORTS AND THE FORMATION OF CABINETS

(1) Introduction

The Lebanese government never ceased attempting to restore some internal political order throughout the civil war. This included various kinds of reconciliation efforts as well as the formation of cabinets through which various parties involved in the war might be co-opted. In doing so, the government had to take into consideration both internal and external factors, especially the dominant power of the Syrians. Syria also took an interest in restoring Lebanese order so as not to give Israel any cause for intervention, and more importantly to show its presence as a "benefit" to the international community.[67] As a result, it mediated between warring factions, interfered in the formation of the Lebanese cabinet, convened reconciliatory meetings, and presented its own peace plans, though at the same time it sometimes encouraged the sectarian conflicts which made it possible to perform "divide and rule" policies.

These kinds of Syrian efforts to pacify Lebanon might theoretically have matched in part with the interest of the Lebanese government. However,

[67] Thompson (2002) p.75.

since sectarian-based Lebanese leaders tended to interpret "reconciliation" differently, and since they sometimes exploited their official status in favour of their own sectarian communities, conflict resolution was rarely successful. As the president's power was superior to that of his counterparts, the prime minister and speaker of parliament, this section will mainly focus on the president's behaviour toward the Syrians.

(2) The Franjieh Period (1975−1976)

After the Ayn Rummaneh clashes between the Phalange Party and the Palestinians on April 13, 1975, the spread of fighting between rival militias intensified the internal polarisation within Lebanon. On the one hand, the Jumblatt-led LNM protested against the slaughter of the Palestinians and called for a political and economic boycott of the Phalange Party. On the other hand, the Maronites rallied behind the Phalange Party and the National Liberal Party, and demanded the intervention of the Lebanese army. They accused the Solh government of not having dispatched the army during the initial phase of clashes at Ayn Rummaneh and used this as a pretext for the resignation of the Phalange members from the cabinet, which led to the collapse of the Solh government.

Responding to these developments, President Franjieh initially continued with his policy of antagonising the Sunnis, which had its origin in the formation of the government under Amin Hafez in 1973, and formed a government composed of military officers under an aged Muslim brigadier, Noureddin Rifai. This was welcomed by the Phalange Party and the National Liberal Party but was rejected by the LNM-PLO coalition.[68] Since the Muslims and Palestinians considered the Lebanese army to be a Maronite symbol, and since the high ranks were actually dominated by the Maronites,

[68]Haddad (1985) p.47. /Weinberger (1986) p.149, p.151.

Franjieh's action was considered to be an example of his sectarian bias. As a consequence, the strong opposition from the LNM-PLO coalition forced him to dismantle the military cabinet and to appoint as prime minister his traditional opponent, Rashid Karami, with whom Syria had good relations.[69]

Until the formation of the military cabinet, Syria had avoided clear public reactions to Lebanese events, with the exception of press statements supporting the rights of the Palestinians. However, since Franjieh's actions had caused heavy armed confrontations and a political stalemate, Syrian leaders were forced to involve themselves more actively in the Lebanese situation.[70] In particular, Syria would have been seriously embarrassed by a new confrontation between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian commandos, which would have forced Syria to intervene on the Palestinian side. This scenario was not at all favoured by the Syrian government.[71] As long as Syria relied on the Kissinger approach to recover the Golan Heights, Asad did not want to take any action that would be viewed unfavourably by the United States. To avoid the scenario being realised, Syria immediately decided to launch a diplomatic initiative with Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam, Air Force Commander Naji Jamil, and Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi.[72]

The Syrians played an important role in forming the Karami cabinet, taking into consideration the preferences by the Sunni establishment, the LNM, and the PLO, all of which perceived him as the sole candidate for the premiership. This was desirable for Syria as Karami was traditionally a strong supporter of Syrian influence in Lebanon. Backed by domestic support for Karami, Syria managed to force Franjieh to accept Karami, his long term

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[69] Gordon (1983) p.108. /Petran (1987) pp.167-168.
[70] Weinberger (1986) p.153.
[71] Salibi (1976) p.108.
[72] These three figures became key figures in Syrian policy toward Lebanon.

political rival in northern Lebanon, as prime minister. After Karami assumed the premiership he had to remove two major obstacles in order to form his cabinet. Having called for the boycott of the Phalange Party, Jumblatt refused to join any cabinet in which representatives from the party would be present. Jumayiel for his part was not willing to cede to Jumblatt's demands. Karami soon faced political deadlock, which was accompanied by heavy fighting, and had to rely on Syria for mediation. Syria suggested a plan for a temporary mini-cabinet, and a six-member cabinet was finally formed in July. In addition to the appointment of Karami, the mini-cabinet was a further blow to Franjieh since he hoped to have both Phalange and LNM members included. Karami also made a painful concession in designating Chamoun as interior minister as they had not been on speaking terms since the 1958 civil war.[73]

Karami and Syria may have calculated that Chamoun's presence in the cabinet would appease or at least decrease the opposition from Jumayiel and Jumblatt to the Karami cabinet, and thus would stabilise the country since Chamoun was backed by Jumayiel and was not vetoed by Jumblatt.[74] However, their choice of Chamoun brought about the opposite result. "Chamoun refused even to consult with Karami and used his position at every opportunity to sabotage the government's policy and to advance the rightist (Maronite) cause."[75] Karami's effort to stabilise the country by forming a "neutral" government, which was strongly backed by the Syrians, faced a severe blow from Chamoun.

Though Syria forced both Franjieh and Karami to relinquish some of their political preferences in helping to form the cabinet, Franjieh had to made

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[Seale (1988) p.270.]

[73] Dawisha (1980) pp.88-90. /Khazen (2000) pp.295-297. /Weinberger (1986) pp.155-156.

[74] Khazen (2000) p.296.

more concessions by nominating Karami and excluding Jumayiel and Jumblatt from the cabinet than Karami was obliged to do by appointing Chamoun as interior minister. While Franjieh may have considered that the inclusion of Phalange and LNM members into the cabinet would contain their "radical" activities on the ground, Syria might have been calculating that their inclusion would further paralyse the country because of the political deadlock among cabinet members that would have resulted. Under the heavy offensive against the Maronites by the LNM-PLO forces bolstered by Syria, Franjieh was forced to obey the Syrian initiative.

After the signing of the Interim Sinai Agreement in September 1975, the intensity of communal fighting reached such a level that the Karami government asked President Asad to intervene to help Lebanon in mid-September. However, since relations between Franjieh and Asad had worsened after the formation of Karami cabinet, Franjieh accused the Syrian-supported LNM-PLO forces of starting the fighting and even indicated the possibility of resorting to the Arab League or to some other major Arab countries for conflict resolution. Since Syria did not want the "Arabisation" of the conflict, Khaddam immediately responded and negotiated a cease-fire as well as the formation of the National Dialogue Committee (NDC) in order to propose reforms and achieve reconciliation between various groups and movements.[76]

The NDC was composed of 20 members equally divided between Muslims and Christians. Some of the most prominent politicians were represented: these included Kamal Jumblatt; the distinguished Sunni politicians, Sa'eb Salem, Abdallah Yafi, and Rashid Karami; the Speaker of Parliament, Kamil Asad; the Secretary-General of the pro-Syrian organisation of the Ba'th Party, Amin Qanso; the leader of the Phalange Party, Pierre Jumayiel; ex-

[75] Petran (1987) p.168.

President and the leader of the National Liberal Party, Camille Chamoun; and the leader of the National Bloc Party, Raymond Edde.[77] The fact that the pro-Iraqi organisation of the Ba'th Party had no representative on the NDC was an indication of increasing Syrian influence in internal Lebanese politics.

However, the result of this Syrian mediation effort was disappointing and the NDC meeting finally became a "dialogue of the deaf". The agenda of the NDC discussions was preoccupied with the following issues: Lebanese territorial sovereignty, put forward by the Phalangists and their allies; and political reform, including the abolition of confessionalism, advocated by the LNM and their allies. When the representatives from the Phalange Party and the National Liberal Party boycotted the NDC meeting, the sub-committee on political proposed reform to cancel Article 95 of the Lebanese constitution, which involved sectarian distribution of parliamentary representation, to lower the voting age to eighteen, and to set up an economic and social council, all demanded by the LNM. Consequently, the Maronite side labelled the NDC as "the supreme revolutionary command" and Karami and Franjieh, who were fearful of further polarisation and were also keen on preserving confessionalism as their power basis, reached a compromise deal whose content was not the abolition of Article 95 but its reinterpretation.[78]

The escalation of violence between the Maronite militias and the LNM-PLO forces, especially around the Palestinian refugee camps of Tel Zatar and Jisr Basha, as well as Israeli raids on the camps during December 1975 and January 1976, forced Asad to appease each side. Firstly, in order to prevent a Maronite attempt to partition Lebanon and establish their own mini-state, which might draw Israel into Lebanon, in mid-January Syria dispatched

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[76] Deeb (1980) p.124.
[77] Deeb (1980) p.3.
[78] Deeb (1980) p.4. /Khazen (2000) pp.316-317. /Petran (1987) pp.179-180.

units of the Syrian-based Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), which was officially under PLO leadership but in reality was a part of the Syrian army. After stopping the Maronite progress, Syria imposed a cease-fire on January 21.[79] "While Asad sought to tame the Maronite establishment, his objective, in early 1976, was not to defeat Christian forces militarily."[80] On the contrary, Syria needed Maronite and Sunni zuama cooperation in order to curb the LNM-PLO forces whose military offensive against the Maronites had the potential of giving Israel cause for intervention.

Syrian contacts with the Phalange Party in December 1975 and a heavy military offensive by the LNM-PLO forces in January 1976, which led to the fall of Chamoun's stronghold, Damour, changed Maronite perceptions toward Syria and thus led to a situation in which their cooperation with Syria was an option to prevent further damage. Until then, Franjieh had not managed to convince Maronite leaders about the merits of working with the Syrians, though he had secretly negotiated with Syria over a political settlement since November 1975, by using his close associate, Lucien Dahdah, then Chairman of the Board of the Intra company. Franjieh calculated that by aligning with Syria he could redress the balance in favour of the Maronites. In February, the Maronite changes of perception and situation led Franjieh to go to Damascus to finalise the Syrian-initiated peace plan, later called the "Constitutional Documents". While the peace plan reasserted the allocation of major political posts to specific religious sects, it stipulated a division of the parliament equally between Christians and Muslims, strengthening of the position of prime minister, and the conditions for Palestinian respect for Lebanese sovereignty.[81]

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[79] Hinnebusch (1986) p.5. /Hinnebusch (1998) p.140. /Ravinovich (1985) pp.49-50. /Salibi (1976) pp.149-159.
[80] Khazen (2000) p.327.
[81] Deeb (1980) p.6 and p.125. /Khazen (2000) pp.327-328. /Petran (1987)

Karma, who also went to the Syrian capital along with Franjieh, objected to the opening up of the posts of prime minister and speaker of parliament, which had been stipulated in the original Syrian plan to satisfy Jumblatt, and instead urged for the continuation of the present political formula. In the final official text of the "Constitutional Documents", the plan for the opening up of the above two posts was not adopted. Karami might have recognised the Syrian need to cooperate with him in its attempt to pacify the country and succeeded in maintaining Sunni communal interests. After Franjieh announced the "Constitutional Documents" on February 14, Jumblatt criticised it vehemently. One of the reasons for this was that while it formulated a more balanced confessional composition in governmental posts and provided a moderate resolution for the Lebanese conflict, it did not adopt the LNM's most crucial program: the abolition of political confessionalism.[82] The other reason was that Jumblatt's desire to be premier or speaker was ignored. However, since military balance was still in favour of the PLO-LNM forces, compromise was not a real choice for Jumblatt.

In reality, though the "Constitutional Documents" was supposed to resolve the Lebanese political agenda, to put an end to the armed conflict, and to start a new era of peace and reconstruction, the opposite took place. Jumblatt's dissatisfaction with the Syrian plan and his demand for Syria to press for more radical changes caused the resumption of heavy fighting, especially around the presidential palace. Because of this, there was heavy pressure in March for Franjieh's resignation.[83]

Syria's future position in Lebanon thus became dependent on the outcome of an early presidential election for a successor to Franjieh whose wide

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p.182. /Weinberger (1986) pp.173-175.

[82] Khazen (2000) pp.328-330. /Petran (1987) pp.189-190.

[83] For example, 66 deputies in Lebanese parliament (two-thirds of deputies) signed a petition for his resignation. [Khazen (2000) p.340.]

unpopularity deprived him of sufficient stature to stabilise the country. The Syrian option was that a successor would be elected prior to the end of Franjieh's term with the understanding that the president resign following the election. Asad's three main envoys, Jamil, Shihabi, and Khaddam, negotiated these issues with Franjieh, who initially opposed this treatment. However, the unanimous adoption of a constitutional amendment (Article 73) by the Lebanese parliament, which made possible the early election of Franjieh's successor, on top of both Syrian and prominent Maronite pressure on Franjieh to resign as well as a mounting threat by the LNM to establish a revolutionary government, finally led him to sign the amendment of Article 73.[84]

Two main candidates for elections emerged in late April. One was Raymond Edde who criticised not only the Phalange activities in the initial phase of war but also Syria's role in Lebanon. Since he had alienated the Maronite leadership, he was supported by the LNM-PLO forces. The other was Elias Sarkis who was supported by the Phalange Party, the National Liberal Party, and Karami. The official Syrian position was that the election of the Lebanese president was an internal affair and Syria would not intervene. However, Syrian support for Sarkis was obvious, since Edde stated the Syrian military intervention since January was a central issue for the Lebanese. The Shihabist Sarkis's "neutral" political stand was acceptable to both Christians and Muslims and was seen favourably by the Syrians in the light of its attempt to stabilise Lebanon. However, Sarkis lacked wide popular power base and army support, and thus needed Syrian support. In fact, prior to his election, Sarkis met the three Syrian envoys in the presidential palace and worked closely with Franjieh.[85]

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[84] Khazen (2000) pp.340-341. /Petran (1987) p.196. /Weinberger (1986) p.201.
[85] Odeh (1985) p.168. /Khazen (2000) p.340. /Petran (1987) pp.196-197. /Weinberger (1986) pp.201-203.

As Deeb pointed out, when the parliamentary deputies met on May 8 to elect a new president, Syrian military presence in Lebanon (Saiqa and the PLA), as well as the direct pressure exerted by Syria on some reluctant deputies to vote for Sarkis, may well have affected the final result of the election.[86] Indeed, a group of deputies in Beqqa was virtually forced to vote for Sarkis since the Syrian military presence in their districts was overwhelming. It is also said that Saiqa troops forcibly brought anti-Syrian deputies suspected of boycotting the election to the parliament session.[87] Consequently, Sarkis gained 66 votes out of 69 deputies present and the number of deputies who actually boycotted the election was only three: Raymond Edde, Sa'eb Salem, and Rashid Solh, who were all on bad terms with Syria and/or Syria's close ally Franjieh.[88] Even though Syrian influence in the election was obvious, almost all the Lebanese deputies, forced or not, chose to elect Sarkis to the presidency, and their actions seemed to be based on his Shihabist stance.

(3) The Sarkis Period (1976−1982)

After the election, President-elect Sarkis expressed the hope of building a political consensus among the Lebanese. However, Lebanese hopes of terminating the conflict generated by the election of a new president soon changed into disillusionment.[89] Franjieh announced that he had no wish to resign until the formal conclusion of his term in September. He might have calculated that if he resigned under strong military pressure from the LNM-

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[86] Deeb (1980) p.130.
[87] Petran (1987) p.197.
[88] Khazen (2000) p.344.
[89] It seems that these Lebanese hopes were based on the facts that he was generally refereed to as a "moderate", he had no private army, he had never engaged in violent attacks against the Palestinians, and he had no direct responsibility for the outbreaks of the civil war. [Mortimer (1976) p.4]

PLO forces, his position within the Maronite community would be further weakened, especially since his political rivals in the community, Jumayiel and Chamoun, had increased their power by forming the Lebanese Front.

It seems, however, that Syria tolerated Franjieh's unwillingness to resign, because of the indirect benefit of having a well-known figure in office. As a result, a new wave of violence led by the LNM-PLO forces and aimed at subverting the result of the presidential election continued throughout May 1976.[90] This led to the direct intervention of a sizeable part of the Syrian army on the side of the Maronites. The intervention started in June and ended in October through the mediation of the Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It also gave Franjieh an opportunity to contain the LNM-PLO forces by using Syrian army power.[91] Since the LNM-PLO forces intended to defeat the Maronites militarily and since some Maronites were prepared to draw Israel into the fighting on their behalf, Asad "hoped to win over the Maronites by demonstrating Syria's unwillingness to countenance a sectarian triumph over them."[92] With the Syrian intervention, the power balance between the sub-state groups tilted toward the Maronites, and the Syrian-Maronite alignment managed to smash the LNM-PLO forces.

Sarkis's inauguration in September, which took place in Shtura, Syrian-occupied Beqqa, close to the Syrian border, further convinced the Lebanese that Sarkis was a puppet president of Syria, especially since his election to the presidency was more or less owed to the Syrians. In fact, more Syrians attended this ceremony than Lebanese, and the Syrian armed presence of hundreds of tanks and soldiers in Shtura and its environs seemed remarkable. Though sixty-seven deputies attended the ceremony, Edde,

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[90] Weinberger (1986) pp.203-204.
[91] For the detail of this period, See Weinberger (1986) pp.209-231.
[92] Hinnebusch (1998) pp.140-141.

Jumblatt, Salem, and their supporters boycotted it.[93]

Though Sarkis's presidential term started with these troubles, he initially tried to implement a "neutral" policy to pacify the country.[94] In the formation of his cabinet, Sarkis's decisions were largely defined by his debt to the Syrians for his election to presidency. Despite this, he persisted in his Shihabist political views. While he took into consideration the Syrian opposition to LNM participation in the cabinet, he managed to put in place a cabinet without representatives from any of the warlord factions. He nominated as prime minister the respected economist Salim Hoss, who formed a "technocratic" cabinet composed of four Christians and four Muslims in December 1976.[95] The Sarkis-Hoss administration began to take measures to restore public order, on the basis of which it hoped to launch a process of economic rehabilitation. The Lebanese government was strongly opposed to any schemes from radical Maronites and the PLO compromising or impairing the political integrity of Lebanon.[96] This attempt to construct such a centrally-controlled state was matched with Syria's interests, since the stabilisation of its western flank under a Syrian-influenced regime would decrease the potentiality of Israeli penetration into Syria through Lebanon.

However, their common desire to establish a strong state faced strong opposition from the zuama, especially the Maronite warlords, whose aspirations had fluctuated between a tendency toward their own mini-state and a desire to dominate the country as a whole. It also worsened Syrian-

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[93] Petran (1987) p.212. /Weinberger (1986) p.224. /Though Petran mentioned Karami as one of main figures who boycotted the ceremony, it seems correct that Weinberger mentioned Salem instead of Karami, since Karami supported Sarkis during the electoral process and Salem was generally on bad terms with the Syrians before the outbreaks of the civil war.

[94] In fact, "Sarkis, in his speech after the (inauguration) ceremony, tried to depict his role as that of a middle-of-the-road statesman." [Deeb (1980) p.15.]

[95] Kassir (1994) pp.257-258. /Rabinovich (1985) p.56.

[96] Hoss (1984) p.20.

Maronite relations, which were already under increasing strain after the Maronites, having managed to maintain their positions by aligning with Syria in 1976, no longer felt they needed Damascus.[97]

The change in Maronite-Syrian relations and Sarkis's disappointment at the Syrian attitude toward the Shtura Agreement gradually caused him to distance himself from Syria.[98] While Sarkis became closer to the Lebanese Front during the fighting between the Lebanese Forces and Syria in 1978, he carefully tried not to alienate and antagonise Muslim and Palestinian forces in Lebanon and avoided an all-out confrontation with Syria.

However, when his order for the Syrian troops to stop fighting against the Lebanese Forces was ignored, Sarkis tendered his resignation in July, probably calculating that he was irreplaceable and indispensable to the Syrians. Immediately, Syria asked Sarkis to remain in office, since the Syrian military presence in Lebanon under the umbrella of the ADF owed its legitimacy to Sarkis who had the right to call for an end to the ADF mandate. Thus, the Syrian army ceased its attack against the Lebanese Forces, and Sarkis withdrew his resignation.[99] Considering the result of his defence of the Lebanese Front, it might be possible to say that he leaned to sectarianism.

On the other hand, as a Shihabist, Sarkis continued to take into consideration the Syrian and Muslim preference for Hoss. Indeed, relations between Sarkis and Hoss were generally good.[100] When Hoss tendered his resignation in May 1979 in protest against the lack of political will for reconciliation among key politicians, Sarkis asked Hoss to form a new

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[97] Muir (1977) p.7.
[98] As for the details of attitudes taken by Sarkis and Syria over the Shtura Agreement, see the section on the military dimension.
[99] Hanf (1993) p.239.
[100] Conversation with Salim Hoss (a former Prime Minister), July 10, 2001.

cabinet.[101]

After Sarkis's "Arabisation" effort to pacify Lebanon between 1979 and 1981, for which he had gained support from his Sunni counterparts, was disrupted not only by antagonism between Arab states but also by Syria's passive attitude, he finally decided to abandon the extension of the ADF mandate in July 1982, though he had previously requested the continuation of the mandate upon its periodic expirations. Furthermore, he demanded the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon and managed to obtain an agreement with Arab states, including Syria, to terminate the ADF mandate at the Fez Arab summit in September.[102] These actions were clearly anti-Syrian but were arguably in line with the position of Prime Minister Shafique Wazzan, a technocrat who assumed his post as Hoss's successor in 1980. In fact, after the "Missile Crisis" in mid-1981, which threatened to bring about direct Syrian-Israeli military confrontation in Zahle,[103] Sarkis and Wazzan were able to reach agreement on the important issues and presented a joint program: the Lebanese Front would break all contacts with Israel; the Palestinians would observe the provisions of the Cairo Agreement strictly; and the Syrian forces would withdraw in stages by August 1982, though Wazzan confirmed Syria's right to deploy missiles in Lebanon.[104]

Though Sarkis's independent-mindedness was a blow to Syria, he still took Syrian demands into account. He agreed, at the 1982 Fez meeting, that the implementation of a Syrian withdrawal at the end of the ADF's mission would be left to Lebanese-Syrian negotiations.[105] Thus, "Asad was able to maintain the legitimacy of Arab League sanctioning of the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon even after the termination of the ADF mandate. As long as

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[101] Kassir (1994) p.434. /*MEI* May 25 and July 6, 1979.
[102] Thompson (2002) p.77.
[103] For the details of "Missile Crisis", see Seale (1988) pp.368-373.
[104] *FBIS* June 9, 1981. /Hanf (1993) p.251.

the Israelis maintained forces in Lebanon, Syria would have a written endorsement of its continued presence."[106] Sarkis, whose policy concerning the Syrian forces was supported by Wazzan, could have put more pressure on Syria for its complete and immediate withdrawal. There were two reasons for this: firstly, Syria was isolated in the Arab world by virtue of its siding with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War; and secondly, its dominant position in Lebanon was largely shattered by the Israeli invasion in June 1982, though its forces remained entrenched in Beqaa. However, he perhaps considered the growing power of the Shi'ites in Lebanon, their relations with Syria, and Israel's alignment with the Maronites, and so avoided antagonizing Syria.

It seems possible to say that as a Shihabist he not only avoided all-out confrontation with Syria and even tried to appease it by using the Arab League, but also strove to work together with his Sunni counterparts.

(4) The Jumayiel Period (1982−1989)

After the assassination of his younger brother, Bashir, on September 14, 1982, Amin Jumayiel was elected as president by an overwhelming majority of parliament, winning the votes of 77 of the 80 representatives, and he took office on September 23. Unlike Bashir, who was said to have links with CIA and Mossad, Amin was known as a "moderate", though he was also a member of the Phalange Party.[107] He retained Wazzan as prime minister, and Wazzan selected as ministers nine competent technocrats who had no political or governmental experience.[108] Jumayiel himself may have been eager to form a broad coalition of all the important political groups in Lebanon, but since he was elected under the Israeli occupation, his policies

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[105] Salem (1982) p.12. /Thompson (2002) p.77.
[106] Thompson (2002) p.78.
[107] Haddad (1985) p.84. /Seale (1988) pp.391-393.
[108] Petran (1987) p.295.

needed to take Israel's position in Lebanon into consideration. Thus, he did not try hard to involve Syria's main allies in Lebanon, Berri and Jumblatt, in his government.[109] It seems that as a second choice, considering that he needed to appease Israel, Jumayiel formed a "neutral" technocrat government that would not harm his personal reputation.

Jumayiel initially took an even-handed stance toward "occupation forces": he, along with many Lebanese, wanted the USA-led Multi National Forces (MNF), which was created after the Israeli invasion in June 1982, to supervise the evacuation of Palestinian guerrillas from Lebanon, as well as Israeli and Syrian forces.[110] Though he perhaps desired to take a "neutral" position toward these forces, the USA did not seriously pressure Israel into withdrawing its forces. In addition, Amin came to closely ally with Israel and the USA and to ignore the Syrians and their Lebanese proxies. These were the results of the existing Maronite-Israeli connection, the weakening of Syrian influence in Lebanon as a result of the Israeli invasion, the newly established Israeli hegemony in Lebanon, and the Cold War context in the Middle East.[111] In effect, Muslim hopes for him to develop a policy of national reconciliation dwindled, and their anti-Jumayiel feelings constituted the basis for strengthening alliances with Syria in the hope of destroying the American-backed Israeli-dominated order in Lebanon. Their opposition alliance with Syria was later realised in the form of the National Salvation Front (NSF), which caused the Israeli army huge damage.

With Israel gradually decreasing its military presence in Lebanon in the autumn of 1983 when it started, in large-scale, to withdraw its troops from the Shuf, Syria once again began to play an important role. As a first step, Syria arranged a Lebanese conference of "National Reconciliation" which

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[109] Hanf (1993) p.270.
[110] Hudson (1988) pp.216-218.
[111] Gerges (1997) p.97.

met in Geneva in late October. Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam set agenda and its sequence: Lebanese identity, the May 17 Agreement, and Lebanese internal reform.[112] Despite the Syrian demand for the abrogation of the May 17 Agreement, Jumayiel managed to gain a mandate to work with the USA on a re-negotiation of the agreement largely because two of the four staunch Syrian allies in Lebanon, Karami, and Berri, followed Franjieh and softened their attitudes toward the agreement in exchange for the Maronite recognition of the Arab character of the Lebanese state. These three figures advocated the freezing of the agreement as a mechanism to give Jumayiel time to consult with the USA. At the same time, Jumblatt, bolstered by his military victory over the Maronites in the Shuf, which contributed to the Israeli withdrawal in the autumn, consistently supported the Syrian position. Karami, Berri, and Franjieh argued that while the agreement should not be ratified, it also could not be abrogated, since both paths would lead to the continuation of Israeli occupation: if ratified, Syria would not withdraw and consequently Israel would stay; if abrogated, Israel would not withdraw and consequently Syria would stay. Khaddam's attempt to persuade his allies to reiterate their support for abrogation was not successful.[113]

Internal support for the renegotiations with the USA—even among the pro-Syrian figures—and Jumayiel's confidence in the USA to check the power of Syria and its allies in Lebanon made it possible for him to defy Syria and thus to gain manoeuvrability. However, his trip to Washington in December, which aimed to get US support to resolve the Lebanese deadlock over the May 17 Agreement, was unsuccessful. Since the US presence in Lebanon had

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[112] As for the internal reform, there was not much progress, since the principal issue was not internal reform but other two topics raised by Syria. [Jureidini and McLaurin (1984) p.25.]

[113] Haddad (1985) pp.109-114. /*MEI* November 11, 1983.

been attacked twice that year and since the USA perceived Syria as the problem obstructing the withdrawal process, Reagan had no intention of pressuring Israel, whose relations with the USA were at their best, to renegotiate with Lebanon.[114] Jumayiel "discovered belatedly that the US was unwilling to over-invest in Lebanon, and it could not afford the high costs involved: Lebanon was not worth it."[115] Once his Western protector, the MNF, evacuated Lebanon in February 1984, Jumayiel acknowledged the danger of neglecting pan-Arab and anti-Israeli feeling among the Lebanese, especially the Muslims, and found himself with no choice but to enter a new relationship with Syria to protect his presidency from the strong NSF, especially Druze and Shi'ite, pressure.[116] In exchange for Jumayiel's statement that he was prepared to abrogate the agreement, Jumblatt and Berri were persuaded by the Syrians not to drive Jumayiel into a corner.

The battle was now off and the Lebanese government took the necessary constitutional step to formally cancel the May 17 agreement, which was realised on March 5.[117] Syria then initiated the second national dialogue meeting in Lausanne in mid-March. The meeting was supposed to be more or less under Syrian guidance. However, Syria was racked by the fraternal war between pro-Asad and pro-Rifat factions which resulted from Asad's illness and so did not have enough power to orchestrate the conference. Khaddam failed to get his Lebanese allies, Berri and Jumblatt, to drop their basic demand for the resignation and trial of Jumayiel. He also failed to persuade them to moderate their demands for more power within the Lebanese political system. Moreover, Franjieh demanded the preservation of all Maronite privileges just when a nine-point plan submitted by Jumayiel was

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[114] Haddad (1985) p.117.
[115] Gause (1997) p.98.
[116] For the details of the conflict situation, see *MEI* November 25, 1983, February 10, 1984, and February 24, 1984.

about to be finalised.[118] There seems no evidence that Syria tried to persuade its traditional ally, Franjieh, to withdraw his demand.[119] Jumayiel was probably disappointed at Syria's behaviour toward its allies even though he would have recognised the extraordinary conditions in Syria.

In April, a "national unity government" led by Karami was formed, which was delicately balanced both between and within various sects, although the important posts such as foreign and defence minister were allocated either to Muslims or pro-Syrian figures.[120] Although the cabinet tired to reunite the country and to restore state sovereignty in all parts of Lebanon on the basis of Karami's ministerial statement, by the time it received its crucial vote of confidence on June 12, the cabinet itself had become as battered and disunited as the country. Christian and Muslim ministers were divided on major issues and their ability to control the fighters in the street was increasingly in doubt.[121] Under these fragmenting conditions, Jumayiel initially expected Syria to help him via its relations with Franjieh, Karami, Hoss, Berri, and Jumblatt. However, since most of these politicians possessed their own militias, it was difficult for even Syria to bring them into line to back Jumayiel. Moreover, Syria did not want to strengthen the president at the expense of its trusted allies.[122] Even when Jumayiel's leadership of the Phalange Party was challenged by Ja'ja in February 1985,

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[117] *MEI* March 9, 1984. /Seale (1988) p.417.
[118] *MEI* March 23, 1984.
[119] On this respect, Petran pointed out that given Franjieh's close relations with Asad, his sudden demand "raised the questions about the real Syrian position." [Petran (1987) p.356.] However, Syria closely watched the conference and feared the failure of dialogue and the resulting fierce internecine fighting. [*FBIS* May 21, 1984.] It seems that Syria did not manage to put pressure on Franjieh, because of its preoccupation with the inner power struggle.
[120] *MEI* May 4, 1984.
[121] *MEI* June 15, 1984.
[122] Salem (1995) p.176.

he did not ask Asad for help, even though Asad had offered to send any help he would need to calm the rebellion.[123]

The soured Jumayiel-Syrian relations and the failure of the Karami cabinet to end the conflict and achieve national reconciliation and full Israeli withdrawal,[124] led Syria to sideline the Lebanese government and to promote an accord between the three main pro-Syrian militia leaders: Hubayka of the pro-Syrian factions in the Lebanese Forces, Berri of Amal, and Jumblatt of the Druzes. This was an explicit recognition by Syria "given to the militias as the effective wielders of power in Lebanon."[125] In late December 1985, these leaders met in Damascus and agreed on the following: an end to the state of war, gradual reform of the sectarian political system, and the "special" relationship between Syria and Lebanon.[126]

The "Tripartite Agreement" aimed to be a "Pax-Syriana" that would pacify Lebanon, but this agreement soon collapsed in January 1986. Since it stipulated the transfer of the prerogative of the Maronite president partly to the Sunni prime minister and partly to a council of ministers, almost all Maronite leaders, including Franjieh, opposed the terms that Hubayka had accepted in their name. Backed by this strong anti-Hubayka feeling among the Maronites and also resenting Syria's sidelining of him in the "Tripartite Agreement", Jumayiel, with the help of Ja'ja, who shared his feelings toward Hubayka and Syria, militarily defeated Hubayka and his factions in the Lebanese Forces, thus dashing any hope of the agreement being implemented.[127]

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[123] Salem (1995) p.193.
[124] The Israeli forces withdrew to the "security zone" in June 1985 and maintained its proxy forces: "South Lebanese Army", which was created in 1978 after the Litani Operation and was led by Antoine Lahad after the death of the first leader Saad Haddad in 1984.
[125] Rabinovich (1987) p.63.
[126] *MEI* January 10, 1986. /Thompson (2002) pp.78-79.
[127] Hanf (1993) pp.306-310. /Harris (1996) pp.193-201. /*MEI* January 24 and

After the collapse of the agreement, Syria tried, mainly by using its proxy, Amal, to contain the "radical" Hizbollah forces and to prevent the PLO forces from restoring their presence in Lebanon.[128] This Syrian effort toward what they called "normalisation" may have influenced Jumayiel's perception of the Syrians, causing him to recognise the merit of improving relations with Asad. However, Syria set the condition that the dialogue would approach all issues under the spirit of the "Tripartite Agreement".[129] Though Jumayiel actually acknowledged the necessity of taking the Syrian factor into consideration in resolving the Lebanese question, he opposed this Syrian condition.[130]

Finally, Jumayiel's disappointment at Syria and his presidential power being largely owed to Ja'ja and the Lebanese Forces, since he could no longer count on external powers—the USA and Israel—to contain Syria and its allies in Lebanon, reinforced his Maronite-oriented approach, and this continued until the last phase of the civil war. As his presidential term neared its end in September 1988, the Lebanese parliament was unable to elect his successor because of the deep division between the Lebanese factional groups. After a Syrian attempt to elect Franjieh resulted in failure, Jumayiel stepped down without nominating a successor and appointed the Christian Commander of the Lebanese army, Michael Awn, as the acting prime minister. This was unacceptable to the Muslims and Syrians who continued to consider Salim Hoss, who had succeeded Rashid Karami after his assassination in June 1987, as the legal prime minister. Since Hoss refused to step down, two rival governments appeared in Lebanon: the Awn government, supported by the Lebanese Forces and most of the Maronites; and the Hoss government, backed by Syria and its Muslim allies. This

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February 7, 1986. /Petran (1987) pp.368-369.

[128] For the details, see Hinnebusch (1998) pp.145-148.

[129] *FBIS* January 9, 1987. /Salem (1992) p.32.

[130] Devlin (1988) p.90.

situation made the complete breakdown of the Lebanese state itself more probable than ever, as did Awn's declaration of the "War of Liberation" against the Syrian forces in Lebanon in March 1989. Arab concern for Lebanon was thus heightened, and this led to the conclusion of the Ta'if Agreement in October 1989.[131]

(5) Brief Summary

Overall, the attempts by the Lebanese government to stabilise Lebanon through reconciliation efforts and the formation of cabinets were seldom successful. While Syria interfered in these Lebanese attempts in order not to give Israel a pretext for intervention in Lebanon, it also encouraged its Lebanese allies to fight on the ground so as to recover and consolidate its hegemony there. In effect, the Lebanese government was continuously under interrelated threats from Syria, and the leaders tried to generally appease and occasionally contain the Syrians, with taking into consideration the regional dynamics in the Middle East and its effects on Syria. Their alignment with Syria was also affected by Lebanese identity factor, especially the Arab nationalism, and political interdependence. As regards the latter, Syria did not want to antagonise the president and the prime minister and hoped to receive their support for its Lebanese policy, in order to legitimise its intervention. They, in turn, sometimes exploited Syria to consolidate their power and favour their own community. However, these actions fuelled opposition figures and groups, resulting in the failure of conflict resolution.

[131] Rabinovich (1989) pp.103-104. /Thompson (2002) pp.79-80.

4. MILITARY DIMENSIONS : DISINTEGRATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LEBANESE ARMY

(1) Introduction

The cohesion or disintegration of the Lebanese army was a crucial factor in the capacity of the government and its potential to stop the civil war and restore order. During the civil war, although the army's cohesion decreased and some sectarian-based brigades acted outside of government control, the Lebanese army remained a symbol of Lebanese sovereignty. As a result, Syria had not only to avoid clashing with the Lebanese army openly but also to refrain from supporting the factional tendencies and activities within the army, since this sort of behaviour might weaken the legitimacy of Syria's Lebanese intervention in the international arena. However, the "Christian character" of the Lebanese army—its senior officers were mostly Christians and the Maronite president had a general policy of maintaining this characteristic of the army as a means to suppress opposition groups—made it difficult for Syria to cooperate with the army, though Damascus sometimes supported its activities. This section will deal, in the order of Lebanese presidential terms, with Lebanese-Syrian relations over the issue of the Lebanese army,

(2) The Beginning of the Disintegration of the Lebanese Army (1975—1976)

After the outbreak of the civil war, the Lebanese army did not initially interfere in the fighting, not only because of the lesson learned in the 1958 civil war that the policy of non-interference in fighting assured the "neutrality" of the army, but also because of the conviction that the army's intervention would be interpreted as action siding with the Christians on the

basis of its "Christian character".[132] However, the heavy fighting between Maronite militias and Muslim militias in the outskirts of Tripoli in the late summer of 1975 led to the situation where the army was the only force available to prevent further escalation of sectarian violence. Though the Karami cabinet was hard pressed to prevent the escalation of fighting, Karami hesitated to accept the deployment of the army in his hometown, since the Muslims and the PLO did not consider the Commander, Iskandar Ghanem, to be "neutral" and a suitable choice for the post.[133] In fact, Ghanem failed to intercept the Israeli commando operation in the heart of Beirut in April 1973 which led to the killing of three senior Palestinian leaders.[134] Finally, Franjieh agreed to replace Ghanem with Hanna Sa'id who was considered less political than his predecessor, and also agreed to give Karami more authority to command the army with hope that these concessions would make it easier for the army to intervene in the fighting. However, Karami, pressured by the LNM-PLO forces, was still opposed to army intervention, and so the army was deployed only as a buffer force between the combatants.[135]

However, the army's immobility and its continuing "Christian character", despite the Muslim demand to reshape Lebanese army with a balanced sectarian composition, led to its disintegration as a result of Muslim officers' rebellions. In late January 1976, a Sunni Lieutenant, Ahmad Khatib, formed the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) by recruiting supporters from most of the army units throughout the country.[136] Though he may have considered that by harming the army's solidarity as Christian force the power balance would be more favourable to the Muslim and PLO forces, his actions were primarily

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[132] Rabinovich (1985) p.47.
[133] Khazen (2000) pp.313-315. /Petran (1987) p.176.
[134] For the details of this incident, see Khazen (2000) pp.203-208.
[135] Khazen (2000) pp.314-315.

influenced by the Palestinians, who feared that if the army sided with the Maronites, it might carry out a heavy attack against them.[137] "The LAA program issued on February 3 called for a nonsectarian army, a new democratic Lebanon based on secularism and Arabism, electoral law reform, and the abolition of all private militias."[138] The rebellion was partly directed against Syria, which was engaged in reconciliatory efforts aimed at preserving a reformed sectarian system and did not want to drive the Maronites into a corner, even though Syria stopped a Maronite offensive against the LNM-PLO coalition by arranging a cease-fire on January 21.

On March 11, another Sunni Brigadier General, Azib Ahdab, announced that he was assuming power as provisional military governor and declared a state of emergency. He demanded that Franjieh resign within 24 hours, and called on parliament to elect a new president within a week. Although he commanded fewer than a thousand troops, his action stimulated a general call for Franjieh's resignation.[139] Ahdab proclaimed his support for Syria but Damascus perceived the coup to be directed against the Syrian role in Lebanon. Indeed, the coup was intended to oust Syria's main ally, Franjieh, from the presidency. Furthermore, it was a part of Palestinian effort to counter Asad's attempt to bring the PLO under his control.[140] After this, the Lebanese army ceased to behave as a single body.

However, the LAA attracted very few Sunni officers and almost all of its adherents were lower-rank officers, while the senior Sunni officer corps remained loyal to the state, the government, and the army. The Sunni officers were also loyal during Ahdab's coup. Though his objectives of a united army and the end of domestic violence was shared by senior army

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[136] Deeb (1980) p.7. /McLaurin (1984) pp.93-95.
[137] Hanf (1993) pp.213-214.
[138] Petran (1987) p.190.
[139] Randal (1984) pp.95-96.

officers regardless of their sectarian background, the illegality of Ahdab's actions prohibited many who identified with his objectives from siding with him.[141] The fact that the army still had a considerable number of Sunni officers became a crucial asset for both Franjieh and Syria, especially when the Syrian army and the remainder of the Lebanese army confronted the LNM-PLO coalition backed by the LAA during the spring and summer of 1976. In other words, the army's continuing cross-sectarian composition made it possible for Franjieh to deny that the army was a "Christian army" and at same time to label the LAA as a rebel army with sectarian motivation. In addition, Syria was able to show other Arab states and the international community that it sided with the legitimate armed forces in Lebanon.

(3) The Deployment of the Lebanese Army and the Withdrawal of the ADF (1976－1982)

After Sarkis assumed the presidency he tried to pacify the country by using the Lebanese army. In doing so he had to consider the Syrian presence in Lebanon, which had been legitimised by the Arab League as a part of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) and which later constituted the majority in it. The relations between the Lebanese army and the Syrian-dominated ADF will here be the main focus of the following discussion.

After the Riyadh and Cairo conferences in October 1976, the PLO began to reinforce its positions in southern Lebanon and so brought about a confrontation with the newly-created Christian militias, which were led by Major Saad Haddad and armed and financed by Israel. The PLO-LNM and Haddad forces intensified their fighting and the cycle of violence continued from the latter part of 1976 to the first part of 1977. Syria, however, found

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[140] Khazen (2000) p.333. /Petran (1987) p.191.
[141] McLaurin (1984) pp.95-96.

itself caught in a dilemma. While it sought a containment of Israeli influence in the South and favoured the PLO-LNM forces there, it also feared that intensification of the fighting there would invite further Israeli intervention. In addition, Syria could not send the ADF to southern Lebanon because of Israeli opposition based on the "Red Line" Agreement.

To resolve the perilous situation in the South, Syria sponsored a meeting with the Palestinians and the Lebanese government in Shtura. The conference brought into existence the Shtura Agreement, which was concluded between the Palestinians and the Lebanese state under the auspices of Syria in July 1977.[142] "It provided that the Palestinians would respect Lebanese sovereignty, stay out of Lebanese politics, move their military forces to restricted areas in the South, and refrain from attacks across the (Israeli-Lebanese) border, while the Lebanese army would move south and take control of the border area from Haddad."[143] However, the Shtura Agreement was not carried out completely.

The process was to take place in two stages. However, it was carried out fully only in northern Lebanon and implemented partially in southern Lebanon.[144] Although Syria was the power-broker for the agreement, it began to lose interest in the implementation because of regional political shifts. The installation of the new Likud government, as well as increased Israeli-Maronite cooperation, led Syria, deterred by Israel from maintaining a direct presence in the South (the "Red Line" Agreement), to need controllable Palestinian armed forces as a proxy there.[145] Though Sarkis continued to press for a Palestinian withdrawal from the South and the deployment of the Lebanese army there on the basis of the Shtura agreement, because of

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[142] Pogany (1987) pp.122-124.
[143] Hinnebusch (1986) p.8.
[144] For the details of implementation process, see Avi-Ran (1991) pp.75-76.
[145] Ma'oz and Yaniv (1986) p.200.

passive Syrian attitudes these measures did not materialise. At the same time Sarkis probably understood the difficulties of rebuilding an army capable of this task.[146] He tried to have UN forces stationed in the South, but this did not materialise, because of Syria's objections that the introduction of such a force would diminish the role of the ADF and thus badly affect Syrian power in Lebanon.[147]

However, after the Israeli Litani Operation in March 1978, Sarkis and Asad agreed to send a Lebanese army unit to the South, with Syria securing Palestinian cooperation. The agreement seems to have been established as a result of the following factors. On the one hand, Asad may have thought that containment of the Haddad's force in southern Lebanon would in turn weaken the Maronite forces, especially the Lebanese Forces in northern Lebanon which the Syrian-led ADF had militarily confronted since February 1978, and also that further objection to the deployment of the Lebanese army in the South would decrease its legitimacy in Lebanon. On the other hand, Sarkis hoped to gain prestige for the Lebanese army in the South and also to transfer Syria's attention to the South.[148] Perhaps he aimed to increase the legitimacy of the government by exploiting Syria's delicate position in Lebanon. The newly created Litani Brigade of the Lebanese army, numbered at 650 and which was put together under Prime Minister Hoss, aimed to reach the UNIFIL zone bordering Israel by passing through the area controlled by Haddad, but its progress was halted by shellfire from Haddad's militias.[149]

As the fighting between the Syrian forces and the Lebanese Forces continued, the latter called for the replacement of the ADF by an

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[146] Glass (1977) p.11.
[147] Brynen (1990) p.116.
[148] Avi-Ran (1991) p .101.
[149] Petran (1987) p.243.

international peacekeeping force. Pressured by Maronite demands,[150] and by securing support from the Arab countries financing the ADF, Sarkis managed to successfully negotiate with Asad at Beiteddine in mid-October 1978, who feared a Lebanese refusal of the renewal of the ADF's mandate. The conference called for the rebuilding of the Lebanese army, with a balanced sectarian composition, to replace the ADF. This was followed by the Lebanese parliament's approval of the new army law in March 1979. Though non-Syrian troops of the ADF withdrew from Lebanon completely by May, Syrian troops carried out only a partial withdrawal from East Beirut and still held some strategic positions especially in the centre of Beirut. The Syrian attitude was explainable by the rejection of this army law by Sarkis, who, fearing that any military reform would strip the Maronites of their prerogatives, sided with the Lebanese Forces. He was also influenced by the continuing bad relations between Syria and the Lebanese Forces.[151]

In January 1980, Syria further redeployed most of its forces which had been stationed in northern Lebanon and East Beirut to Beqqa, though it still kept several thousand troops in West Beirut. Syria's actions seem to have been influenced by two factors. Firstly, by concentrating its forces in Beqqa, Syria tried to ensure additional protection for its most vulnerable flank in the event of future Israeli attacks, the probability of which increased after the establishment of the Likud government. Secondly, since the Asad regime was facing a series of military attacks at home from the Muslim Brotherhood, the concentration of its troops in the area relatively close to Damascus made it

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[150] Camille Chamoun stated that since the Syrian forces abandoned its original peacekeeping role and transformed a party to the conflict, they could not stay in Lebanon permanently and the Maronites would continue the fighting until the last Syrian soldiers could be expelled from Lebanon. [Cobban (1978) pp.15-16. /Hanf (1993) p.234.]

[151] Haddad (1985) pp.60-61. /Petran (1987) pp.248-249. /Pogany (1987) pp.132-134.

easy for security forces in Syria to be reinforced by units of the ADF.[152] Thirdly, but more importantly since the mandate of the ADF had to be renewed every six months, Syria might have calculated that it was necessary to appease Sarkis in view of the continuation of hostilities between the ADF and the Lebanese Forces. However, in March, Syria rejected the demand by General Khoury, Commander of the Lebanese army, "that Lebanese troops should replace Syrian forces in all sectors of Beirut."[153] In addition, Syria continuously prevented the Lebanese army from going to the South by strengthening its surrogate PLO-LNM forces there when the Lebanese government tried to establish a symbol of authority in the South by sending an army unit there in mid-April.[154]

Despite these actions by Syria to preserve its prestige and power in Lebanon, Sarkis continued to extend the ADF mandate on its periodic expirations until his resignation in 1982. His action seems to have been influenced not only by Syria's still dominant power in Lebanon and its occasional gesture of appeasement toward him but also by regional factors and his own perception. Since he relied on other Arab states as counterbalances to Syrian power in Lebanon, their views that the termination of the mandate would only lead to an alternative bilateral agreement between Lebanon and Syria, one that would only decrease whatever influence Arab states could exert on Damascus to moderate its policies in Lebanon, may have affected his actions.[155] In addition, as a Shihabist he probably did not want to provoke the Syrians, which could alienate the Muslims. However, Sarkis's reliance on the Arab community to resolve the hostilities between the ADF and the Lebanese Forces and to

[152] Pogany (1987) pp.135-138.
[153] Pogany (1987) p.137.
[154] Haddad (1985) p.62.
[155] Thompson (2002) p.76.

secure the deployment of the Lebanese army in all Lebanon's territories resulted in failure. In fact, though the Arab League summit in Fez in 1981 stipulated support for the Lebanese government's plan for the army's deployment in the South, the polarisation between the moderate and hard-line Arab states, especially antagonism between Saudi Arabia and Syria which resulted from the former supporting Iraq and the latter aligning with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, prevented the actualisation of the deployment.[156]

(4) Further Disintegration of the Lebanese Army (1982－1989)

After Amin Jumayiel assumed the presidency, he began to restore the army's capability by using emergency powers, including the power to legislate by decree, which he was given by the parliament. However, because of the Israeli occupation, he was forced to take into consideration the interests of Israel and its ally in Lebanon, the Lebanese Forces.

Jumayiel nominated Ibrahim Tannous, who had been the head of the Phalange's military training for the past nine years, as the new army commander. He then exploited Tannous's power to purge officers considered politically undesirable by the Lebanese Forces. By issuing Decree Law 10, Jumayiel also restored the commander's absolute authority, which had been somewhat reduced by the new army law in March 1979. Since the army was staffed with officers favoured by the Lebanese Forces and since those officers won rapid promotions, the army's "Christian character" was strengthened, and this prevented it from functioning as a symbol of national reconciliation. In addition, reflecting Jumayiel's reliance on the USA, Washington promised to supply the Lebanese army with a great quality of arms and military equipment, and to send American advisors to help train the new army.[157]

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[156] Haddad (1985) pp.65-69.
[157] McLaurin (1984) pp.101-102. /Petran (1987) pp.295-296.

How did all this affect relations between the army, which still retained its "Christian character", and Syria? The relations were clearly manifest in the following three dimensions: the "Shuf War", the battle for the "Tripartite Agreement", and the "Camps War".

With the beginning of Israel's partial withdrawal from the Shuf in July 1983, Asad's main allies in Lebanon, Jumblatt and Berri, voiced their rejection of the Lebanese army's deployment in the region since they considered the army sectarian and confessional.[158] However, Jumayiel managed, with the help of the USA and France, to hold meetings with Jumblatt in order to materialise the Lebanese army's dispatch to the Shuf. Jumblatt may have concerned the probable resumption of hostilities in the Shuf and the resulting further damage and casualties there, if a political arrangement was not reached. In August, a series of meetings between the Lebanese government and Jumblatt were held in Paris and an agreement, which was to be implemented by the legal authorities, including the Lebanese army, and which would provide security for the Shuf, was concluded. It was also agreed that Jumblatt would seek the consent of Syria and its allies. However, Syria rejected this accord.[159] Since Syria desperately needed strong coalitions between its allies in Lebanon in order to abrogate the May 17 Agreement, it may have considered Jumblatt's actions to be destructive of the solidarity of those opposed to Jumayiel. Syria's actions also undermined the role of the Lebanese army by rejecting its role in the pacification of the Shuf which was to be carried out in line with the accord in Paris.

Though the sectarian appeal to Druzes within the army to abandon the institution had some effect during the "Shuf War", the number of persons who were affected by the appeal was initially small and the unity of the army

[158] Haddad (1985) pp.100-101.

was still preserved.[160] However, with his external patrons, the USA and Israel, decreasing their presence in Lebanon, Jumayiel increasingly tried to use the army against his rivals, especially the Druzes and Shi'ites, and thus the army further drifted toward full alignment with the Lebanese Forces. As a result, most Druze soldiers had abandoned their posts by the end of 1983, and the army's mainly Druze brigade disintegrated when it was sent to the Shuf to suppress Jumblatt's forces. Later in February 1984, the sixth brigade of the Lebanese army, composed mainly of Shi'ite and pro-Amal figures, followed the call of Berri's defection and joined him.[161] The coalition between Amal and the sixth brigade of the Lebanese army may have had a positive outcome for Syria during the "Camps War". Since this made it possible for Syria to demonstrate its alliance with a brigade of the Lebanese army, the criticism against the legitimacy of its policy of surrounding the Palestinian refugee camps might have been somewhat decreased.

While Syria succeeded in inserting a clause in the "Tripartite Agreement" that the Lebanese army command should be rehabilitated under Syrian guidance, this Syrian action, along with its support for Hubayka, strongly antagonised not only the Maronite warlords but also the army's Maronite leadership. Syria bombed East Beirut to protect Hubayka's factions and the army made a counterattack in early 1986, which had negative consequences for Syria. Firstly, Syria's open clashes with forces representing "Lebanese legitimacy" hurt its status in the international arena. Secondly, the ties between the Lebanese Forces leader, Ja'ja, and the army Commander, Awn, were solidified. In fact, after the Syrian army cleared militias from the streets of West Beirut in March 1987, it suggested that Jumayiel and Awn take the same measure in East Beirut against Ja'ja. However, due to

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[159] Haddad (1985) pp.101-103. /McLaurin (1984) p.103.
[160] Betts (1988) pp.112-113. /McLaurin (1984) pp.107-108.
[161] McLaurin (1984) pp.107-108. /Petran (1987) pp.348-349.

Jumayiel's reliance on Ja'ja and the close relations between Awn and Ja'ja, this Syrian ploy failed.[162]

The strong ties between the army and the Lebanese Forces considerably deepened Syria's suspicion of the army's "neutrality". When clashes and tensions persisted between Amal and the Palestinians at Chatila and Bourj Barajineh refugee camps in June 1986, Joint Committees were set up to supervise the truce and the deployment of the Lebanese army's "special forces" which were made up of a number of different army brigades as a buffer force around the camps.[163] Though the Lebanese army's role in easing the tensions was sometimes helped by the Syrian army, the Lebanese side could not rely on full Syrian support. Even when the Lebanese army entered into West Beirut to implement the Syrian-sponsored security plan, Syria dispatched only symbolic numbers—about 200 men—from its battalion.[164]

(5) Brief Summary

Overall, though the Lebanese government tired to increase the army's role, most of the efforts resulted in failure, since the army still remained a "Christian army", and Syria was generally sceptical and sometimes opposed to the deployment of such a confessional army. Though Syria generally criticised the separatist movements in the army, it sometimes gave tacit consent to these currents through support of those army units favourable to its strategies.

5. ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS : THE MILITIA ECONOMY AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS

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[162] Harris (1988) pp.93-97.
[163] *MEI* June 27,1986.
[164] *MEI* July 11,1986.

(1) Introduction

As the civil war progressed, so did the fragmentation in Lebanon.[165] This situation affected the economy: as the militia economy emerged, the "normal" economic system nearly ceased to function. Under the flourishing militia economy, attempts by the Lebanese government to reconstruct a national economy was one of its important activities to restore state functions by securing revenues. In doing so, the government had to take into consideration Syrian economic interests, since Syria was involved not only in the militia economy, through smuggling, but also in the attempts by the Lebanese government to reconstruct its economy. This section will begin by briefly surveying the militia economy in Lebanon and Syria's involvement in it. This will be followed by a discussion of Lebanese efforts toward economic reconstruction, and again of Syria's involvement.

(2) The Spread of the Militia Economy in Lebanon

The militia economy came into being with "the transition from the local mobilisation of armed defence groups in villages or neighbourhoods that operated within the framework of a unified state to the monopolisation of resources and means of coercion by large, organised, and hierarchical militias that gradually carved up the Lebanese territory after 1976."[166] In particular, the Lebanese Forces, the PSP, Amal, and Hizbollah attempted to consolidate their power in their own communities by looting state property and by depriving opponents of strategic resources such as oil and electricity. They gave priority to securing access to resources without having to rely on the mediation of the enemy, for example, by constructing separate ports,

[165] For the details of fragmentation process during the civil war, see Harris (1996) pp.203-233.
[166] Picard (2000) p.293.

since Lebanon imported more than 50 percent of its consumer goods.[167]

In addition, militias began to be involved in criminal economic activities, and even Syrian forces in Lebanon became deeply engaged in smuggling in the 1980s. In fact, nearly 70 percent of Syria's annual imports were smuggled in from Lebanon, and thousands of tons of cement, petrol, sugar, and other goods which were sold in Syria at subsidised prices were smuggled into Lebanon where their prices were higher.[168] Syrian troops stationed in Lebanon were involved in these processes in the Beqqa.

In the Beqqa adjunct to Syria, Zahle was a strategic point because of its nexus of east/west and north/south communications with the interior of Lebanon. The control of Zahle would therefore mean the control of Beqqa and, by extension, Lebanon as a whole. Thus, the loss of Zahle would have been a serious blow to Damascus. Zahle also overlooked the Beirut-Damascus highway, an important supply and communication line. More importantly, Syria believed that its control of Beqqa was justified for security reasons, because a drive northward through it led to the Syrian city of Homs, the headquarters of Syria's transport communications.[169] The Asad regime continued to give particular attention to Zahle and its surrounding district, especially after Syria consolidated its hegemony in Lebanon in 1976.

After the outbreak of conflict, certain factors resulting from the security problems in other parts of Lebanon became paradoxically advantageous for the economy of both Zahle and the Beqqa as a whole. In particular, the continual fighting in and around Beirut encouraged economic decentralisation, and so Zahle became more important as an entrepot and service centre for the east region, and experienced commercial and industrial expansion. This economic vitality in Zahle attracted the Syrians, and the

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[167] Picard (2000) pp.293-299.
[168] Sadowski (1985) pp.6-7.
[169] Haddad (1982) p.34.

number of Syrian visitors increased. After Syrian troops came there, a series of economic networks was quickly formed for smuggling drugs, consumer goods, and other materials between Lebanon and Syria.[170]

Though the Lebanese drug trade dated back to the early 20th century, it increased dramatically after the outbreak of the conflict, due to international demand and decreased control by the central government. It is said that the trade was tacitly supported by the Syrian regime, and a number of high-ranking Syrian military and intelligence officials, such as Rifat Asad, the brother of President Asad, and Defence Minister Mustafa Tlas, permitted drug processing and allowed smugglers to travel unhindered between Lebanon and Syria. The Syrian-imposed closure of a large area of mountain vineyards as military areas, along with the rising prices of drugs, no doubt influenced those local farmers who were devoted to drug cultivation, which was an activity that generated about USD 3 billion annually. The profits the drug smuggling gave to Syrian officials remained useful for cementing their allegiance to the Asad regime until 1990, when Syria, hoping to advance relations with Western countries, accepted the USA demand to restrict Lebanese drug cultivation.[171]

The smuggling of consumer goods and other materials from Lebanon to Syria was also tacitly encouraged by the Syrian government. When Syrian businessmen organised the acquisition of building materials for the Syrian construction industry in late 1983, Zahle acted as an agency for obtaining timber, iron, and porcelain. To the Beqqa as a whole the deals were estimated as up to approximately USD 5 million per day, and two-thirds of the business went through Zahle. However, Syria's financial and political crises in 1984 caused an economic downturn in Beqqa. Syrian foreign reserves decreased sharply as problems in obtaining aid from Arab oil states occurred both as a

[170] Harris (1985b) pp.282-283.

result of Syria siding with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War and the economic difficulties facing these Arab states. In addition, Asad's anti-corruption campaign adversely affected the smuggling trade on the Beirut-Damascus highway. This was a reflection of the power struggle over the potential succession between Rifat Asad and other prominent Alawis. Rifat was prominent in Beqqa commercial operations, and the assault on the smuggling may well have contributed to the decrease in his political status.[172]

However, drug smuggling between Lebanon and Syria continued until the end of the conflict. It seems that Asad on the one hand did not want to further antagonise his senior officials, which might have shaken his regime and that the weak Lebanese state on the other hand had no choice but to accept the smuggling. Despite these discouraging circumstances, the Lebanese government tried to reconstruct its economy and Syria, for all its involvement in the militia economy and the drug trade, showed interest in the process.

(3) The Lebanese Government's Attempts at Reconstruction

The spread of the illegal militia economy created a situation where the Lebanese government lost control over public revenues and income but "continued to spend in order to maintain essential services, pay wages and salaries and subsidise some basic imported goods."[173] Given this asymmetry between revenues and expenditure, the government had to reconstruct its economy by relying on foreign, especially Arab, financial assistance. However, its attempts were seldom successful, and the responsibility for this, albeit indirectly, was Syria's.

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[171] Abdelnour (2001). /Harris (1985) p.283. /Joffe (2000).
[172] Harris (1985) pp.283-284.

After the Lebanese government created the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) in January 1977 to formulate the reconstruction plan and to mediate external funds, state officials frequently visited the oil-producing Gulf countries to secure financial assistance.[174] This Lebanese effort bore fruit and at the 1979 Tunis summit Arab states pledged to pay USD 2,000 million over five years toward Lebanese reconstruction. However, their promises did not fully materialise, and by December 1981 Lebanon had received a total of only USD 372 million, though the amount should have reached USD 800 million.[175] The Gulf states' hesitation was primarily due to the political instability and uncertainty in Lebanon, especially as a result of the continuation of hostilities between the Lebanese Forces and the Syrian-dominated ADF.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, reflecting the strained relations between Sarkis and Asad, the economic relationship between Lebanon and Syria was not always a good one. However, Syria agreed with Lebanon in 1981 to amend the 1953 trade pact to allow the export of a greater variety of Lebanese goods to Syria. Since Syria was moving into self-sufficiently in cement production and Lebanon had traditionally exported both black and white cements to Syria, Lebanon clearly needed to diversify its export goods to Syria.[176] Syria may well have been attending to the Lebanese economic needs so as not to further antagonise Sarkis.

However, the closure of the trans-Syrian pipeline and the halt of Iraqi crude oil export to Tripoli in April 1982, which resulted from the hostilities between Syria and Iraq, worsened the Lebanese attitude toward Syria. After a delegation of local businessmen visited Iraq, the Lebanese cabinet approved

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[173] Chami (1992) p.326.
[174] *MEED* December 31, 1977.
[175] *MEED* December 18, 1981. /Starr (1984) p.71.
[176] *MEED* August 4, 1978, April 10, 1981, and March 5, 1982.

plans to establish a centre in Baghdad to promote Lebanese industrial goods.[177] In the context of the strained relations between Lebanon and Syria as well as the antagonism between Syria and the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, although the Lebanese government tried to improve economic conditions with the help of these Arab states, it also had to avoid the severance of economic relations with Syria since some aspects of Lebanese economic life depended on Syria. For example, the Electricite du Liban network, which covered 85 percent of Lebanon's electricity needs, and which suffered from heavy losses as a result of illegal tapping of electricity lines by individuals and militias, was forced to import electricity from Syria through the Beqqa.[178] In addition, Syrian was a transit route for Lebanese goods to the Gulf countries.

With Syrian hegemony in Lebanon gradually recovering in the mid-1980s, Syrian influence in Lebanese economic policy was acknowledged. The Lebanese government had to take into consideration Syrian clients', especially Berri's, economic interests. Firstly, the Ministry of the South, headed by Berri, was created in 1984 to guarantee his cooperation with the Karami cabinet. The Ministry of the South was initially merely a political gesture, but it soon absorbed the funds and functions of the Council of the South which had been created in 1980 to reconstruct the South after the Israel's Litani Operation.[179] Secondly, in the 1985 budget the cabinet approved the allocation of USD 40 million toward an aid program for the South.[180] Thirdly, the cabinet asked the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) to revive a 1982 project to upgrade the highway from Beirut to the Syrian boarder at Masnaa, and the CDR agreed to provide USD

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[177] *MEED* April 16, April 23, and June 4, 1982.
[178] Starr (1984) p.76.
[179] Harik (1994) p.20.
[180] *MEED* October 19 and December 14, 1984.

2,5 million to the Ministry of the South. Since the project was carried out by the Syrian Mount Kassioun Company, Syria's influence with its client, Berri, was apparent.[181] Fourthly, when the cabinet agreed to close illegal ports in September 1986 so as to secure customs revenue, Syrian allies in Lebanon, Amal and the PSP, were not cooperative. There seems no evidence that Syria pressured them to side with the government, and thus the attempt resulted in failure.[182]

Did Syria, despite its deep involvement in smuggling, contribute in any positive way to Lebanese economic reconstruction? From the above, it appears that Syria interfered in the economic process in such a way as to maintain and promote its own or its clients' economic interests, and thus distorted the process of reconstruction.

However, Syrian involvement sometimes brought benefits for the Lebanon. Firstly, in the fall of 1976, the Syrian-led ADF created conditions in Beirut for the Lebanese banking system to return to normal. This was favourable not only for Beirut's financial community, since the precarious security condition after the outbreak of the conflict made it impossible for the banking sector to find domestic outlets for its holdings, but also for Syrian enterprises to have used the traditionally highly regarded system.[183] The same took place in Tripoli when Syrian troops established security after clashing with the Sunni fundamentalist movement: five Beirut banks opened branches there.[184] Secondly, when poor Muslims, especially the Shi'ites, protested against a probable rise in the cost of living in late August 1987 after the Lebanese government made a decision to cut subsides to basic goods in order to contain its spiral deficits, the Syrian army intervened to

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[181] *MEED* November 23, 1984, December 7, 1985, and April 18, 1987.
[182] *MEED* September 13, October 11, and October 18, 1986.
[183] Lawson (1996) p.95.
[184] *MEED* January 25, 1986. /*MEI* October 11, 1985.

break up the demonstration.[185] Though this action had been suspended because of widespread opposition, the government finally cut the petrol subsidy, though only partially.[186] In these ways, it could be said that Syria, though indirectly, helped economic reconstruction in Lebanon.

(4) Brief Summary

Overall, the reconstruction efforts by the Lebanese government were for the most part directly or indirectly affected by Syrian actions, and the government generally had to pay careful attention to Syria's intentions. This appears to have made it difficult for the Lebanese state to carry out its reconstruction programme in terms of a "pure" economic calculation.

[185] *MEED* September 5, 1987.
[186] *MEED* September 26, 1987.

IV. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LEBANESE STATE UNDER SYRIAN HEGEMONY (1989–2002)

Since the end of the Lebanese civil war, the Lebanese government has tried to reconstruct the country. In doing so, the state has had to take into consideration Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, which was firmly legitimised by the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination in May 1991. As a result, though the Ta'if Agreement stipulated that postwar Lebanon would continue to be a "consociational democracy", democratic practice has been restricted under Syrian indirect rule. In reality, Syria has frequently intervened in Lebanese political, economic, and social affairs to serve its own interests. In turn, Lebanese state officials have tried to exploit the Syrians for their own interests, while keeping an eye on the regional dynamics of the Middle East which has largely affected Syrian diplomatic ties with the Lebanese state as well as its transstate ties with Lebanese sub-state groups. However, faced with Syria's dominant position and its allies there, their attempts often have ended in failure. Therefore, as in the previous chapter, the external and internal circumstances surrounding the Lebanese state's dealings with the Syrians, along with the consolidating process of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, will be briefly discussed, and these will be followed by a detailed presentation of the political, economic, and social aspects of Lebanese-Syrian dynamics. Finally, there will be a consideration of the impact of the unequal relationship between Syria and Lebanon on current discussion in Lebanon of the Syrian presence in the country.

1. THE DYNAMICS OF MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON LEBANON AND SYRIA

(1) Introduction

Even though the civil war has ended, Lebanon continues to be an arena for regional rivalry. Syria has used Lebanon in its regional/international policies, a fact which has arguably both weakened or strengthened the Syrian position in Lebanon. Syria's two main external concerns after 1989 have been the Syrian-Iraqi rivalry and the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. The focus here will be on the respective impact of these concerns on Lebanon.

(2) The Syrian-Iraqi Rivalry and Lebanon

The ending of the Iran-Iraq War in August 1988 marked the start of a new phase in the rivalry between Syria and Iraq over Lebanese territory. In 1989, when there were two rival governments in Lebanon, Iraq now found itself free from having to attend to the eastern border with Iran and began to focus on its western border. In a manifestation of its desire for vengeance against Syria for the latter's support of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, it increased its involvement in Lebanon by extending aid to the anti-Syrian Awn-led government, while Syria supported the rival government under Hoss. Iraq's backing allowed Awn to declare in March a "War of Liberation" against the Syrian forces, and fierce fighting continued between the Syrian army and Awn forces throughout the spring and summer. This situation intensified Arab mediation efforts, and in May a three-state committee was formed, composed of Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Algeria. Using their financial and political power, the Saudis played a dominant role in pushing the Lebanese toward reconciliation and the Ta'if Agreement was finally concluded in October, under the auspices of the Arab League, as a basis of Lebanese national reconciliation.[1]

The agreement stipulated a Syrian "special" status by inserting two

[1] Thompson (2002) pp.79-80. /Zisser (2001) p.53 and pp.136-137.

provisions which gave Syria the legal right to keep its army in Lebanon. How long it would be able to do so was not to be determined by any outside body, and the army would be able to respond to perceived threats against Syrian security within Lebanese territory.[2] However, Syrian hegemony in Lebanon was not completely consolidated, and was still being challenged by Awn. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Syria joined the USA-led anti-Iraqi coalition, an act which secured tacit Israeli permission to use both its troops and air force against Awn—a clear violation of the "Red Line" Agreement—and thus succeeded in defeating him.[3] The surrender of Awn in October strengthened Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, which was firmly legitimised in May 1991 with the ratification of the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination. Thereafter, the established Syrian hegemony in Lebanon has enabled the Asad regime to "play the Lebanon card" in carrying out its regional policies.[4]

(3) The Syrian-Israeli Negotiations and Lebanon

In addition to the bitter relationship between Syria and Iraq and the possibility of getting financial aid for the stagnant Syrian economy from both the West and from the Gulf states, another factor behind the Syrian decision to join the anti-Iraqi coalition may well have been the breakdown of global bipolarity that took place in 1989. The decline and eventual dissolution of the USSR as a reliable patron stripped Syria of the option of going to war as a means to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict.[5] Syria's lack of any real alternative to the peace process forced Asad to abandon Syria's traditional conditions:

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[2] Thompson (2002) pp.80-81.
[3] Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp.136-137. /Hinnebusch (1998) p.149.
[4] Hinnebusch (2002b) p.158.
[5] Hinnebusch (1994) p.175.

UN sponsorship and a united Arab delegation. He was also forced to accept the USA's procedural terms, which were designed to shape the course of the negotiations to Israel's advantage.[6] Syria attended the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991, and a succession of Middle East peace negotiations has affected Syrian regional policy, especially toward Lebanon, and also Lebanese foreign relations.

The conference stipulated two ways for the post-Madrid negotiations to proceed: multilateral talks concerning development, refugees, security, water, and the environment; and bilateral talks between Israel and the frontline Arab states.[7] Although Syria entered direct negotiations with Israel, these negotiations were fraught with difficulties and obstacles, and no real progress was made until June 1992, when the Labour government under Yitzhak Rabin was established.[8] The stalemate of the negotiation process during this period intensified Hizbollah's military activities against Israel's occupied "security zone" in southern Lebanon. Faced with Syrian determination to use Hizbollah to acquire negotiating leverage with Israel, the weak Lebanese government had no choice but to accept.

At the Syrian-Israeli negotiations in August 1992, Israel stated that though UN Resolution 242 applied to the Golan Heights, it did not call for withdrawal from all the occupied territories. Syria, in contrast, maintained that since UN Resolution 242 clearly required full Israeli withdrawal, a partial withdrawal was not acceptable. Despite these differences, Asad continued to demonstrate his seriousness toward the negotiations. Indeed, Syria took the initiative in encouraging the Palestinians, Jordanians, and Lebanese to resume peace talks, and even supported their dialogues when they were interrupted by the Israeli expulsion of Hamas members to

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[6] Hinnebusch (1996) p.48.
[7] Barnett (1998) pp.221-222.
[8] Zisser (2001) p.105.

southern Lebanon in December 1992.[9]

In 1993, their different stances on the Golan Heights stalled the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. Frustrated and claiming to respond to Hizbollah's attacks on its presence in the South, Israel launched massive military incursions into southern Lebanon in July, known as "Operation Accountability". Although recognising that the heavy Israeli attacks against both Hizbollah in the South and its forces in Beqqa were aimed to force concessions in their negotiations, Syria did not wish to abort the peace process itself, and cooperated with Israel in the resolution of the crisis.[10] This cooperative behaviour led Israel to consider Asad to be a serious negotiating partner who wanted peace. However, the continued diverse stance on the Golan-for-peace equation pushed Israel to give priority to the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. The Oslo Accord in September 1993, and the subsequent separate agreements that Israel reached with Jordan and the PLO, not only made it possible for Syria to negotiate for anything else but the Golan, but also weakened Syria's bargaining power with Israel. In this context, Lebanon, especially Hizbollah's operations against the "security zone", became a more important asset for the Syrians, a condition which, arguably, led Asad to pay more attention to considering ways in which the Lebanese situations might serve his policies.[11]

Firstly, since Asad realised that Israel could benefit from a Syrian move to control Hizbollah's activities in the South, he linked a solution to the problem of southern Lebanon and Hizbollah's military activities there to an overall solution of the Arab-Israel conflict, and included in this a solution to

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[9] Hinnebusch (1996) pp.51-52. /Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp.165-166.
[10] Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp.149-150. /Hinnebusch (1998) p. 56.
[11] Hinnebusch (1996) pp.50-53.

the Golan problem that would be in his favour.[12] Secondly, when Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri announced in February 1993 his readiness to sign any agreement with Israel under UN Resolution 425 (which called for an end to Israeli occupation in the South) against Syrian wishes, Syria contained this move in order to avoid the possibility that it might weaken the Syrian negotiating position toward Israel.[13]

The year 1995 was crucial for the peace process, and the Syrian-Israeli negotiations were accelerated by the change of leadership in Israel after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. The succeeding Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, declared that the Golan was Syrian territory, and both Peres's eagerness to reach an agreement with Syria and the post-assassination shift in Israeli public opinion brought Asad to the negotiating table in late 1995. Nevertheless, no breakthrough ensued, and in April 1996, as it had in July 1993, Israel launched heavy military operations against Hizbollah and Lebanon's infrastructure: this was "Operation Grapes of Wrath". The exacerbated tensions between Syria and Israel and the Israeli election campaign led Peres to suspend negotiations.[14]

After the Likud Party won in the May 1996 election, the Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu attempted to separate the Lebanese-Israeli peace track from the Syrian-Israeli peace track, and insisted that the Syrian-Israeli negotiations should be resumed with no preconditions and irrespective of progress in negotiations between Syria and the former Labor government.[15] Against this, Asad maintained that peace was a strategic choice, that negotiations should be resumed from the point at which they were interrupted, that all understandings reached between them concerning

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[12] Zisser (2001) p.147.
[13] Hinnebusch (1998) p.157. /Norton (1997) p.10.
[14] Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p.72. /Hinnebusch (1996) p.54. /Hinnebusch (1998) p.156.

withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Golan and arrangements about security affairs should be considered still valid, and that the Syrian and Lebanese tracks were inseparable.[16]

The "Lebanon First" option advocated by Netanyahu was a response to pressure from the Israeli army which had already begun to question the effectiveness of the Israeli presence in the "security zone" after "Operation Grapes of Wrath". Since the option aimed to split Lebanon and Syria and also to eliminate the Syrian "trump card" by leaving the South unilaterally, it was not surprising that Syria rejected this proposal. Though Hariri initially tried, against the wishes of the Syrians, to promote the "Lebanon First" option by using his close ties with the West and the Gulf states, his attempt again met with stubborn Syrian objections and resulted in failure. As a result, the stalemate in Syrian-Israeli negotiations intensified Hizbollah's military activities in southern Lebanon.[17]

The number of Israeli casualties in the South increased, and thus the "security zone" became a liability for Israel. In 1998, Netanyahu announced Israel's readiness to accept UN Resolution 425, and demanded Lebanon calm its boarder with Israel. Syria rejected this proposal, and Lebanon, having no choice but to follow Syria, also rejected it.[18] After Ehud Barak was elected as prime minister in May 1999, he announced his intention to withdraw the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) from Lebanon within one year, in cooperation with Syria. Then, following prolonged and exhaustive deliberations, Syria and Israel decided to renew negotiations. Sponsored by US President, Bill Clinton, Barak and the Syrian Foreign Minister, Faruq Shar, met in Washington in mid-December 1999. However, the meetings between the two

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[15] Hajjar (1999) pp.112-113.
[16] Hajjar (1999) pp.122-123.
[17] Hinnebusch (1998) p.157. /Norton (1997) p.12. /Zisser (2001) pp.146-147.
[18] Zisser (2001) p.146.

there, and later at Shepherdstown, did not lead to real progress. Eventually Barak announced that the opportunity for peace with Syria was closed, and he decided on a unilateral IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, which was effected on May 24 2000. The Israeli presence in Lebanon had come to an end.[19] However, Israeli retention of a sliver of disputed territory, the "Shabaa Farms", has enabled Syria to continue using Hizbollah's attacks on Israeli positions to give Israel the message that it could not have peace in the northern border without a comprehensive settlement with Syria and Lebanon.

After Ariel Sharon visited the Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in September 2000, the second Palestinian intifada erupted against the IDF in the West Bank and Gaza. In sympathy, Syria has tolerated and even encouraged limited Hizbollah military activities against the IDF in the Shabaa Farms, which Syria and Lebanon have regarded as still Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory. However, the Syrian new leadership, led by Bashar Asad, who took on responsibility for Lebanese policy from Vice President Khaddam in 1998 and who was elected as president after his father's death in June 2000, was not interested in a conventional military confrontation, and thus did not retaliate against the retaliatory Israeli attacks on Syrian military installations in Lebanon in April and July 2001 following Hizbollah's military operations in the Shabaa Farms.[20] Repeated Palestinian uprisings and strained Palestinian-Israeli relations have continuously influenced Syrian policy toward Lebanon. When Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah released his peace proposal in mid-February 2002 to set the agenda for the March 27-28 Arab League summit in Beirut, Asad visited Lebanon on March 3 to firmly impress that Syria should be a leading player in the Arab-Israeli peace process. However, his visit was also aimed at softening, ahead of the

[19] Zisser (2001) pp.124-125, p.146.

summit, the Maronite opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon, as well as at managing divisions within the Lebanese government.[21]

In the aftermath of "September 11", American officials initially avoided mentioning Hizbollah in the context of the US war against terrorism. The Bush administration, in order to secure Arab backing for the American-led war in Afghanistan, calculated that it would not explicitly target Hizbollah and other Syrian-sponsored guerrilla groups in its war on terror, as long as Syria cooperated by causing its surrogate forces to refrain from launching violent provocations against Israel. Syria, for its part, hoped that its participation in the anti-terrorism campaign could be traded for US pressure on Israel over the Golan Heights.[22] However, it soon became clear that this hope could not be realised under the pro-Israeli Bush administration, and Hizbollah launched military attacks twice in October 2001, an action which resulted in Washington adding Hizbollah to its "terrorist" list.[23] The unprecedented level of American pressure, which included the possibility of economic sanctions, on Syria and Lebanon to rein in Hizbollah has placed the Hariri government in a difficult position, a position which was clearly evident in its negotiations during the December over the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement, which would establish a free-trade zone on both sides of the Mediterranean by 2010. The European countries, especially Britain, demanded Lebanon to show its explicit stance of combating terrorism.

(4) Brief Summary

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[20] Ghadbian (2001) pp.627-628. /Perthes (2001) pp.37-38.
[21] Gambill (2002-3/4). /For the details of Abdullah's plan and its analysis, see Montagu (2002).
[22] Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (2002) p.348.
[23] *MEI* October 26 and November 23, 2001.

Now that the regional rivalry between Syria and Iraq over Lebanese soil has ended, the regional Syrian-Israeli power struggle has taken on more diplomatic and military dimensions, and continues to have a strong effect on the Lebanese state.

2. THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF SYRIAN HEGEMONY

(1) Introduction

Before discussing relations between Lebanese sub-state groups and Syria, it would be useful to deal with the process of Syria's strengthening hegemony in Lebanon after the civil war. This was brought about by a number of factors: the formation of the Ta'if Agreement, Awn's defeat, the disarming of Lebanese militias and the PLO, and the conclusion of the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination. These set the basic framework for Lebanese-Syrian relations under Syrian indirect rule during the post-war period.

(2) The Formation of the Ta'if Agreement and Awn's Defeat

After Awn declared a "War of Liberation" against the Syrians on March 13, 1989, he received aid from the Lebanese Forces (LF) headed by Samir Ja'ja. In spite of the animosity between them, which had originated in Awn's open battle with the LF over the control of Beirut port while he was in the process of consolidating his authority over the Christians, they coordinated to confront the common enemy: Syria.[24] The escalation of fighting placed more pressure on Arab mediation efforts, and led to the formation of the Ta'if Agreement in October.

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[24] Abul-Husn (1998) pp.107-108. /Salem (1991) pp.65-67.

The Ta'if Agreement, firstly, aimed to lay foundations for the establishment of a new Lebanese political order by bringing in a series of constitutional amendments concerning the system of government. These measures included reducing the Maronite president's power and placing him on an equal footing with the Sunni prime minister and Shi'ite speaker of parliament, expanding the parliament's power, and establishing parity in the number of seats between Christian and Muslim deputies, even though the Christians were now a demographic minority. To materialise these changes, the agreement stipulated the Lebanon's constitutional amendment. Secondly, the agreement called for the disarming of militias and the restoration and extension of the authority of the central government in Beirut to all of Lebanon, including the South. Thirdly, it stipulated that the number of Syrian troops stationing in Lebanon would be determined only by the two states and that the Syrian army would redeploy to Beqqa two years after the amendment of the constitution. It also formalised the Lebanese "special" relationship with Syria. Fourthly, it demanded the Israeli withdrawal from the "security zone" in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425 and other UN resolutions.[25] Syria was able, by using its political power and diplomatic skill, to secure an internationally recognised legal basis for its presence. It was also enabled to do so by the fact that the agreement was sanctioned not only by the Lebanese government but also by the Arab League and the United Nations.[26]

After the Ta'if Agreement was concluded, Syria and its allies in Lebanon began to make an effort to implement it, with international and regional backing. Elias Hrawi was elected as president after the assassination of Rene Muawwad, and he, in cooperation with Prime Minister Hoss, tried hard

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[25] Hamdan (1997) pp.216-226. /Norton (1991) pp.461-464. /Zisser (2001) p.137.
[26] Thompson (2002) pp.80-81.

to implement the agreement. In fact, the Hrawi-Hoss administration dismissed General Awn, suspended payments to civil servants under him, imposed an economic blockade on the districts controlled by him, and appealed to opponents of the agreement to support the peace process in Lebanon.[27]

Awn rejected the Ta'if Agreement on the ground that it did not call for a Syrian withdrawal from all Lebanese territory, but only for a redeployment of Syrian forces to the Beqqa Valley. Awn's followers launched a series of attacks against pro-Ta'if figures. In contrast to Awn's popularity among the Christians, that of the LF commander Ja'ja diminished, and he came to fear being marginalised within the community. He began to distance himself from Awn, stated his acceptance of the Ta'if Agreement, and even sent messages to Hoss indicating his willingness to serve in the Hrawi-Hoss administration. The split resulted in the open battle between Awn-led army units and the LF in January 1990, and Awn's massive support among the Maronites made it possible for him to launch military attacks against the LF.[28]

For a long time, Syria had restrained itself. It was concerned that direct Syrian action against Awn might cause a bloody battle, might arouse opposition not only from within Lebanon but also in the regional and international arena, and might also provoke outside, especially Israeli, intervention against the Syrians.[29]

The condition for a military move against Awn became ripe for Asad in the latter part of 1990. Domestically, Syria had won support for the post-Ta'if process from most of the political and military forces in Lebanon, such as Hizbollah, the LF under Samir Ja'ja, and the Maronite religious

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[27] Harris (1996) pp.264-266. /Nasrallah (1993) pp. 106-107.
[28] Norton (1991) pp.464-465. /For the details of Ja'ja-Awn split and their causes, see Laurent (1991) pp.88-101.
[29] Zisser (2001) pp.140-141.

establishments represented by Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir. Backed by Syria, Hrawi had already started to negotiate with Ja'ja in June, which resulted in the acceptance of the process by the LF. The increased Maronite support for the post-Ta'if politics consequently enabled Hrawi to request Syrian assistance officially in order to oust Awn. Internationally, during 1990 and particularly after the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis, Syrian participation in the USA-led anti-Iraqi coalition improved its relations with Western countries, especially the United States. Through the USA, Syria received tacit Israeli acceptance for its military move against Awn. The domestic and international support outlined above led Syria to order its troops in October to attack Awn's enclave around the presidential palace in Ba'abda, an act which led eventually to the capture of all of East Beirut. Awn initially took refuge in the French Embassy before going into exile in France. The alleged assassination by Syrian intelligence forces of Dani Chamoun, a leading supporter of Awn and hence one of Syria's main remaining opponents in Lebanon, finally eliminated military opposition to the Syrian presence.[30]

(3) Disarming Lebanese Militias and the PLO, and the Conclusion of the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination

In the wake of the Gulf Crisis, the post-Ta'if process became firmly "Syrianized" with tacit American blessing. Reaping the full benefits of its membership in the anti-Iraqi coalition, Syria had the Lebanese parliament pass the constitutional reform proposals on August 21, 1990, which was stipulated in the agreement. September 23 of the following month, when the new constitutional amendment was promulgated, was due to be the start of the "Ta'if clock" with regard to the dissolution of militias and the

[30] Harris (1996) pp.274-278. /Zisser (2001) p.141.

redeployment of the Syrian army to Beqqa. According to the Ta'if Agreement, these were timed to occur respectively six months and two years after the amendment of the constitution.[31]

The government, led by Prime Minister Omar Karami, was named under Syrian auspices on December 24. The cabinet had the following items as its main agenda, all mandated by the Ta'if Agreement: to appoint new deputies to the parliament so as to make Christian-Muslim representation equal, to dissolve militias at the same time as extending government authority throughout the country, and to formalise "special" relations with Syria.[32] This section will deal with the latter two issues respectively.

In 1991, there remained four powerful Lebanese militias: Amal, Hizbollah, the Druze militia under Walid Jumblatt, and the Maronite Lebanese Forces. Though both Lebanese and Syrian governments had common interests in dissolving them, the process by which they went about this was largely influenced by Syrian strategic calculations. In March, the Defence Minister, Michael Murr, ordered the Lebanese army to occupy the headquarters of four militias, and later ordered all Lebanese and Palestinian militias to disarm by the end of April 1991. This was seven, not six, months after the "Ta'if clock" had been set in motion. The decision meant that the Lebanese army, backed by the Syrian army, could use force against any militia failing to comply with the order. This, however, proved to be unnecessary, as the process of disarming Lebanese militias was remarkably successful.[33] "With the Syrian army backing a rejuvenated Lebanese army, and with strong international support for the dissolution of the militias, particularly from the US, few militias were in any real position to resist."[34] In a parallel development, the

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[31] Maila (1994) p.41. /Norton (1991) p. 461.
[32] Salem (1994b) p.49.
[33] Norton (1991) pp.468-469.
[34] Najem (2000) p.27.

Lebanese army began to deploy its troops throughout the country as an additional step in the recovery of the sovereignty and authority of the central government.

However, the Lebanese government had to make some concessions to Syria. Firstly, the government was forced to allow Hizbollah to keep arms in the South to support the Syrian aim to keep pressure on Israel militarily, though it recognised that such treatment would invite Israeli retaliation against its territory and offer the IDF a pretext to continue stationing itself in the southern "security zone".[35] Secondly, the government compromised on the surrender of heavy weapons. The Druze militia handed over its weapons to the Syrian army, and the Lebanese Forces militia was allowed to store heavy weapons until they could be shipped abroad.[36]

As for the treatment of Palestinians, the Gulf Crisis and the subsequent Gulf War gave the Lebanese and Syrian governments good opportunities to remove weapons from refugee camps, which could otherwise become an obstacle for both states in their efforts to stabilise the country. At the end of January 1991, the remnants of the PLO in the South declared open a second front in order to support Saddam Hussein, and actually fired missiles and rockets into northern Israel and the "security zone". As Israel responded with shelling and helicopter attacks, the Lebanese army was forced to act, and thus an army brigade went to the South to silence all guns in the region. The Syrian Defence Minister, Mustafa Tlas, who was backed by unanimous Lebanese feeling against the Palestinian armed activities there and was well aware of the danger caused by such Palestinian behaviour, announced that all militias, Lebanese and non-Lebanese, had to disarm. This was also consistent with the long-standing Syrian policy of containing the Palestinians. From April to July, heavy fighting between the Lebanese army

[35] Najem (2000) p.27.

and the Palestinians continued. However, as the Palestinians found no reliable ally among the Lebanese, their future was clear from the start of battle. On July 4, the PLO announced it would hand over medium and heavy weapons to the Lebanese authorities.[37]

Parallel to the disarmament process, Syria continued to negotiate with Lebanon, as the Ta'if Agreement stipulated only the frameworks for their relations and left the particulars to be worked out in bilateral agreements. The first bilateral agreement concluded in accordance with the Ta'if Agreement was the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, which was signed on May 22, 1991, in Damascus. However, reflecting the strengthening of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, which had been brought about by Awn's defeat, by the success of the disarmament of Lebanese militias and the PLO, and by the sanction of the international community as a result of Syrian participation in the anti-Iraqi coalition, the treaty clearly favoured Syria and placed Lebanon in a disadvantageous position.[38] Unlike the Ta'if Agreement, it stipulated that the duration and size of the Syrian army's redeployment in Lebanon would be decided on the expiration of that provision in the Ta'if Agreement, thus making it possible to put off decisions on the redeployment of Syrian troops until the last possible moment. Since the Syrian policy toward Lebanon was mainly prompted by military and security interests, the treaty again stipulated that Lebanon should not be a source of threat to Syrian security, and should not allow itself to become a base for any force, organisation, or state hostile to Syria. On the other hand, the treaty also mentioned that Syria, keen to preserve Lebanon's security, unity, and independence, should not allow any action that would constitute a

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[36] Hanf (1993) p.617.
[37] Hanf (1993) pp.620-621.
[38] "The overwhelming consensus in literature dealing with this issue suggest that the provisions in the treaty have institutionalised Syrian dominance of

threat or danger to Lebanon's security.[39] The Syrian security interest was further emphasised in the September 1991 Defence and Security Agreement, by which Syria solidified its right to use its military force in Lebanese territory and to formally prevent any limits on its behaviour there.[40]

After the signing of the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, the treaty, particularly its treatment about the Syrian army's redeployment, was widely and fiercely criticised, especially by the Christians. The Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, comparing it to the May 17 Agreement in 1983 and the "Tripartite Agreement" in 1985, charged that it was an accord between unequal partners and also that it was an imposed treaty.[41] Other opponents stated that the treaty would link Lebanon too closely with Syria and that since Syria was in the stronger position, it merely provided legitimacy for Syrian domination of Lebanon.[42] In contrast, advocates of the agreement, including President Hrawi, maintained that an alliance with Syria was a rational choice for Lebanon, so as to secure the state from regional and international pressure and also to improve its negotiating position toward Israel.[43] In sum, the treaty stipulated that the Lebanese would deal with the Syrians from a disadvantageous position.

3. THE BASIC INTERESTS OF LEBANESE SUB-STATE GROUPS AND SYRIA, AND A BRIEF SURVEY OF THEIR RELATIONS

(1) Introduction

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the Lebanese political system." [Najem (2000) p.29.]

[39] Thompson (2002) pp.82-83. /As for a text of the treaty, see *The Beirut Review*, no.2, 1991, pp.115-119.

[40] Thompson (2002) p.83.

[41] *FBIS* May 23, 1991. /*MEI* May 31, 1991. /Najem (2000) pp.28-29.

[42] Salem (1994b) p.51.

[43] *FBIS* May 24, 1991. /Salem (1994b) p.51.

Under indirect Syrian rule, the main sub-State groups in Lebanon—the Maronites, Sunnis, Shi'ites, and Druzes—have had differing relations with Syria.[44] These relations have been mainly shaped by the regional dynamics of the Middle East, the Syrian stake in Lebanon, and the interests of Lebanese sub-state groups. On the one hand, Syria has needed the support of sub-state groups to justify its presence in Lebanon, and has struggled to gain broad support. However, when behaviour by a sub-state actor has clearly been against Syrian interests and beyond its tolerance, Syria has, together with its Lebanese allies, clamped down on the group. On the other hand, Lebanese sub-state groups, whose power has been inferior to that of the dominant Syrians, have nevertheless attempted to use the Syrian presence to their advantage. Their behaviour has been mainly determined by power struggles in the reconstructed state both between and within groups, and also as a result of the self-identity of each group. Although its self-identity has determined the basic tendencies of each group, it appears that power calculations have had more effect on a group's relations with Syria.

(2) The Maronites and Syria

The Ta'if Agreement gave Syria an opportunity to neutralise the Maronites who had long been an opponent of "Pax-Syriana", both because of their traditional "Lebanon-oriented" identity and their bitter relations with Syria during most of the civil war period. The Phalange Party, the Lebanese Forces (LF), the Maronite patriarch, and most of the Maronite zuama, which had no

[44] The reason why I exclude the Palestinians is mainly that their power in Lebanon was weakened by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the PLO's evacuation from Beirut, the " Camps War " in the late 1980s, and the Lebanese army disarming of them in 1991. In effect, Syria did not need take into much consideration their presence in implementing its Lebanese policy. For the details of their situation, see Peteet (1996) pp.27-30.

credible external patrons after Israel downgraded its support for them, accepted the agreement, while Awn and his supporters rejected it. The acceptance of the former groups provided some political legitimisation for the post-Ta'if process, though most of them became disillusioned with it later.[45]

The head of the LF, Samir Ja'ja, who had helped the Syrians to oust Awn, was a member of the first post-Ta'if government, but was later forced to resign. He refused to recognise Syria's predominant position in Lebanon, and was not involved in the successive governments on Syrian terms. Syria may well have calculated that Ja'ja would revert to being an opponent of its rule, and his decreased power in the Maronite community gave it an opportunity to leave him out. In fact, Ja'ja's unpopularity among the Maronites, largely due to his having aided Syria in toppling Awn and also to his having dissolved the LF as a militia, which had long been his power base, in accordance with Syrian policy, led to his electoral defeat in the Phalange Party. Afterwards, the Lebanese government, in line with Syrian wishes, declared a ban on the LF in March 1994. Ja'ja was later arrested in April for the murder in October 1990 of the National Liberal Party leader Dany Chamoun, who had succeeded to the leadership after his father's death in 1987 and had taken an anti-Syrian stance, along with Awn, during the "War of Liberation". He was also charged with leading the Zuq bomb incident in February 1994, which targeted the Maronites and raised concerns about Lebanese stability. Ja'ja denied the charges in both cases.[46] In addition, members of the LF, the pro-Awn movement, and the National Liberal Party led by Dory Chamoun, who had succeeded his elder brother after his assassination, were detained during the 1990s for plotting against national

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[45] Hinnebusch (1998) pp.148-149.
[46] Harris (1996) p.300. / *MEI* December 2, 1994. /*MEM* March 24, 1994. /Phares (1995) pp.213-218.

security.[47]

The Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir originally supported the Ta'if Agreement, and did nothing to stop the collapse of Awn's power.[48] However, he later expressed resentment of Syrian indirect rule in Lebanon, which had made it possible for Damascus to encroach on the Lebanese sovereignty, and held that the Lebanese regime's lack of popular legitimacy was a result of the election process being set up to favour pro-Syrian candidates. He charged the Syrian-supported order with discriminatory treatment of Christians as a whole.[49] Though Sfeir accepted Lebanon's "privileged relations" with Syria in a joint Christian-Muslim working paper on the condition that they would not contradict "Lebanese sovereignty", he stood out as the only senior Lebanese religious leader who never visited Damascus through the first half-decade of the 1990s.[50] His behaviour was mainly based on the traditional Maronite "Lebanon-oriented" identity, but his stance, as was manifested in the paper, provided a basis for Lebanese acceptance of some Syrian presence in Lebanon. The discussion of the Syrian presence was re-activated especially after Sfeir's statement in September 2000 calling for the redeployment of the Syrian army in accordance with the Ta'if Agreement, and was largely triggered both by the Israeli evacuation from the "security zone" in May and perceived Syrian interference in the parliamentary elections during the summer.

In contrast to Ja'ja, the Phalange leadership, embodied by its chairman George Saade and two Arab-leaning ideologists, Karim Pakradouni and Joseph Abukhalil, adopted a realist policy in order to accommodate the Syrian presence. They modified their agenda and reconsidered their

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[47] Khazen (2001) p.46.
[48] Phares (1995) p.212.
[49] Khazen (2001) pp.45-49.
[50] Harris (1996) pp.299-300.

attachment to the party's "Lebanon-oriented" identity. Indeed, the leadership declared its allegiance to the Arab identity of Lebanon in its 1994 annual convention. The party also became supportive of the post-Ta'if process and praised Syria's role in Lebanon.[51] Following Saade's death in 1998, Mounir Haji succeeded to the leadership in 1999 and also aligned with the Syrians. During the parliamentary elections in 2000, Haji joined the electoral list led by the pro-Syrian Interior Minister, Michael Murr, but his failure to win a seat seriously undermined his political stature. As a consequence, power struggles in the party occurred during 2000 and 2001 between a faction wishing to distance itself from Syria and a faction wishing to cooperate with Damascus. The leading figure associated with the former trend was Amin Jumayiel, who was ironically permitted by Syria to return to Lebanon in July 2000, while it was Pakradouni who represented the latter trend. Pakradouni was eventually elected as the party president in October 2001, and he chose, after calculating that an excess of anti-Syrian activities under Syrian indirect rule would strip the Phalange Party and, by extension, the Maronites of political power, to bandwagon with Syria.[52] In addition to the new leadership in the Phalange Party, a former LF leader Elie Hubayka and the northern za'im, Suleiman Franjieh, continued to cooperate with Syria. Franjieh has been one of the key pillars supporting "Pax-Syriana" in the Lebanese government, and indeed has occupied official posts such as health minister except for few years. Hubayka, however, was not a reliable client for the Syrians; he had no real power and legitimacy in the Maronite community, and was assassinated in January 2002.[53]

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[51] Phares (1995) pp.218-219.
[52] For the details of the power struggle and the process of Pakradouni's election to the party president, see *DS*, September 1, 3, 18, 20, 21, and 25, and October 4, 5, and 22, 2001 and Gambill (2001-10).
[53] *DS* January 25, 2002. /Though there are some explanations for his assassination such as Israeli or Syrian plots [Gambill and Endrawos (2002-

Though Syria succeeded in installing the pro-Syrian Maronite figures, Elias Hrawi and Emile Lahoud, to a presidency whose power had decreased but was still important as one of the three pillars in the government, Damascus failed to construct broad and lasting Maronite support of its rule. This is largely attributed to its perceived discrimination toward the community as a whole. Among other things, the alleged "forced" and "unjust" electoral process in the Maronite districts and the treatment of Ja'ja, who alone stood accused of the crime of assassination while it was widely supposed to have been committed by many other militia leaders, arguably contributed to the negative image surrounding the Syrian presence and its allies in the government and thus to the strong Maronite support for the latest political current calling into question the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Even though the constitutional reforms Syria had engineered had built disproportionate representation of the Christians into the system (e.g.50% of seats in the parliament), Syria worked assiduously to ensure these were its own clients and exclude those who were hostile but arguably more representative of Maronite (though not Orthodox) opinion. Damascus was always able to find many Maronite clients ready to bandwagon (despite their tradition of "Lebanese" identity) with the superior power it wielded.

(3) The Sunnis and Syria

As regards the Sunnis, the post-Ta'if regime, which enhanced the power of the Sunni prime minister and disbanded the militias (which the Sunnis largely lacked), "reversed the deterioration of their position in the civil war and gave them a greater access to government than their cohesion or numbers warranted."[54] However, Syria's supremacy and its allocation of pro-

1)] , there remains no confirmation about this incident.

[54] Hinnebusch (1998) p.152.

Syrian figures to the presidency and speakership of parliament have checked the power of the prime minister.

Between 1992 and 1998, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri tried to reconstruct Lebanon by using his ties with Saudi Arabia and the West, but the Lebanese government was no longer the master of Lebanon. As he tried to act "independently" and to balance against Syrian power, especially in the political and security fields, by generally counting on the above external ties and his popularity among the Lebanese, his moves were largely blocked by Syria and its allies in the government. One example of this was his attempt in 1994 to broaden Christian support for his government by including more "independent" Christians in the cabinet. The move was contained mainly by two pro-Syrian figures in the government, Speaker Nabih Berri and President Elias Hrawi, the latter lacking strong support among the Christians owing to his close relations with Syria.[55] In contrast, Hariri exercised freedom in the economic sphere, even though such affairs were connected with Syria. Syrian Vice President Khaddam and Hariri had business connections and these ties were not readily manipulated to the sole advantage of Syria. For example, the failure of Syria to liberalise its banks forced Syrian business to revive its reliance on Lebanese banks.[56]

Hariri also pursued power struggles against his communal rivals. As a social outsider and nouveau riches of lower-middle-class background, he stood apart from Sunni leading families in Beirut and Tripoli. Hariri used his wealth and position to extend his patronage network in West Beirut so as to compete with Hoss and Sa'eb Salem, where these figures had their own constituency. Omar Karami in Tripoli was also his political opponent owing to Karami's close relations with Syria.[57] In effect, these rivals served the

[55] Najem (2000) p.224.
[56] Hinnebusch (1998) p.154.
[57] Harris (1996) pp.305-306.

interests of Syria which generally wished to check Hariri's power.

Syria also needed a more stable partner in the Sunni religious community, both to check radical Islamic movements which might spill over to Syria itself, and to enhance its legitimacy in Lebanon. As regards the former, Syria's patronage of the moderate Islamic movement, Ahbash, allowed it to check opposition from more radical Islamic movements.[58] As regards the latter, its dependence on the Ahbash had side-effects. In 1995, the killing of its leader, Nizar Halabi, took place, which could be interpreted as part of a conspiracy to assassinate Lebanese officials, politicians, and communal leaders allied to Damascus.[59]

Syrian patronage of the Sunnis, except for Hariri, seemed to be successful. During the recent debate about the Syrian presence in Lebanon, Grand Mufti Qabaani and Karami made statements which justified its role in Lebanon.[60] Hoss also supported the Syrian role as a defence against Israeli aggression, especially after the eruption of the second intifada, and maintained the importance of coordination between Lebanon and Syria as neighbouring countries.[61]

(4) The Shi'ites and Syria

The Damascus Agreement in January 1989 gave Syria the position as the only ultimate arbiter between Amal and Hizbollah, two pillars of the Shi'ite community, and this role manifested itself particularly in the Lebanese parliamentary elections, which will be discussed below in Section 4. This part focuses mainly on the relations each group has maintained with Syria during the post-Ta'if period.

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[58] Hinnebusch (1998) p.153.
[59] Harris (1996) pp.306-307. /*MEM* September 6, 1995.
[60] *DS* November 15, 2000 and May 17, 2001.
[61] *DS* July 27,2001. /Conversation with Hoss July 10, 2001.

Syria, for its part, has needed the support of Amal to smooth its policy in Lebanon and to stabilise the Lebanese situation, since Amal, which has advocated a pluralistic and undivided Lebanon (compatible with Syrian aims), has incorporated the secular Shi'ite middle class.[62] Amal, on the other hand, has had its own reasons to support the Syrian-dominated post-Ta'if regime. Firstly, Amal's pragmatic leader Nabih Berri managed to adapt the movement to post-Ta'if politics, and has kept control of the office of speaker of parliament, whose power was increased in the Ta'if Agreement. In effect, senior party officers, such as Berri and Beydoun, became more interested in maintaining their official positions. Secondly, newly established private Shi'ite banks took over from Amal the ability to capture the capital flows from the Shi'ite diaspora, which increased Amal's dependence on Syria.[63] Thirdly, Hizbollah has been generally more popular than Amal among the Shi'ites. This came about because of Amal's role during the "Camps War", when it sided with Syria against the Palestinians and also because of Hizbollah's effective social services, especially toward poor Shi'ites, and its vanguard role in the resistance to Israel in the South.[64] Overall, the Amal leadership's increased political stakes in the post-Ta'if process and Amal's vulnerable position within the Shi'ite community have contributed to its consistent alignment with Syria.

In contrast, Syrian relations with Hizbollah have fluctuated. Though their damaged relations of the late 1980s were mended by the Damascus Agreement, Hizbollah was not initially willing to approve the Syrian-supporting Ta'if Agreement. Firstly, Hizbollah was concerned the agreement would benefit Maronites and Sunnis and create a threat to the status it had

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[62] Hinnebusch (1998) p.152.
[63] Picard (2000) p.315.
[64] As for the details of Hizbollah's social activities, see Harik (1994) pp.23-31 and Picard (2000) pp.315-317.

gained during the civil war. Since the process of reconstructing the Lebanese state required a return to the political power game within governmental institutions, the generally low educational level of the Shi'ites had the potential to make it difficult to fill the political offices and positions allocated to the community with competent members. Secondly, the agreement also carried the seeds of a real threat to Hizbollah, by calling for the disarmament of the militias as its base of power.[65]

With Syrian hegemony in Lebanon consolidating, especially after Syria's alignment with the USA-led anti-Iraqi coalition in 1990, Hizbollah leaders might have calculated that to establish a close alliance with Syria would guarantee to preserve or increase their power. While Hizbollah agreed to disarmament in Beirut and Beqqa, two main strongholds of the group, its armed presence in the South was permitted, since the Israeli-backed South Lebanese Army still remained armed there. Hizbollah, on the other hand, was required to coordinate its military operations with Syria to serve Syrian regional policy, especially toward Israel, in return for gaining Syrian support for its role at the head of the Islamic resistance in southern Lebanon.[66] Syria has also needed Hizbollah's support to stabilise the Lebanese political situation, since the movement has incorporated the radicalised Shi'ite lower class, as opposed to Amal.[67]

Consequently, Hizbollah's cooperation with the Syrians manifested itself clearly in its participation in the Lebanese political system and in its concerted military activities in the South. As regards the former dimension, Hizbollah participated in the 1992 parliamentary elections. The victory enlarged its stake in the political system, and started to align Hizbollah with the Syrian-backed system, though its political power was occasionally

[65] Zisser (2001) pp.139-140.
[66] Hinnebusch (1998) p.148.
[67] Hinnebusch (1998) p.152.

contained by the Syrians, especially when quarrels with Amal took place. As regards the latter dimension, the progress and stalemate of peace talks between Syria and Israel clearly influenced the value of and scope of Hizbollah's military activities on which much of its prestige was based. When the Israeli government under the Labour Party considered Syria as a serious negotiating partner between 1992 and 1996, Syria generally kept its military operations in check. However, when the Netanyahu government continued to neglect Syria by advocating the "Lebanon First" plan between 1996 and 1999, Syria encouraged Hizbollah's military activities as a means of putting pressure on Israel.[68]

After the Israeli forces pulled out from Lebanon in May 2000, the movement faced the problem of its own raison d'être. Since its legitimacy was partly dependent on its armed struggle against the IDF forces in the "security zone", the evacuation might have damaged its power and status. However, even after the Israeli withdrawal, Syria has needed a surrogate force to pressure Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights, and thus Hizbollah has acted as before, under the Syrian pretext that the Shebaa Farms, which Israel has considered Syrian territory, is Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory. As this pretext has also been favourable for Hizbollah, its leadership actually stated that it would keep fighting for the Shabaa Farms against Israel.[69] In addition, Hizbollah's military activities in Shabaa from late 2000 to the first half of 2001 were connected with the Palestinian second intifada. After "September 11", Hizbollah initially continued military operations, but the possibility of American economic sanctions against Syria soon forced Damascus to limit Hizbollah's activities.

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[68] Zisser (2001) pp.146-147.
[69] *DS* May 21, 2001.

(5) The Druzes and Syria

When the civil war ended, the most prominent leader in the Druze community, Walid Jumblatt, did not appear to put full confidence in Syria, no doubt because of his bitter experiences during the conflict, especially after the assassination of his father by Syria and/or its clients and because of the confrontation between his forces and Syrian troops during the "Camps War". He has nevertheless managed to cope pragmatically with the Syrians. It was necessary for him to do so to secure his political status and thus to survive in the community. With Syria consolidating its position in Lebanon after the Ta'if Agreement, he sided with Syria against Awn during the "War of Liberation", and later participated in the post-Ta'if political process. In addition, the rivalry between Jumblatt and Druze za'im Talal Arslan might have forced the former to keep ties to Damascus, which could have thrown its support to the latter. At the same time, Syria needed support from Jumblatt in order to stabilise the "Pax-Syriana", since Arslan had close relations with the Maronites, who were generally unfavourable to the Syrian presence in Lebanon.[70]

The close relations between Jumblatt and the Syrians manifested themselves in the following ways. In the parliamentary elections of 1992, 1996, and 2000, the electoral districts in Mount Lebanon were gerrymandered to secure the elections of Jumblatt and his allies.[71] In the first Hariri government between 1992 and 1998, he served as the Minister of the Displaced and, by keeping this position and offering many houses for the displaced—among whom there were huge numbers among the Druzes as a result of the "Shuf War"—he appeared to present himself as the only reliable

[70] For the details of the Druze situation during the first half of 1990s, see Harris (1996) pp.307-309.
[71] Gambill and Aoun (2000-8).

patron of the Druze community.

After Bashar Asad assumed control of Lebanese policy from Khaddam in 1998, Jumblatt was ousted from the cabinet portfolio because of his close relations with Khaddam. As a result, he began to criticise the Syrian-backed regime and the Syrian presence in Lebanon.[72] Although he temporarily toned down his criticism toward President Lahoud, a Syrian client, during the 2000 parliamentary elections, he again started to attack Lahoud's policies, labelling them "militarisation" of the Lebanese state.[73] He also became one of the leading figures to question the Syrian presence in Lebanon by responding positively to the Patriarch Sfeir's statement in September 2000 and to the public mood in Lebanon. However, he later mended fences with Lahoud in the autumn of 2001, with Lahoud gradually recovering his power as a result of his attacks against the anti-Syrian movements in the summer.

(6) Brief Summary

In sum, the Muslim groups have generally maintained good relations with Syria more than the Maronites. In this point, it seems possible to say that the self-identity of each group has guided their actions. However, as clearly manifested in the cases of the Phalange Party under pragmatic leadership, Hariri, and Jumblatt, their power calculations and own interests have sometimes overridden their communal identity.

4. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN 1992, 1996, AND 2000

(1) Introduction

After Syria firmly legitimised its presence in Lebanon on the basis of the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, it has attempted to

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[72] Gambill and Nassif (2001-4).
[73] *MEI* August 31, 2001.

stabilise the Lebanese political situation under its hegemony. To realise these ends, Syria and its allies in Lebanon, in every parliamentary elections, gerrymandered the electoral laws and took an interest in the formation of electoral lists. Within these parameters, the Lebanese candidates tried to manipulate the Syrians to their benefit. This section will focus on Lebanese-Syrian dynamics over electoral issues.[74]

(2) The Issue of the Electoral Laws

In July 1992, the Lebanese parliament passed new electoral laws aiming to replace the old ones, which had been in effect since 1960. Though Syrian interests were reflected in the issues of deputy numbers and size of electoral district, the change in the electoral laws was profitable not only for the Syrians but also for some Lebanese candidates, especially pro-Syrian political figures. It is thus possible to say that the change in electoral laws was an outcome of their shared interests and that it was not solely "imposed" by Syria.

The new laws increased the number of deputies from 99 to 128, though the Ta'if Agreement had stipulated that the number would be 108, and, on the basis of the agreement, divided the number equally between Christians and Muslims. One of the main reasons for adopting the higher figures may well have been Lebanese and Syrian calculations that stability would result from allowing a larger number of politicians into the parliament by including older leaders who had assumed power since the pre-civil war period as well as younger leaders who had risen to prominence during and after the conflict. Nevertheless, the regional distribution of additional seats largely reflected Syrian interests. In fact, a number of new deputies were to come from Beqqa

[74] As for the details of results of each election, see the following materials: Khazen (1998) for the 1992 elections; Majed and Young (1996) for the 1996

and North Lebanon, where Syria's influence was then quite strong because of proximity to Syria, and where the Syrian army would remain even in the event of a partial withdrawal, as stipulated in the Ta'if Agreement.[75]

More importantly, the new electoral laws contradicted the Ta'if Agreement over the size of constituencies. The agreement stipulated that future parliamentary elections would be based on Muhafazat, larger electoral districts, of which in Lebanon there were six: North Lebanon, Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Beqqa, Nabatiyya, and Sidon. The purpose of adopting Muhafazat as electoral constituencies was that since a candidate in one sectarian group would have to appeal to another sectarian group in order to win, the system would encourage intercommunal alliances, would favour politicians acceptable not only to their own sect but also to members of other sects, and would thus become a vital mechanism in preserving national integrity by undermining sectarian tendencies.[76]

Prior to the 1992 elections, Syrian officials had grown concerned that some of their most important allies in Lebanon might lose the elections if they were to take place as stipulated in the Ta'if Agreement. Syria's continued intent to influence Lebanon through its allies there, even after the supposed redeployment in September, was revealed by the fact that the new electoral laws gerrymandered districts in order to secure the election of pro-Syrian candidates. In effect, the new laws laid down a mixed system which stipulated that Beirut, North Lebanon, and South Lebanon, which was created by combining Nabatiyya with Sidon, would vote on the basis of Muhafazat, while Mount Lebanon and Beqqa would do so on the basis of Qada (plural: Aqda), which were smaller electoral districts. In Mount

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elections; and *MEI* September 1 and 15, 2000 for the 2000 elections.

[75] Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg (1999) pp.97-98. /Hanf (1993) p.625. /*MEI* July 24, 1992.

[76] Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg (1999) p.98. /Norton and Schwedler

Lebanon, the important Syrian ally, Walid Jumblatt, acknowledged that given the overwhelming Christian majority who favoured candidates aligning with the family of his Druze rival Arslan, he and his political allies would probably be defeated if the region was treated as one single Muhafazat. The application of Qada to Mount Lebanon, by narrowing their constituency to the predominantly Druze region of Shuf and Aley, actually resulted in not only the elections of Jumblatt and his allies but also the victory of Elie Hubayka, a Maronite militia leader aligned with Syria and unpopular among the Maronites. Beqqa was also divided into Aqda, to secure the elections of powerful pro-Syrian figures such as the President Elias Hrawi and the Speaker Hussein Husseini.[77]

For North Lebanon, the creation of two constituencies was initially proposed: one with a Maronite majority that would make the election of Suleiman Franjieh possible and the other with a Sunni majority that would give reliable support to Omar Karami. However, this scenario was abolished to prevent the possibility of Samir Ja'ja' being elected and of Franjieh being defeated, and thus gave way to the single electoral constituency on the basis of Muhafazat. If a two-constituency plan had materialised, Ja'ja could have formed a powerful base to challenge Franjieh and other Maronite politicians, notably George Saade.[78] The adoption of one constituency seemed to be influenced by the calculations of both Franjieh and Syria. Farnjieh secured his seat by aligning with Karami to maintain his political power in northern Lebanon. To do this he had to sideline deep-rooted family rivalry with Karami. At same time, Syria desperately needed the election of pro-Syrian Maronite figures to counteract the strong Maronite opposition to the

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(1994) p.50.

[77] Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg (1999) p.98. /Hanf (1993) p.628. /Norton and Schwedler (1994) pp.50-51.

[78] Khazen (1998) pp.19-20.

electoral process.

For South Lebanon, the expanded constituency was adopted for the following reasons. Firstly, as the boarder region was a tense and unstable Israeli-occupied zone, it might have been considered that elections on the basis of a larger constituency would prevent this region from being interfered with by Israel and/or its surrogate, the South Lebanese Army. Secondly, there was Berri's insistence that, considering the Shi'ite majority in the South, the single constituency would give him more manoeuvrability and more influence and control and also favour his massive list of 22 candidates.[79]

As the 1996 parliamentary elections approached, various drafts of the new electoral laws were debated in the parliament, as the 1992 laws had been issued with the reservation of "for one time only".[80] However, the new electoral laws, which won parliamentary approval on July 10, clearly reflected the interests of Syria and its allies in the Lebanese government. Like the previous laws, the new ones violated the key provisions of the Ta'if Agreement and stipulated that the elections in Mount Lebanon would be again organised exceptionally on the basis of Qada. The primary objectives of gerrymandering in Mount Lebanon was likewise that it became easier for the pillars of the government, such as the Minister of the Displaced, Walid Jumblatt, the Interior Minister, Michael Murr, the Minister of Hydraulic Resources, Elli Hubayka, to retain their seats. The measures to secure Jumblatt's election also may have reflected Prime Minister Hariri's concern that Jumblatt's defeat would hamper the return of war-displaced Christians to Shuf and thus his reconstruction efforts. Another objective was to tame the Foreign Minister, Faris Buayz, by securing his seat, since he had openly

[79] Khazen (1998) p.20. /Norton and Schwedler (1994) p.51.
[80] As for the details of drafts, see Salem (1997) p.28.

opposed the creation of two different types of electoral constituency.[81] Since the Maronites had already expressed their intention to boycott the elections before parliamentary approval was given, Syria concerned that his refusal to stand would further damage the legitimacy of the elections.[82] It seems possible that his "opposition" was intended to pressure Syria into maintaining his seat by exploiting its concern, considering his close relations with Damascus.

The unification of two Muhafazats into one constituency, South Lebanon, was also an outside the original plans in the Ta'if Agreement. Although the government's justification for the unification was the same as for previous elections, the main reason was that the Speaker Berri demanded the combination of two southern districts into one constituency as a means to strengthen his power, as in 1992. The main reason why Beirut held one constituency was to favour Hariri over Hoss, since the latter stated that the adoption of two different criteria in delineating electoral constituencies violated legal norms.[83]

Since Syria and its allies in the Lebanese government were surprised that 40 percent of the government-backed candidates lost in the municipal elections of 1998, it seems probable, as Gambill pointed out, that they firmly decided to eliminate the possibility of such a defeat in the next parliamentary elections.[84] The new electoral laws, which won parliamentary approval in late December 1999, completely reorganised electoral districts for the coming 2000 elections so as to secure the victory of pro-governmental figures. 14 reorganised constituencies were arrived at by dividing some

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[81] Harik (1999) p.145. /*MEI* July 19, 1996. /Norton (1999) p.44.
[82] *MEM* July 4, 1996.
[83] Khazen (2001) p. 47. /*MEI* July 19, 1996.
[84] Gambill (1999-12). /For the process and details of municipal elections in 1998, see *MEI* May 22, June 5, and June 19, 1998.

Muhafazats and combining others.[85]

The new laws divided North Lebanon into two districts, particularly in order to remove the possibility of candidates of the Lebanese Forces (LF) being elected and to ensure the elections of the Agriculture Minister, Suleiman Franjieh, and other Syrian allies. Bcharre, a Lebanese Forces stronghold, was combined with the predominant Sunni areas, Akkar and Dinniya. Sunni Tripoli was combined with Christian Minyeh, Zghorta, Batroun, and Koura, so as to neutralise votes in Tripoli, a stronghold of the Sunni Islamist Jama'a Islamiya. Mount Lebanon was divided into four different electoral districts, and two of these were based on Qada: the Shuf was set to ensure the elections of Walid Jumblatt and his allies, after he had tactically reconciled with President Lahoud in order to secure his seat, and the Metn district was designed to consolidate support for the Interior Minister Michael Murr. In order to reduce the number of seats won by Rafiq Hariri, who criticised the Hoss government, Beirut was divided into three districts: one for Hariri and the others for Tammam Salam and Hoss, both of whom were his political rivals in the Sunni community of Beirut. South Lebanon still remained a single constituency, to preserve the electoral power of Berri and his allies over rival candidates supported by Hizbollah.[86]

Against the new laws, Beirut MP, Najah Wakim, tried to submit a petition claiming the illegality of the new laws in January 2000, but he failed. Though ten signatures by members of parliament were needed, only two of them, Nassib Lahoud and Nadim Salem, were willing to sign his petition, in spite of the fact that 17 deputies had voted against the introduction of new laws in December 1999.[87] The decrease of the number who later supported

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[85] Conversation with Hassan Krayem in the AUB, July 4, 2001. /Quilty (2000) p.21.
[86] Gambill and Aoun (2000-8) /Quilty (2000) pp.21-23.
[87] Gambill (2000-2).

his attempt was partially influenced by his own resentment against the new laws, which forced him to run either in Hariri's district or in Tammam Salem's district, neither of whom had good relations with Wakim.[88] More importantly, however, 15 deputies might have withdrawn their support for him to secure their seats. In effect, as one activist in the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) pointed out, electoral laws were changed before every parliamentary election and gerrymandering occurred to ensure the elections of pro-Syrian candidates.[89]

(3) The Issue of the Formation of Electoral Lists

The change in electoral laws made the election of pro-Syrian candidates theoretically and "legally" possible. However, the electoral process in Lebanon, a "list system" in which each voter casts his or her ballot for multiple candidates, required further careful management by Syria. For example, of the five seats in the Aley district, two were allocated to the Maronites, two to the Druzes, and one to the Greek Orthodox. Voters were thus able to choose two Maronite candidates, two Druze candidates, and one Greek Orthodox candidate. To secure victory, this system encouraged each candidate to form a joint list with other candidate, because, though voters were not obliged to cast their votes for a pre-designed slate of candidates, they generally tended to do so. As a result, Syria was interested in influencing the formation of candidate lists in order to secure the election of its political allies in Lebanon. It thus encouraged them to form a joint list if they ran for election in the same electoral district.[90] As Gambill and Aoun (2000-8) reported, though Syria intervened in the formation of electoral lists

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[88] *MEI* August 18, 2000.
[89] Conversation with Nissrin Mansour (an activist in the Lebanese Democratic Association for Democratic Elections), June 26, 2001.
[90] Gambill and Aoun (2000-8). /Norton and Schwedler (1994) p.53.

in many districts, it seemed to pay more attention to southern Lebanon, where the rivalry between Amal and Hizbollah manifested itself and the volatile situation might be exploited by Israel. For these reasons, the following discussion will mainly focus on the South.

In the 1992 parliamentary elections, a coalition list, which was mainly composed of candidates from Amal and Hizbollah, as well as Bahiyya Hariri, the sister of Hariri, would not have been drawn up without Syrian influence. Hizbollah was actually opposed to both Amal and Bahiyya Hariri.[91] However, that they were able to set aside their differences and form a single electoral list was not only because of Syrian influence but also because of their willingness to join in a tactical and popular alliance.[92] Amal's leader, Berri, and Bahiyya Hariri might have calculated that their alliance with Hizbollah would become advantageous considering popular support toward the latter for its resistance to Israel. At the same time, Hizbollah might have acknowledged that its alliance with "moderates" would decrease the allergy to its "radical" image among some voters.

In the elections of 1996, the electoral process in the South was characterised by a last-minute alliance between Berri and Hizbollah Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah. Initially, Nasrallah had declared to a mass rally of supporters that Hizbollah had made a decision to run independent lists of candidates. His action was connected with the increased tensions between Amal and Hizbollah, with each other accusing the other of working against the resurgence of state authority and national institutions. This confrontation was further exacerbated by Hariri who stated that the battle was between "moderation" and "extremism". In return, Hizbolllah accused Hariri of betraying the Arab cause since he allegedly had contacts with the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu; Hizbollah also stated its refusal

[91] Khazen (1998) p.35. /*MEI* September 11,1992.

to join any list that included Bahiyya Hariri. Since the conflict between the two groups in a region close to Israel made Syria nervous, Nasrallah and Berri were summoned by Hafez Asad to Damascus and, after their return, they announced their commitment to make a joint list. However, reflecting the Syrian preference toward Amal, Hizbollah was on balance a loser in South Lebanon. Among the 23 seats allocated to the district, the party won only four seats.[93]

What other factors, besides Syrian pressure, influenced Hizbollah's initial "independent" attitude and its final agreement with Amal? As regards the former, the victory in the 1992 elections, where it won 12 seats, and its quick and effective care given to the populace in the South after the Israeli reprisals, might have given the leadership ongoing confidence in its popularity. As regards the latter, though it seems impossible to neglect Syrian influence, Hizbollah's experience in Mount Lebanon, where the elections had taken place earlier, had more of an effect on its decision to cooperate with Amal. From the start of elections in Mount Lebanon, Syria had stated that Hizbollah should collaborate indirectly with Hubayka. This meant that Hubayka would leave one of the Shi'ite seats in his list open for Hizbollah's deputy Ali Ammar, while Hizbollah supporters would vote for Hubayka's list. Hizbollah rejected the arrangement by arguing that it could not cooperate with Hubayka, whom it considered to have assumed a major role in the massacres of the Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila camps during the summer of 1982. Eventually, Ammar joined in a list headed by a Christian opposition figure, Pierre Daccash, but Ammar was unexpectedly defeated. Given the unpopularity of Hubayka among the Christians, his defeat raised the question of the validity of electoral process there. However,

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[92] Norton and Schwedler (1994) p.57.
[93] Majed and Young (1996) pp.38-41. /*MEM* August 21, 22, 28, 29, 30 and September 5, 1996. /*MEI* September 20, 1996.

it also seemed to lead Hizbollah to rethink its relation with Syrian-backed figures and thus its alliance with Amal in the next voting session for South Lebanon.[94]

During the 2000 elections, the joint list put up by Amal and Hizbollah took all 23 seats in the combined South-Nabatieh district. Syrian pressure in forming the joint list was clear, since two of its members who had stood as independents in the previous 1996 elections, Bahiyya Hariri backed by Amal and Mustafa Saad supported by Hizbollah, refused to shake hands in public.[95] However, it seems that Hizbollah's alliance with Amal from the initial phase in the 2000 elections was also influenced by its having learnt from previous experience in elections, as well as by its desire to consolidate power in legal institutions. The Israeli withdrawal from the South in May 2000 reinforced this desire.[96] In fact, when a violent clash between the supporters of Amal and those of Hizbollah took place just before the elections, the leaderships of both parties quickly acted to mend their fences by issuing a joint statement.[97]

Even though Syrian influence in the formation of electoral list was clear, each candidate in southern Lebanon also seemed to have the reason for bandwagoning with it. Amal and Bahiyya Hariri, on the one hand, exploited Hizbollah's popularity and Hizbollah, on the other hand, softened its "radical" image. This kind of bandwagoning by Lebanese candidate was also seen in other regions. Maronite sources such as Gambill and Aoun (2000-8) tended to exaggerate Syria's role in forming electoral lists as predominant and authoritative, when it resulted from astute politicking.

In the 1992 and 1996 elections, the two electoral poles in North Lebanon

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[94] Majed and Young (1996) pp.28-29. /*MEM* August 21, 1996.
[95] Gary C. Gambill and Daniel Nassif (2000-9). /*MEI* September 15, 2000.
[96] For the detail of transformation of Hizbollah, see Hamzeh (1993) and Usher (1997).

were Suleiman Franjieh and Omar Karami. Considering their rivalry, it would have been usual for each of them to make his own electoral list. However, despite the claim by Karami's supporters that he was not given the right to choose the members of his electoral list, he cooperated with Franjieh to form a single list whose aim was to defeat Ja'ja.[98] Since Karami had resigned as prime minister after his failure to reconstruct the Lebanese economy, he might have calculated that cooperation with the Syrians would guarantee his seat, even though his status in northern Lebanon was downgraded.

In Beirut, after Syrian attempts to persuade Hoss to join with Hariri on the electoral list for the 1996 elections ended in failure as this meant that Hoss would be subjected to Hariri in selecting fellow candidates, Hariri still managed to persuade one of Hoss's electoral allies, Bishara Merhej, to join his list. It was believed that Merhej was persuaded by Syria to collaborate with Hariri so as to punish Hoss.[99] However, it seems impossible to deny Merhej's intention to bandwagon, given the unfavourable condition for Hoss. In the Shuf, Zaher Khatib, who had not been on good terms with Jumblatt, joined the Jumblatt-led list by using Syrian influence on the Druze chieftain. Jumblatt might have been forced to include Khatib on his list in exchange for Syria's allowance that the elections would be again held on the basis of a Qada.

During the 2000 elections, a bizarre electoral alliance between Hizbollah and the Phalange Party was seen in Baabda-Aley district and Baalbeck-Hermel district. Though the Syrian strong position in Lebanon might have played a role in persuading these opposing groups to form the alliance, the Lebanese groups' understanding of the circumstances also influenced the

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[97] *SWB* July 18 and July 19, 2000.
[98] Khazen (1998) pp.34-35.
[99] Majed and Young (1996) p.36.

outcome. As regards the former district, since Hizbollah seemed to be determined not to repeat the defeat of the 1996 elections, a compromise was reached whereby a slot on the list, led by Aley MP Talal Arslan, was left open so that Hubayka's supporters could write in his name.[100] As regards the latter district, a Phalange candidate Nadir Sukkar joined the list with Hizbollah in order to benefit from the Shi'ite majority there.[101]

(4) Brief Summary

Overall, Lebanese candidates tended to bandwagon with Syria so as to secure their seats, and over time the number of figures who cooperated with Syria increased, reflecting especially the change in Maronite attitudes toward the elections. In 1992, many Christian leaders, represented by Sfeir, called for a boycott of elections until the Syrian forces redeployed to the Beqqa Valley, since they considered that the Syrian presence would obstruct "fair elections".[102] However, a large number of influential Christian figures participated in the 1996 elections, and this trend was further reinforced in the 2000 elections. The main reason behind this change of attitude was the realisation by Christian leaders that the boycott of 1992 had had disastrous effects on their community's political power and had led to the political marginalisation of Christians and the weakening of the opposition as a whole, while allowing pro-Ta'if figures to dominate the political field.[103]

In this respect, a former State Minister, Pierre Helou, pointed out that since even one seat in the parliament made the chance of participation in the political process possible, it would be better to fight within the institutional

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[100] Gambill and Aoun (2000-8).
[101] Gambill and Nassif (2000-9).
[102] Baaklini, Denoeuz, and Springborg (1999) pp.98-99. /Harik (1998) p.141. /Norton and Schwedler (1994) pp.53-54.
[103] Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg (1999) pp.104-105. /Salem (1997) p.28.

framework.[104] By contrast, Dory Chamoun still opposed participation, on the basis that the elections were part of a conspiracy by Syria to take over Lebanon.[105] In the 2000 elections, the number of people who supported Chamoun was very small, and many traditional Christian politicians who had boycotted the previous elections participated in the electoral process. Bashar Asad's promise to the Christian leaders that Damascus would restrict the interference of Syrian intelligence forces also facilitated Christian participation. In fact, since these forces stayed their hand during the voting process and the final tallying, the 2000 elections took place in a fairly liberal atmosphere.[106]

While the Syrian attempt to influence Lebanon by taming deputies and incorporating them into the parliament seemed to be successful, it was arguably the Lebanese politicians' tendency to bandwagon in order to secure their seats that had the most far-reaching consequences.

4. THE DYNAMICS OF THE RELATIONS AMONG THE "TROIKA"

(1) Introduction

The Ta'if Agreement did not change the sectarian system in the Lebanese political field, but altered the "rules of the game". In other words, post-Ta'if Lebanon still remains a consociational democracy in its form, though adjustments were made to fit the reality as well as the lessons derived from the civil war. Firstly, the proportion of Muslim to Christian deputies and officials became even. Secondly, the power of the Maronite president was decreased, in favour of the Sunni prime minister and the Shi'ite speaker of

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[104] Conversation with Pierre Helou (a former State Minister), July 11, 2001.
[105] Conversation with Dory Chamoun (the National Liberal Party leader), July 9, 2001.
[106] Conversation with Salim Nasr (General Director of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies), June 22, 2001.

parliament. Thirdly, since compromise among the top three leaders was stipulated as essential to make the political process function, the division of power among them remained ambiguous. Because of the interrelationship of these three figures' spheres of influence, post-Ta'if politics has been given the name of "Troika".[107]

However, this system has not functioned as anticipated in the Ta'if Agreement. In reality, the top leaders have tended to antagonise each other, as a result of the differences of interests, tendencies, and positions of the sects they represent. Using this mutual antipathy, Syria has played one off against another to serve its interests. While Syria has been in the dominant position in Lebanon, it seems an exaggeration to argue that Syria has fully orchestrated Lebanese politics. Even though it is true that top leaders have usually taken Syria's opinion into consideration and also made concession to Syria, they have more or less tried to use the Syrians for their own ends.

The main focus of this section will be the periods of government headed by Rafiq Hariri, on the grounds that he has been prime minister twice, he has occupied the position for a total of about 8 years, and, more importantly, he has tried to act "independently" of Syria while his counterparts, President Elias Hrawi and his successor Emile Lahoud, and the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, have been fairly dependent on Syria. Before mentioning the dynamics of the "Troika" in the two Hariri governments, the political situation under pre-Hariri period will be briefly discussed, in order to understand the background to his assumption of the premiership.

(2) The Karami and Solh Governments (1990−1992)

On December 24, 1990, the government led by Prime Minister Omar Karami was formed to replace the government of Salim Hoss, who

[107] Hudson (1999) p.27. /Najem (2000) p.213.

considered that his government had completed its agenda by passing the constitutional reform proposals in August, by ousting General Awn with help of the Syrian army in October, and by reunifying Greater Beirut under state control in early December. Hoss tendered his resignation on December 19. The Karami cabinet, which was the biggest in Lebanese history, consisted of 30 ministers who were pro-Syrians and/or wartime militia leaders, and was equally divided between Christians and Muslims. The choice of Omar Karami as prime minister could be explained by it being Syria's preference, since his family had maintained close relations with Damascus for a long time and his hometown, Tripoli, was well within the sphere of Syrian influence.[108] Even though it was apparent that Syria played a key role in determining the composition of the government, the inclusion of militia leaders such as the LF leader Samir Ja'ja in the government was also a necessary step for the Lebanese state, which gave high priority on the stability of the social order as the basis for the process of economic reconstruction.

Concerned about the level of economic devastation and the repercussions which had resulted from the long armed struggle, in January 1991, the Karami government reactivated the Council for Development and Construction (CDR), which had been originally established in 1977. Though the Karami government tried to initiate the reconstruction project, little progress was realised. The government's failure to articulate a consistent and clear economic policy, alongside an over-staffed and inefficient public sector, decreased confidence regarding Lebanon's economic future and thus discouraged both domestic and international investors and aid donors. Though Karami attained relative stability of the social order as a result of dissolving militias and gathering heavy weapons, which might have had the

[108] *MEI* January 11, 1991. /Salem (1994b) p.49.

potential to attract foreign funds for economic recovery, the economic situation continued to be poor.[109]

In February 1992, the Central Bank stated that it could no longer draw on reserves to protect the value of the Lebanese pound on foreign exchange markets. The currency soon experienced a serious fall from 880 to 1200, and later 2000, pounds to the dollar. These economic conditions provoked nation-wide labour strikes led by the Confederation of Trade Unions during the spring, and culminated in a violent mass riot on May 6. Worried about public grievances, Syria, which had initially asked Karami to stay and had urged him to make a serious effort to cope with the economic crisis, now endeavoured to replace him. Syria's decision was also influenced by relations among the "Troika". The government was often beset with internal feuding over policy and appointments of its members' clients to public posts. Though it indeed offered the Syrians great manoeuvrability, the May riot, in part, assumed the character of a cross-sectarian opposition against the Karami government, which was widely viewed as a surrogate of Damascus, and, by extension, against the Syrian presence in Lebanon.[110] In other words, if Karami had remained as a prime minister, the public unrest would have led to further criticism of Syrian policy and injured Syria's status in Lebanon.

On May 13, following Karami's resignation and after discussions in Damascus between Asad and Hrawi as well as Khaddam and Husseini, Rashid Solh was named as his successor. The Solh government was composed of 24 ministers, although 16 of those continued on from the previous government. Considering the composition, Ja'ja stated that the Solh government would be doomed to inevitable failure, and indeed it failed to

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[109] Najem (2000) pp.30-32.

[110] For the details of Lebanese economic crisis and consequent social unrest, and the change of Syrian perception, see *MEI* March 20 and May 15, 1992 and also *SWB* May 8, 1992.

stabilise the economy.[111] Since Syria was adamant that parliamentary elections should be held in the summer of 1992 as scheduled, while some Lebanese, especially Christians, opposed it, the new government was incapable of winning enough confidence from foreign investors to improve the economy. After the elections were over, Syria had to remedy the economic problems which the Karami and Solh governments had failed to resolve in order to further consolidate its presence in Lebanon. These circumstances limited Syria's range of choice for the next prime minister and resulted in the formation of a government under Rafiq Hariri.[112]

(3) The First Hariri Government (1992－1998)

Before discussing the relations among the "Troika" under the first Hariri government, a brief explanation about the background to his nomination will be useful in order to understand his actions.[113]

In addition to the statements by the Western powers that the parliamentary elections were not fairly representative and that Syria should redeploy its troops to the Beqqa Valley as stipulated in the Ta'if Agreement, the Lebanese domestic situation was not favourable for Damascus. Firstly, since the most popular Maronite politicians boycotted the elections, Syria needed to form a popular government which could decrease the power of those leaders and increase the legitimacy of post-election politics. Secondly, Syria was concerned about the Lebanese economy, whose condition had continued to deteriorate during the elections because of uncertainties about the future. In mid-September, the Confederation of Trade Unions submitted to the government a two-week ultimatum which demanded an improvement of the worsening economy or the probability of an open-ended strike, and

[111] *MEI* May 29, 1992. /*SWB* May 13, May 18, and May 19, 1992.
[112] Najem (2000) pp.37-41.

indeed a general strike took place in mid-October. Thirdly, the business community in Lebanon, whose cooperation would be essential for Syria to improve Lebanon's miserable economic condition, demanded that Rafiq Hariri play an important role in the coming government. Both international and domestic conditions unfavourable to Damascus finally led Hrawi to ask Hariri to form a new government on October 22, after consultation with the Syrian leadership.[114]

Hariri, a billionaire who enjoyed the support of international society and of the majority of Lebanese communities, had enormous potential power to make and carry out government policies at will. However, security and military issues, including the redeployment of Syrian troops and the disarming of Hizbollah, were to be decided by Damascus and its Lebanese allies, who retained the key non-economic ministries, such as defence, foreign affairs, and interior. Also, Hariri's sphere of influence surrounding economic issues, which was to be given free rein, was sometimes curtailed, even though his cabinet included 12 experienced technocrats, mostly his close allies, who were appointed to the economic portfolios itself and other key portfolios such as industry, telecommunications, and agriculture.[115]

The constraints surrounding Hariri could also be explained by the power which each member of the "Troika" assumed. The Ta'if Agreement increased the power of the speaker of parliament. Firstly, his term of office was extended from one to four years. Secondly, the speaker had the right to determine the timetable for the examination of draft laws.[116] In connection with his increased power, the power of parliament iself was also enhanced.

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[113] For the details of Hariri's career, see Najem (2000) pp.44-46.
[114] *MEI* November 6, 1992. /Najem (2000) pp.43-44, pp. 46-47. /*SWB* October 15 and October 24, 1992.
[115] *MEI* November 6, 1992. /Najem (1998) pp.26-27. /Najem (2000) pp.48-49. /*SWB* November 2, 1992.

Firstly, only parliament now had the authority to oust the prime minister, while only the president had the right to dismiss him before 1990. Secondly, the method under which the cabinet presented urgent laws was changed. Though the cabinet was still permitted to declare a particular bill as urgent, the parliament now had 40 days from the time it took up the bill, rather than 40 days from when the cabinet submitted it, to act on the bill. As a result, the parliament assumed the right to determine whether a particular bill was urgent or not.[117] In addition to these institutional arrangements, the newly-elected Speaker, Berri, with strong Syrian backing, had enormous potential leverage over Hariri.

In contrast to the status of speaker, the President, Hrawi, was in the weakest position among the "Troika". Arguably, this was influenced by the institutionally decreased power of the president as stipulated in the Ta'if Agreement and by Hrawi's isolation within the Maronite community, most of which refused to admit the legitimacy of post-Ta'if politics; nevertheless he had good relations with Damascus and still possessed the right to delay legislation owing to the fact that all legislation required the signature of the president.[118] In carrying out his policies, Hariri consequently had to bargain mainly with the powerful Berri so as to ensure that draft laws would be placed on the agenda of relevant parliamentary committees within a reasonable amount of time.[119] Detailed focus will be made on Hariri's relationship with Berri since the political process during the first Hariri term was largely determined by the dynamics of that relationship

Immediately after Hariri completed the composition of his cabinet, Berri expressed resentment that he had not been properly consulted over it, and

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[116] Najem (2000) p.214.
[117] Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg (1999) pp.95-96.
[118] Najem (2000) p.215.
[119] Bahout (1996) p.28.

was upset in particular over Hariri's decision to take over the finance portfolio for himself, since the ministry was a traditional Shi'ite preserve.[120] In January 1993, tensions among the "Troika" arose over many high-level administrative appointments. Berri and the pro-Syrian Deputy Prime Minister, Michael Murr, stopped over in Damascus on the way to Tehran to meet President Asad.[121] It seems that their intention was to use Asad's power to pressure Hariri into paying more attention to their interests. Though Hariri rejected the idea of a cabinet reshuffle, they succeeded in securing the position of Director-General at the Ministry of Emigrant Affairs for Haytham Jomma, who headed Amal's executive committee, thus causing concern among the predominantly Christian emigrant community.[122] Since Hrawi's power was weakest within the "Troika", he could not secure the appointment of his Christian ally as the post. In the following months, the parliament refused to grant the government special powers, specifically rule by decree, which Hariri demanded. Though Hariri later tried several times, he faced repeated refusal by the parliament.[123]

Though Hariri had to make some concessions in the face of the reinforced power of Berri and other pro-Syrian figures, he used the tactic of either threatening to resign or actual resignation in order to get his policies through. His actions were based on the calculation that he was an indispensable figure for Syria, which needed to stabilise Lebanon to legitimise its presence there and also to give a good impression to Saudi Arabia and the West in order to attract foreign investment into Syria itself. Hariri threatened to resign in August 1993 for the first time, but when he did

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[120] *MEI* November 6, 1992. /Najem (2000) p.217.
[121] *SWB* January 16 and January 18, 1993.
[122] Najem (2000) p.218. /*SWB* January 20, 1993.
[123] For the analysis of both strength and weakness of the parliament, see Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg (1994) pp.100-104.

it again in May 1994, the situation was more serious.[124]

On May 8, Hariri stated that he intended to make changes to his cabinet with a view to widening the range of Christian representation in the government, and accused certain ministers of being obstructive and of failing to perform their tasks adequately. When his wish to reshuffle his cabinet, aiming to facilitate his economic recovery process, was blocked by Hrawi and Berri (the latter clearly supported by Syria), he suspended his activities as PM. As he withdrew his services, the functions of government came to halt for a week. While Hrawi wanted his own Christian allies in the government, Berri, using this crisis, again demanded a greater Shi'ite role in financial affairs. Syria, meanwhile, warned against bringing in Christians who opposed its role in Lebanon. However, Hariri's action caused a serious economic crisis, including a drastic fall in the value of the Lebanese pound and a rush to buy dollars, a situation that Syria could not ignore. Hariri, having succeeded in making Syria realise how much Lebanese stability depended on his existence in the government, went to Damascus and secured from his critics the assurance that they would support him and not obstruct him as before. While he might have calculated that the wider Christian representation in his cabinet would remedy the frustration of their maginalisation in the political field, enhance the credibility of his government in the eyes of foreign countries, and thus contribute toward attracting more foreign investment which was desperately needed for his grand vision of economic reconstruction (Horizon 2000), his attempt aimed, more importantly, to force Syria to pressure its allies to stop their obstructions of his policy by threatening to include Christian opposition

[124] Najem (2000) p.218. /Indeed, it was analysed that the May 1994 case "threatened to trigger the most serious political crisis in the country since he was appointed prime minister in October 1992." (*MEM* May 9, 1994)

leaders in his cabinet.[125] In other words, Hariri emphasised the idea of broadening cabinet representation as a means to advance the "Horizon 2000" plan.

However, Hariri's eagerness for the reconstruction plan was not fully accommodated by his political opponents, especially Berri. Hariri again announced his resignation in December 1994, when the parliament had become an obstacle to "Horizon 2000". In fact, the parliament's refusal to attach the reconstruction plan to the 1995 budget plan in October deeply frustrated him. In addition, his eagerness to cut through institutional red tape and to get reconstruction bills speedily ratified in the parliament had stalled with Berri, who was determined not to have his own role as speaker and that of parliament bypassed. At this point, Hariri attempted to reshuffle his cabinet by removing his critics. Facing his threat to resign over this issue, Syria became more anxious than before to prevent turmoil in Lebanon, especially as this coincided with its own focus on the USA-mediated peace talks with Israel. Damascus was thus prompt to intervene to defuse the crisis as well as to prevent economic recession. A compromise deal was hammered out by Syria. The result was that although the link between "Horizon 2000" and the 1995 budget was to be broken, the draft legislation of some of the most important projects was to be passed by the parliament, and other parts of the plan were to be dealt with in the first half of 1995. Syria also promised Hariri again that it would order his critics (its supporters) in the cabinet to cooperate with him.[126]

It seems that by repeating his threat to resign (August 1993, May 1994, and

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[125] *MEI* May 27, 1994. /*MEM* May 9, May 10, May 13, and May 16, 1994. /Najem (2000) p.218. /*SWB* May 10, May 11, May 12, May 14, May 17, May 18, and May 19, 1994.

[126] *MEI* December 16, 1994. /*MEM* December 2, December 5, December 6, and December 7, 1994. /Najem (2000) p.219. /*SWB* December 3, December 5, December 7, and December 10, 1994.

December 1994) Hariri made Syria recognise his power as well as his determination to make economic progress and Damascus indeed pressured its Lebanese allies to support him. However, Hariri's attempt to reshuffle his government and to create a more cooperative one was blocked three times by Syria and its allies in Lebanon, in particular, Berri. This situation brought about his change of tactics, and in May 1995 Hariri actually resigned. In this case he had two main aims: to reshuffle the cabinet in his favour and advance Hrawi's attempt to amend the constitution to give himself a second presidential term, which Hariri supported, since he preferred a weaker president. After Hariri and Berri paid a visit to Damascus, a compromise deal was reached.[127]

Hariri managed to compose a more homogeneous second cabinet of 24 members under him, and to expel his leading critics: the Minister of State for Municipal and Rural Affairs, Suleiman Franjieh, the Information Minister, Michael Samaha, and the Labour Minister, Abdallah Amin, who was a senior figure of the Lebanese branch of the Syrian Ba'th Party. He succeeded in nominating his close associates: Fadl Chalak (Post and Telecommunications) and Farid Mecari (Information), and also succeeded in preventing Berri's demand that the financial post should be given to one of his allies.[128]

At the same time, Hrawi and Hariri agreed that any possible amendment of the constitution would be postponed for six months. This seemed to be a concession to Syria, which feared that disputes over amending the constitution could bring about instability in Lebanon, and also to Berri, who hoped to become a king-maker in the election of the president. On the whole, it appears as if the result was a stalemate.[129] However, since Hariri's top policy agenda was to carry out his economic recovery plan effectively and

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[127] *MEI* May 26, 1995. /*SWB* May 20, May 22, and May 23, 1995.
[128] *MEM* May 22, May 23, and May 25, 1995. /Najem (2000) pp.219-220.
[129] *MEI* May 26, 1995.

smoothly, it would be fair to say that he gained more than Berri and his opponents did.

The dispute between Hariri and Berri over the Hrawi's second term continued until the autumn and assumed a deeper crisis.[130] Since President Asad was intently focused on the peace process between Syria and Israel, he could not tolerate being disturbed by any uncertainties, including possible instability in Lebanon. He also acknowledged Hrawi's loyalty and obedience to Damascus. Under Syrian pressure, the vast majority of parliament permitted the extension of Hrawi's term, although this was against the Lebanese will.[131] Berri's dependence on Damascus and his preference for a weaker president on the basis of the same reason with Hariri led to his temporary accord with the premier.

The tensions among the "Troika" further deteriorated after the parliamentary elections in 1996. It took two weeks for the "Troika" and Syria to agree on the formation of a new cabinet, largely because of the dispute between Hariri and Berri over the distribution of portfolios. Berri was angered that Hariri took for himself the ministers of finance and post and telecommunications, that Bassam Sabaa, a Shi'ites with close ties to Hariri, was nominated as the minister of information instead of one of Berri's clients, and that at least 10 ministers among 30 members of the newly-formed third cabinet were Hariri's close allies or supporters of Hariri. Although Hariri might have been forced to include the vocal critics in his cabinet, Suleiman Franjieh (Health) and Talal Arslan (Expatriates), his strong determination to rebuild Lebanon into a regional business centre, clearly apparent in his

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[130] For the details of this process, see *MEM* July 14, August 30, September 5, September 26, September 28, and September 29, 1995.

[131] *MEM* October 2, October 11, October 16, October 17, October 19, and October 20, 1995. /*MEI* November 3, 1995. /In fact, one poll of Lebanese public opinion showed that most Lebanese (over 70 percent) opposed Hrawi's extension. (*MEM* May 11, 1995)

holding of the above two posts, was further reflected in the overall formation of the cabinet.[132]

Though Hariri made much progress in reconstruction, the Lebanese public was increasingly concerned over such problems as the massive budget deficit and the failure to attract long-term private sector investment, which Hariri's economic policy, intentionally or unintentionally, had brought about.[133] He tired to reduce the level of public criticism by monopolising the Lebanese media and by preventing labour unions from striking and demonstrating. However, popular frustration began to reach such serious levels in 1998 that it began to threaten the post-Ta'if political order itself. Damascus may have calculated that its strategy of keeping Hariri in as prime minister would hurt its legitimacy in Lebanon. Since Hrawi's extended presidential term was to expire in 1998, Syria took advantage of this opportunity to introduce a new element into the "Troika". Considering Syria's interest in breaking the continuous and long-term discord between Hariri and Berri, in cleaning up the corruption which was widely criticised by the Lebanese public, and, needless to say, in shifting the political discourse to one more friendly for Damascus, the only figure capable of fulfilling these conditions was the commander of the Lebanese army, General Emile Lahoud.[134] In October, Syria forced the members of parliament to vote on changing Article 49 of the Lebanese constitution, which required the senior members of army and administration seeking presidency to have retired from their posts at least two years before the participation in a presidential election. However, at that time Lahoud was popular with the Maronite community and also enjoyed

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[132] *MEI* November 22, 1996. /For the details of composition of the Hariri's third cabinet, see *SWB* November 9, 1996.
[133] For the details of these both positive and negative aspects, see Najem (2000) pp.226-228. Also see *MEM* October 1, 1997.
[134] Najem (2000) pp.228-231. /For the details of Lahoud's career in the military service, see Venter (1998).

considerable support from the cross-sectarian community because he was perceived as honest and incorruptible.[135] In fact, one prominent exiled leader, former President Amin Jumayiel, even stated his support for Lahoud.[136] Even though it is true that Lahoud's election was largely determined by Syria, it also reflected the desires of the majority of Lebanese. Consequently Berri, as speaker, cooperated to pass a constitutional amendment in the parliament, though this action injured the authority of the legislature.

"Hariri's fundamental concern was almost certainly that Lahoud would significantly undermine his already eroded power base, and make it much more difficult for him to carry out his policies."[137] When Hariri expressed his hesitation to head a new government under Lahoud, it was interpreted as it had been in previous cases, where the threat of resignation had been seen as his strategy to strengthen his bargaining position with Syria and its allies in Lebanon over the distributions of ministerial positions.[138] However, taking into consideration the following circumstances, Hariri seems to have miscalculated. The stalled Lebanese economy and public discontent with Hariri's perceived corruption, as well as deadlock within the "Troika", ended the Syrian leadership's perception of his indispensability to the recovery of the Lebanese economy.[139] Furthermore, in 1998, Bashar Asad began to take over control of the "Lebanon File" from Abdul Halim Khaddam, who was a key ally of Hariri, and developed ties with Lahoud.[140] In short, his already soured relations with both Damascus and Berri, the perception in Syria that his premiership was no longer indispensable, and the internal political

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[135] *MEI* October 16, 1998. / Najem (2000) pp.231-232. /Zisser (2001) p.142.
[136] *MEM* October 28, 1998.
[137] Najem (2000) p.232.
[138] *MEM* November 30, 1998. /*MEI* no. 589, December 11, 1998, p. 4.
[139] Najem (2000) p.232.
[140] Blanford (1999) p.19. /*MEM* February 1, 1999. /Zisser (2000) p.142 and p.145.

changes in Syria, all led Hariri to resign.

(4) The Hoss Government (1998−2000)

Salim Hoss appointed a cabinet of 16 ministers on December 4. The new cabinet was mainly composed of technocrats. No former militia leaders were given portfolios and only two pro-Syrian ministers in the outgoing cabinet, Michael Murr and Suleiman Franjieh, were retained.[141] In other words, it seems that while Hoss targeted economic recovery on the basis of his experience as an experienced technocrat and acknowledged no need to include former militia leaders, he also clearly paid attention to Syria's influence in Lebanon.

Though Hoss was highly respected in Lebanon as capable, honest, and principled, the circumstances surrounding his assumption of the premiership were unfavourable. Lahoud had replaced Hariri as the predominant figure in the "Troika" and Berri still enjoyed strong Syrian support. Though Lahoud's political priority was to clear up the heavy corruption in Lebanon, one of the legacies of Hariri's era, and though Hoss was also eager to carry out this task, the anti-corruption campaign, which targeted Hariri, was perceived as politically partisan.[142] Indeed, the campaign particularly targeted officials from the former Hariri government, although the judiciary was given a free hand to investigate numerous scandals and to bring former high-ranking officials to court and despite Hoss's insistence that there would be no compromise in investigating the theft of public funds. One dramatic example was the case of the former Oil Minister, Shahi Barsumian, who was arrested in March 1999 on charges of misappropriating state funds and of pocketing millions of dollars through the

[141] *MEI* December 11, 1998. /For the details of composition, see *SWB* December 7, 1998.

illegal sale of crude oil owned by the state.[143] This "selective" approach also applied to the reform of bureaucratic system and state enterprise. A number of Hariri's appointees were purged from the civil service, and it was decided that the telephone maintenance enterprise, Orego, which was one of the key pillars of Hariri's patron-client system, should be liquidated.[144]

In spite of Hoss's attempt to bring about economic recovery, Lebanon's reconstruction process received heavy blows. Major companies suffered substantial losses and smaller enterprises were reportedly going bankrupt. Solidere, the biggest real estate company in charge of rebuilding central Beirut, announced a 30 percent fall in its profits during the previous year.[145] Hoss was of the opinion that though the Hariri's economic recovery program itself had some positive aspects, his practices had too many drawbacks, especially the huge financial deficits and public debts, and thus he himself made a five-year reconstruction plan in 1999 which aimed at the reduction of public investment.[146] However, Lebanese business circles had already began to criticise his economic policy in general and his anti-corruptive drive against Hariri's allies in particular.[147] As a result, in August, President Lahoud, on the instigation of Damascus, met Hariri, who still carried too much personal weight to be excluded.[148] Lahoud's demand for Hariri to cooperate in domestic economic affairs reflected the Syrian concern that the continued split between the government and the business group led by Hariri would further worsen the Lebanese economy and thus spill over to the question of its presence in Lebanon. Lahoud's attempt to win Hariri's

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[142] Najem (2000) pp.233-234.
[143] *MEI* April 9, 1999.
[144] *MEI* January 29, 1999.
[145] *MEI* May 7, 1999.
[146] Conversation with Salim Hoss (a former Prime Minister), September 10, 2001.
[147] *MEI* May 7, 1999.
[148] *MEI* August 20, 1999.

cooperation failed, however. Hariri still continued to be a very active figure on both the domestic and international scenes, and this became the foundation of his second government.[149]

(5) The Second Hariri Government (2000−)

After the enormous success of candidates aligned with Hariri in the parliamentary elections of 2000, Syria made the decision to reinstate him as prime minister. This seems to have been influenced by the following factors. First of all, the election results showed decreased Lebanese support for the Hoss government because of his inability to deal effectively with the stalled economic situation and the administrative reform to which he had given priority.[150] Secondly, despite Hariri's enormous spending policies that had left Lebanon heavily in debt, Damascus may have calculated that Hariri could still attract international confidence and thus draw international aid and investment necessary for the Lebanese economy. Thirdly, the risk of bringing Hariri back into the government had been considerably reduced, because of the change in the power balance among the "Troika". Because President Lahoud consolidated his power more strongly than his predecessor, Syria calculated that if Hariri returned to the premiership, he would not be able to exercise the same degree of influence as he had done during his previous government.[151]

After Damascus stated that it preferred a prime minister who would cooperate with Lahoud, Lahoud told Speaker Berri that he would not veto

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[149] After the Hoss government was established, Hariri indeed waited for the time ripe for his coming back to prime minister, with criticising Hoss's economic policy. (*MEM* March 29 and April 8, 1999.)

[150] Conversation with Fawaz Traboulsi (a professor in the Lebanese American University), June 27, 2000.

[151] Conversation with Farid Khazen (a lecturer in the American University of Beirut), July 9, 2001.

any candidate chosen by the deputies for the premiership.[152] Lahoud, supported by his close relations with Syria, continued to consult with Hariri and finally asked him to form a new cabinet. Hariri, in turn, had to allay Lebanese, especially Lahoud's, concern that his relations with Lahoud would become problematic inside the cabinet, since his wish to be a strong prime minister had the potential to cause clashes with Lahoud who wished to be the most powerful of the "Troika". Thus Hariri stressed repeatedly his intention to work closely with the president.[153] Before the consultations took place between Lahoud and Hariri, Berri had tried to obstruct Hariri's potential premiership by stating that "Lahoud had no favourites".[154] However, Syria's urgent need to improve the Lebanese economic situation and its confidence in Lahoud's ability to contain Hariri took precedence over Berri's opposition to Hariri.

Hariri formed his cabinet on October 26. Eight ministers among the 30 members were his allies, and they also held key portfolios such as finance, trade and economy, education, information, and justice, while only three ministers were obviously staunch allies of Syria: Suleiman Franjieh (Health), Najib Miqati (Transport and Public Works), and Karam Karam (Tourism). However, Hariri's demand to have full control over the economic portfolios in order to have a free hand in implementing his economic policy was not realised, and he had to make some compromises with Lahoud and Berri. As regards the former, the telecommunications ministry, which had been set aside for one of Hariri's friend, Ghinwa Jallul, was handed over to the Maronite mayor of Byblos and Lahoud's ally, Jean-Louis Qurdahi. As for Berri, his clients controlled social affairs, energy and water, and agriculture,

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[152] *DS* September 11 and September 14, 2000.
[153] *DS* October 5, October 9, October 16, October 18, October 21, and October 24, 2000.
[154] *DS* September 28, 2000.

which could be vital for improving Amal's ability to dispense patronage in the Beqqa and the South.[155]

Hariri's coordination with Lahoud did not last long. At first, he shared with Lahoud the opinion that the time was not ripe for the withdrawal of Syrian troops, which had been called for by Maronite Patriarch Sfeir.[156] However, Hariri became increasingly opposed to Lahoud and the Syrians. This was mainly because the resumption of Hizbollah's attacks against Israel, which began in the autumn of 2000, hurt his economic reform program. Irritated by the action, he announced in January 2001 that the exiled Lebanese army commander Awn could return to Lebanon at any time.[157] Despite these volatile conditions, he succeeded in securing the renewal of a financial deposit from Kuwait.[158] However, his effort in Paris to give a group of foreign investors the impression that Lebanon would be safe for investment resulted in failure, because of Hizbollah's military attacks in February 2001.[159] Anticipating Syrian containment of Hizbollah's military activities, he temporarily cooled down his criticism of Syria in March by referring to its presence in Lebanon as necessary at present.[160] However, he again angered the Syrians after Hizbollah launched another deadly attack in April.

Hariri's relations with Berri temporarily improved during the parliamentary debate over the 2001 budget in late May, on the basis of their mutual antagonism toward the Lahoud-Hizbollah coalition brokered by Syria. Syria, on the one hand, needed to secure the support of the Lebanese president for Hizbollah's attacks against the Israeli forces in the Shebaa

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[155] *MEI* November 10, 2000. /For the details of composition, see *DS* October 27 and *SWB* October 30, 2000.
[156] *SWB* November 13, 2000.
[157] *SWB* January 8, 2001.
[158] *SWB* January 23, 2001.
[159] Gambill and Abdelnour (2001-7/8).
[160] *SWB* March 30, 2001.

Farms because of increased Lebanese criticism over the party's bellicose stand after Israel's withdrawal in May 2000. On the other hand, Lahoud needed to counterbalance the popularity of Patriarch Sfeir in the Maronite community, which pushed him to rely on Syria and also gave Damascus an opportunity to broker an alliance between Lahoud and Hizbollah. The Lahoud-Hizbollah alliance was seen by Hariri as an embarrassment which prevented foreign investors from coming into Lebanon, and by Berri as a threat both to strengthen Hizbollah's power and to erode his leadership within the Shi'ite community, especially when his patronage system was about to collapse because of layoffs in the civil service and state-run enterprises and a shortage of investment capital for the Council of the South.[161]

Hariri and Berri were also in agreement over security issues. On the third day of parliamentary session, Baabda MP and Hariri's close ally, Bassan Sabaa, accused the security forces of tapping telephone conversations among politicians and between politicians and journalists, and provided the details of their activities. Berri asked Hariri why legislation regulating wire-taps had not been implemented. Hariri responded that all wire-tapping activity was supposed to be authorised by the prime minister and that he had given no such authorisation, suggesting illegal activities by the security forces. Considering that neither Hariri nor Berri was actually threatened by Jamil Sayyid, Lahoud's number one ally and the head of General Security Directorate, they seemed to be targeting Lahoud and, by extension, Syria.[162]

However, the alliance between Hariri and Berri soon deteriorated in mid-June over the timing of the budget debate.[163] Furthermore, Berri began to distance himself from Hariri, starting after the partial withdrawal of Syrian

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[161] *MEI* June 15, 2001.
[162] *MEI* June 15, 2001.
[163] *DS* June 12, 2001.

forces in June and becoming clearer after August 7 when the security forces started a campaign of arrest that mainly targeted the supporters of Awn and the Lebanese Forces, who called for full Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Hariri was upset over the arrests, particularly as they took place while he was out of Lebanon. Following the arrests, Lahoud demanded certain amendments to the criminal procedures law, which limited the detention period pending investigation to 24 hours and redistributed some of the state prosecutor's prerogatives to the Civil Appeals Court. Though the original law had already passed two weeks earlier, despite Lahoud's objections, the parliamentary session on August 13 approved the amendments. The amended law extended the period of legal detention before investigation to 48 hours, and also stipulated that the power to decide whether or not to push ahead with a case in the event of a judicial disagreement would be restored to the state prosecution, headed by Adnan Addoum who was closely connected with General Ghazi Kannaan, the head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon.[164] The reason why Berri pushed the parliament to pass the amendments seems to be that while Berri did not want the power of Lahoud and the security apparatus to increase further, he also acknowledged the importance of Syria's presence in Lebanon for himself. This was because his influence was fairly damaged by Syria's partial withdrawal in June and by the opposition activities mounted against the Syrian presence during the summer. The Syrian withdrawal had the effect of getting back Berri in line with Damascus.

While Hariri was forced to sign the amended draft, he received some recompense on August 14 for his earlier compliance, having several of his bills pushed quickly through the parliament, when the speaker accepted neither protest nor amendment unless Hariri agreed. The draft on

[164] *MEI* August 31, 2001.

administrative appointments was also retained unamended, as was another bill aimed to encourage investment.[165] As Michael Young pointed out, Hariri initiated a tactical retreat on political and security matters in order to carry out his economic policy.[166]

However, it seems clear that Hariri's silence over the security issues did not mean his complete obedience to Damascus in the political field. Firstly, a statement following the weekly cabinet session, chaired not by Lahoud but by Hariri (since Lahoud apparently chose to distance himself from anticipated cabinet criticism of the security forces), criticised the excesses of the security forces in dealing with anti-Syrian demonstrators. Secondly, the statement by Bassan Sabaa that democratic systems had became targeted in the name of "security" could be interpreted as his speaking for Hariri against Lahoud, considering Sabaa's close relations with the prime minister.[167]

Though Hariri initially kept some bargaining power, the balance of power among the "Troika" shifted further against Hariri, in favour of Lahoud. In late August, Lahoud proposed the use of economic experts to monitor the process of privatising state-owned enterprises. Hariri criticised this further expansion of presidential prerogative into the economic sphere and asked for mediation from Damascus. However, Hariri was being pressed to allow more presidential input in the country's economic reform process, and this brought about Lahoud's return to cabinet meetings for the first time in weeks.[168]

Understanding Hariri's weak position in Damascus, Berri continued to keep a distance from the prime minister after August, and even became opposed to him. In December, the contest between the two was intensified over civil service appointments, in particular a chairman to the National Social

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[165] *MEI* August 31, 2001.
[166] *DS* August 18, 2001.
[167] *DS* August 17, 2001.
[168] *DS* August 29, August 30, and August 31, 2001. /*MEI* September 14, 2001.

Security Fund (NSSF), and the 2002 budget.[169] With Syrian blessing, Berri continued his confrontation with Hariri.[170] The Syrian decision to support Berri was, firstly, based on his having readily made concessions to Hariri in the appointment process. In fact, Berri's brother was forced to resign as vice-president of the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). Secondly, both Berri and Syria took a common stand to postpone the Arab summit of Beirut in March. Berri, on the one hand, did not want Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi, whom he considered responsible for the disappearance of Amal's founder Musa Sadr, to come to Lebanon. On the other hand, Syria feared that this summit would be subjected to US pressure, which might force Arab leaders to agree to the containment of Hizbollah's military activities.[171]

In reference to the struggle between himself and Berri, Hariri showed no inclination to make concessions, on the basis that his position as prime minister should accord him a free hand in economic policies and consequently that the NSSF should be integral to his policy agenda. However, Syrian pressure worked to Hariri's disadvantage.[172] In February, Hariri gave supportive words to the role of the Council for the South, which seemingly ended his efforts to reduce its allocations in the 2002 budget. In addition, Hariri's parliamentary bloc stated that the Council for the South and the Central Fund for the Displaced, both dominated by Berri's allies, still played key roles in reconstruction and would not be denied funding. By supporting Berri, Hariri may have hoped to secure the weakening of Berri's opposition to the forthcoming Arab summit in Beirut. Securing his patronage interests from Hariri, Berri announced the implementation of the 1997

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[169] *DS* December 15, 2001. /December 21, 2001.
[170] *DS* December 27 and December 31, 2001, and January 3, 2002.
[171] *MEI* January 11, 2002.
[172] *DS* January 4, 2002. /*MEI* January 11, 2002.

revival plan, which had been ratified in October 1997 by Hrawi, Hariri, and himself, and which required a reduction in the country's considerable expenditures in the security fields, in spite of the fact that raising this plan was seen as "taboo" under Lahoud's mandate.[173] In March, under the growing economic crisis but in opposition to Lahoud, both Hariri and Berri demanded a cutback on security spending.[174]

(6) Brief Summary

Overall, each member of the "Troika" has, more or less, exploited the Syrians to his advantage, either to realise his political preference or to strengthen his political power in Lebanon by aiming to contain his rivals and to extend his patronage network. However, for each of them, sometimes Syrian interest was given priority over Lebanese interests, especially when Syria's security affairs were involved.

6. THE DYNAMICS OF HIZBOLLAH'S ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

(1) Introduction

Under Syrian indirect rule, the Lebanese government has been torn between its desire for reconstruction and the military activities of the Syrian-backed Hizbollah in southern Lebanon. Though both Lebanon and Syria have had common interests, such as the full Israeli withdrawal from the "security zone", they have also had clear differences. The reconstruction-oriented Lebanese government under Hariri, on the one hand, has wished to calm the region and go ahead with the Middle East peace process with the aim of facilitating international aid and investment, while the Asad regime

[173] *DS* February 20, 2002.
[174] *DS* March 1 and March 13, 2002.

of Syria, on the other hand, has kept the heat in the South for its own interests, specifically the recovery of the Golan Heights. Therefore, they have tended to take different views toward the issues of Hizbollah and the peace process, though some pro-Syrian figures in Lebanon, especially Lahoud, have consistently supported the Syrian stance. The dynamics between Hariri and Asad over the above issues will be focused on in this section.

(2) The "Operation Accountability" and its Result

After two years of relative peace in the South because of the fierce battle between Amal and Hizbollah, the latter began in 1991 to engage in the conflict over the "security zone". Beginning in November, after the Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid, a series of roadside bombs killed sometimes as many as five Israeli soldiers at once.[175] The effectiveness of the "security zone" for Israel was soon diminished by Hizbollah's activities since its client South Lebanese Army, recruited by a combination of material incentives and conscription, had no high motivation to fight against Hizbollah. The Israeli response was periodic sweeps, air raids, and artillery bombardment north of the zone, so as to break up concentrations of fighters and deter Lebanese villagers from harbouring the group. However, since the members of Hizbollah were mainly from the local populace and since the organisation enjoyed local support, as a result of its care in providing relief and rebuilding destroyed houses, Israel was unable to prevent Hizbollah from infiltrating villages north of the zone.[176]

Israel thus became increasingly frustrated, and the conflict escalated into a major crisis on February 16, 1992, when Israel assassinated Hizbollah leader Abbas Musawi and his family in Jibshit in southern Lebanon. Hizbollah

[175] Harris (1996) pp.315-316.
[176] Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p.148. /Hinnebusch (1998) p.156.

reacted with rocket strikes into northern Israel. The exchange of fire between Hizbollah and the Israeli forces continued, and the additional Israeli deployment in the "security zone" threatened to bring about a full-scale invasion into Lebanon.[177] In reaction, Syrian President Asad contacted the leadership in Iran and the Lebanese President, Hrawi. A meeting was convened in Sidon with Syrian and Lebanese army officers and representatives of Hizbollah and Amal attending. Syria was partly motivated by the fact that the Lebanese were beginning to question why Damascus was doing nothing, neither restraining Hizbollah nor giving it military support, despite the critical situation.[178]

On February 22, Hizbollah, in agreement with Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, pledged not to attack targets inside Israel and to confine itself to those in the "security zone". It kept the promise for several months. On May 26, after Israeli air raids had killed over 20 Lebanese civilians, the Lebanese parliament stated that it supported the liberation of southern Lebanon from Israel by any means.[179] At the same time, the newly-formed Solh government was discussing its draft of the policy statement, and a number of ministers stressed that the policy statement should not contain absolute support for the resistance and should confine the resistance to the South.[180] On May 28, the policy statement, which was also in line with the stance adopted by the parliament, was finally announced.[181] It appears that the Lebanese government hoped to limit further damage to the stalled economy by restricting the resistance activities to the South, since Israel had twice bombed Hizbollah's position in the Beqqa.[182]

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[177] Harris (1996) p.316. /Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp.148-149.
[178] *MEI* March 6, 1992.
[179] *MEI* May 29, 1992.
[180] *SWB* May 25, 1992.
[181] *MEI* June 12, 1992. /*SWB* May 30, 1992.
[182] *MEI* June 12, 1992.

After the summer lull in 1992, the conflict between Hizbollah and the Israeli army revived, and culminated in the summer of 1993.[183] Given the stalemate of Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations, Israel initiated massive artillery and aerial bombardment—"Operation Accountability"—on July 25, aiming to destabilise the Lebanese regime by targeting Shi'ite towns and villages in southern Lebanon. Israel hoped that the complete disruption of civilian life would generate pressure on the Hariri government and, by extension, the Syrian regime, and thus would force them to curb Hizbollah's activities. Indeed, 300, 000 people fled to Beirut, with 128 dead in Lebanon.[184]

Instead of bowing to Israeli pressure, the Lebanese government pursued the following tactical policies. Firstly, Hariri made diplomatic efforts, mainly in Europe, to end the conflict, since the United States had persuaded Lebanon not to bring the issues to the Security Council, on the basis that a bitter debate might prevent Secretary of State Warren Christopher's forthcoming visit to the Middle East aimed at restarting the stalled peace negotiations. Secondly, the government launched its first organised compensation program to assist the displaced people who had escaped from the South, though the program fell short of satisfying the populace. Thirdly, the government made no attempt to discourage Hizbollah's shelling into the Galille. In fact, no cabinet member openly demanded restrictions on Hizbollah's activities during the hostilities. Fourthly, however, there were neither spontaneous nor government-organised demonstrations of solidarity. When Hizbollah tried to mobilise a rally in Beirut, the government refused it a license. Therefore, since the government tacitly showed its sympathy toward, albeit within limits, Hizbollah, "Operation Accountability" failed to

[183] For the details of both Israel and Hizbollah activities up to the summer, see Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p.149.

exploit state-resistance hostilities in Lebanon.[185]

Meanwhile, Asad hoped for American mediation in the stalled Israeli-Syrian negotiations, and because of this he maintained restraint in the face of Israeli attacks on Syrian positions. Furthermore, he pressured Hizbollah into ending the rocket attacks on Israel, forced the organisation to withdraw its heavy weapons and rockets into the Beqqa, and cut off further supplies of rockets from Iran. On July 31, Israel accepted the cease-fire brokered by the USA with Syrian cooperation. The arrangement was that Israel would refrain from attacking civilian targets in Lebanon while Hizbollah would focus its activities on the "security zone". In addition, it was agreed that a token Lebanese army presence was to be deployed in the South, which Israel anticipated would help stabilise the region.[186] Since the agreement gave the Hariri government some hope of being able to facilitate the reconstruction program by recovering, though nominally, Lebanese sovereignty over southern Lebanon, Hariri himself was probably satisfied with it.

However, this hope soon disappeared, since the size and role of the army, which were initially agreed with the UNIFIL, were reduced after strong opposition from Syria. In fact, several weeks after the deployment, the token force was still keeping a low profile, some distance from the Israeli lines.[187] This enabled Syria both to heat up and cool down activities by Hizbollah to suit its own strategy and to show Israel that security in Israel would depend on a peace accord with Syria. In November, Hizbollah launched a series of coordinated attacks on Israeli and South Lebanese Army bases in the "security zone", which was the biggest blitz since the signing of the Oslo Accord in September. The Israeli charge that it was ordered by Syria to

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[184] Harris (1996) pp.316-317. /Rabinovich (1998) pp.102-103.
[185] Harik (1997) pp.255-256. /*MEI* August 6, 1993.
[186] Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p.150.
[187] *MEI* August 28, 1993.

express its grievance toward the accord seems valid, considering that the Hizbollah attacks were accompanied by escalated Syrian verbal attacks, especially that of Vice President Khaddam, on Arafat and the Oslo Accord.[188]

(3) The "Grapes of Wrath" and its Result

After "Operation Accountability", Hizbollah's military activities were generally confined to the "security zone" and this situation lasted with some exceptions for nearly three years, since the Labour government in Israel in general paid attention to the main Syrian interest—the recovery of the Golan—in the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations. However, as the hope for a breakthrough dwindled, the tensions in the boarder areas, which had already increased since March 1996, finally led to "Operation Grapes of Wrath" on April 11.[189] Israel's massive military operation against suspected Hizbollah targets in southern Lebanon and Beirut had a clear message: to pressure the Lebanese and Syrian governments into curbing Hizbollah. The intense bombardment from land, sea, and air, resulting in many civilian causalities and a huge refugee problem, also appeared to have the intention of damaging the Lebanese economy. The fact that an Israeli helicopter rocketed a power station in a Christian area could be interpreted as a serious blow to investor confidence in Lebanon's stability to the reconstruction process. In sum, the thorny issue of the South and disarming Hizbollah again presented a dilemma for the Hariri government which had always given priority to economic revival.[190]

The Lebanese government kept up its support for Hizbollah even before

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[188] *MEM* November 16, 1993. /*SWB* November 17, 1993.
[189] Harik (1997) pp.256-257. /Jaber (1997) pp.173-176. /For the details of escalation process, see chronology in *MEI* April 26, 1996.
[190] Trendle (1996) pp.5-6. /Jaber (1997) pp.177-192.

Israel launched "Operation Grapes of Wrath". Foreign Minister Faris Buwayz stated that the resistance would continue until Lebanon regained sovereignty over the "security zone", and rejected the demands by Israel and the USA that the Lebanese government should order its army to take action against Hizbollah.[191] As soon as the massive operation erupted, Hariri energetically visited regional and European capitals, using his personal and professional contacts to push for an early end to the conflict. His diplomatic activities were initially successful since he secured both a high-level French initiative which demanded that Israel adhere to UN Security Council Resolution 425 and withdraw from Lebanon as he insisted, and also international emergency aid. In addition, President Hrawi delivered a complaint to the UN Security Council about the Israeli attacks.[192] Their actions were probably undertaken with Syrian permission, because they had been in close contact with Asad since the outbreak of "Operation Grapes of Wrath".[193] At the same time, there was considerable cross-sectarian solidarity with Hizbollah in Lebanon.[194]

Though the Lebanese government was active on the international scene, it was the Israeli attack on the UN base at Qana on April 18 that was a turning point for Lebanese diplomatic manoeuvrability. After the Qana massacre, Washington realised that a cease-fire between Hizbollah and Israel could not be worked out without Syrian intervention. Asad, who only a month earlier had been hopelessly isolated in the anti-terrorism summit at Sharm Sheikh in Egypt, got a chance to bring himself back into the centre of diplomatic

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[191] *MEI* April 12, 1996.
[192] Salem (1996) pp.75-76. /For the details of Hariri's contacts, especially see *SWB* April 18, 1996.
[193] For examples, Hariri met Asad in Damascus on April 13, and Hrawi received a telephone call from the Syrian president on April 11. (*SWB* April 13, and April 15, 1996.)
[194] *MEI* April 26, 1996. /Salem (1996) pp.76-77.

efforts to bring about a cease-fire.[195] As a result of the USA's refusal to negotiate directly with Lebanon, he became a proxy for Hariri in talks with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Though Asad conferred closely and continuously with Hariri and Berri (who shuttled between Damascus and Beirut not to be overshadowed by his rival, Hizbollah), once negotiations got under way, this USA stance sidelined Lebanon.[196]

However, the outcome of negotiations seems to have been reasonable for the Lebanese government, though its call for the implementation of UN Resolution 425 was not acceded to. The reaffirmation of the 1993 agreement had merit for the government since the armed conflict would be confined to the "security zone". More importantly, the Lebanese state acquired equal membership status on a cease-fire committee which included representatives of France, the USA, Syria, and Israel. In fact, this arrangement was headlined by the Beirut mass media as a breakthrough for Lebanon, which gained it international credibility.[197] Lebanon's position of equality on the committee could be interpreted as a result of Hariri's close relations with France, contributing to the upgrading of Lebanon's status which had been injured by the USA refusal to make contact with Lebanon.

(4) The "Lebanon First" Plan and the Lebanese Reaction

The "Lebanon First" plan, which was vigorously proposed by the Netanyahu government and which envisioned the possibility of Israeli unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in exchange for security guarantees by Lebanon for northern Israel, seems to have, in some parts, been inspired by Hariri's earlier behaviour. Early in his tenure as prime minister, Hariri had outlined conditions for negotiations with Israel. In February 1993, he stated

[195] Jaber (1997) pp.193-194.
[196] *MEI* April 26, 1996.

his readiness for an agreement with Israel based on UN Security Council Resolution 425, which called for the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese territories, although denying that he was ready for a peace treaty with Israel.[198] He might have calculated that his statement would have some appeal for Israel, since the negotiations between Syria and Israel were at a stalemate at that time.[199] Though he cautiously denied the possibility of a peace agreement and only demanded the Israeli withdrawal, the move toward a possible agreement could have the potential of decreasing the legitimacy of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon and its backing of Hizbollah's military activities in the South, thus weakening the Syrian negotiation position toward Israel. In fact, Hariri's "independent" action did not survive the spring and by October 1993 he announced a total coordination with Syria over his regional policy.[200]

This trend was manifested in the Geneva summit in January 1994, when Asad made Lebanon a focus of his agenda in his meeting with Clinton. Though this meant Syrian consolidation of its hold on Lebanon, Hariri expressed, along with other ministers such as those of foreign affairs, defence, and information, his government's satisfaction with and appreciation of the Syrian stance.[201] Later, he stated in London that Lebanon and Syria agreed on rejecting the idea of separate peace deals with Israel.[202]

In July 1996, the newly-elected Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, launched the "Lebanon First" plan, largely pressured by the Israeli army, which had already begun to question the utility of its position in the

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[197] Harik (1997) p.261. /*MEI* May 10, 1996.
[198] *SWB* February 13, 1993.
[199] In fact, the Israeli Foreign Minister Simon Peres asked the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher to pressure Syria in order to reactivate the peace process. (*SWB* February 18, 1993.)
[200] Norton (1997) p.10.
[201] *MEM* January 17, 1994. /*SWB* January 18 and January 19, 1994.
[202] *MEM* January 26, 1994. /*SWB* January 27, 1994.

"security zone", especially after "Grapes of Wrath". He suggested the idea of an Israeli withdrawal from the zone in return for appropriate security arrangements, the most important of which was to dismantle Hizbollah and to send the Lebanese army there. Israel saw a number of merits in this proposal. Firstly, it might relieve the pressure on Israel from the USA to make concessions in other tracks of the Middle East peace process, especially in the remaining territories of the West Bank. Secondly, by leaving southern Lebanon, Israel could eliminate the Syrian tramp card in the negotiations over the Golan Heights. Thirdly, a Lebanese-Israeli arrangement could serve as the basis for dialogue between Israel and Syria in the future.[203]

Syria objected to Netanyahu's proposal by stressing that Damascus should maintain its central role in the South and that Netanyahu was trying to separate the Syrian and Lebanese tracks.[204] Fearing loss of leverage over the return of the Golan Heights and anticipating pressures to withdraw its forces from Lebanon after Israel pulled out, Syria signalled to the Lebanese government that it should reject the Israeli proposal and instead repeat the insistence on unconditional Israeli withdrawal as demanded by UN Resolution 425.[205] Following the assertion by the Foreign Minister, Faris Buwayz, that the Israeli offer was vague, Hariri emphasised that Lebanon had not been notified of the "Lebanon First" proposal and noted that all that had been heard was from the newspapers.[206] There were possible reasons why he did not make a more explicit statement on the proposal. Under fierce opposition to the proposal not only from Hizbollah but also even from moderate Amal,[207] he seems both to have hoped to avoid causing turmoil in

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[203] Norton (1997) p.12. /Zisser (2001) p.146.
[204] *SWB* July 29, 1996 and July 30, 1996.
[205] Malik (1997) pp.94-95.
[206] *SWB* July 29, 1996 and August 3, 1996.
[207] Berri stated that the proposal was aimed at waging a cold war, and Nasrallah not only rejected the proposal but also ruled out any

Lebanon, where the parliamentary elections were supposed to take place in the summer, and also to have calculated that if he dismissed the Israeli offer explicitly, Lebanon would not in the future attract enough foreign investment, which was essential for his economic recovery project.

However, Syria was not satisfied with his attitude, and when Hariri visited Washington in December 1996 in a bid to secure the aid that was promised as compensation for the "Grapes of Wrath" operation, Syria opposed his visit on the grounds that closer ties between Washington and Hariri would lessen Syrian power in Lebanon.[208] This Syrian suspicion continued till the next year. When Hariri visited Paris in mid-February 1997, it was reported that France might play a key role in southern Lebanon by sending troops and also that Lebanon was contemplating a separate accord with Israel. Hariri, aware of Syrian sensitivities, denied these reports, and French President Chirac telephoned Asad to reassure him that both France and Lebanon would oppose the Israeli demand to separate the Lebanon-Israel track from the Syria-Israel track within the peace process.[209]

In January 1998, Israel announced its readiness to comply with Resolution 425, if Lebanon would take steps to guarantee security on the Lebanese-Israeli border. As the Israeli Defence Minister, Yitzhaq Mordehay, had said that Lebanon was interested in a security arrangement with Israel, the four Lebanese leaders, President Hrawi, Prime Minister Hariri, Speaker Berri, and Foreign Minister Buwayz, told French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine that if Israel withdrew its forces unilaterally from Lebanon, the Lebanese army would deploy in the South.[210] While this episode shows that even

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arrangements with Israel. (*SWB* July 30, 1996 and July 31, 1996.)

[208] *MEM* December 16 and December 17, 1996. /Najem (2000) p.225. /*SWB* December 18, 1996.

[209] Najem (2000) pp.225-226. /*SWB* February 11, February 13, and February 14, 1997.

[210] *MEI* January 16, 1998. /*SWB* January 16 January 17, 1998.

Syria's allies in the Lebanese government supported the idea of Israeli unilateral withdrawal based on Resolution 425 along with security requirements, Syria rejected this proposal as usual and stated that the Israeli withdrawal should be unconditional, as demanded by Resolution 425. However, its main concern was, as before, that the Israeli plan would diminish the legitimacy of Hizbollah, which was an important tool to pressure Israel.[211] In other words, Syria needed Israel to stay in Lebanon until the final resolution of the Golan Heights issue, while Lebanese state officials might have calculated that the deployment of the army would diminish Hizbollah's popularity in the South, where it largely overshadowed that of the government, and improve the investment climate in Lebanon.

In conclusion, the above two Israeli attempts in July 1996 and January 1998 to withdraw unilaterally from the "security zone" resulted in failure because of consistent Syrian opposition, though the Lebanese officials had been, more or less, interested in the "Lebanon First" plan. Nonetheless, Israel's full withdrawal from Lebanon was proposed in the Knesset elections in May 1999, when Ehud Barak stated, in view of the increasing casualties to its army in southern Lebanon, that the withdrawal could be realised within one year. He reiterated this commitment after taking office, and the full withdrawal indeed occurred on May 24, 2000.[212]

(5) The "Shabaa Farms" Claim and "September 11"

The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon placed Syria in a difficult position. The newly-elected President, Bashar Asad, on the one hand, hoped to keep the Israeli-Lebanese border calm and to prevent Israel from being

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[211] Hajjar (1999) p.124.

[212] Zisser (2001) p.146. /For the details of the situations in southern Lebanon during the period just before the Israeli withdrawal, see Baktiari and Norton (2000).

provoked by a deliberate or unauthorised Hizbollah attack. Although he dispatched Syrian intelligence officers to the South under the guise of preventing Hizbollah retaliation against the members and families of the former South Lebanese Army who had collaborated with Israel, the main aim was to watch Hizbollah's activities in the border area. Since Israel showed its respect for international obligations to the world by saying that its withdrawal was performed on the basis of Security Council Resolution 425, Syria also needed to present a peaceful stance to the international community.[213]

On the other hand, since the Israeli withdrawal stripped Syria of its justification for unprovoked attacks against Israeli forces, Syria had desperately to seek to preserve a pretext for sponsoring Hizbollah's military attacks against Israel, and later stated that the Shabaa Farms represented a still-occupied Lebanese territory. Realising that Syria still needed Hizbollah's guerrilla war to pressure Israel over the Golan issues, Lebanese officials gave their backing to the Syrian claim.

In October 2000 following the outbreak of the second intifada, Hizbollah launched its attacks against the Israeli forces in the Shabaa Farms, and its operations continued into the next year. With these operations progressing, Israel abandoned its moratorium on retaliation against Syrian forces in Lebanon on April 16, 2001, when it bombed a Syrian radar station at Dahr Baydar.[214] On July 1, 2001, Israel launched a second air strike against a Syrian radar station in Beqqa, wounding three Syrian troops as well as one Lebanese soldier.[215]

The Lebanese government was continuously pressured by the US and the UN to stabilise the South. The US ambassador in Beirut, David Satterfield,

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[213] Ben-Meir (2000) p.30. /Gerges (2001) p.109.
[214] *MEI* April 20, 2001.
[215] *DS* July 2, 2001.

warned Hariri in February 2001 that further attacks on the Shabaa Farms would harm the Lebanese economy and discourage investors.[216] In April, America actually withheld USD 20 million in economic aid to Lebanon because of Beirut's refusal to deploy its army in large numbers along the Lebanon-Israel border, and to prevent Hizbollah from launching attacks there.[217] In addition, after the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, presented the UN Security Council with his report on drawing down and reconstructing the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFL), the UN decided in May to reduce the force and, by so doing, to exert pressure on Lebanon to deploy its army in full scale.[218] Furthermore, it decided in July to proceed with cuts in UNIFL numbers and instructed Annan to study the possibility of converting it into an unarmed observation mission, despite strong Lebanese opposition.[219]

At the same time, the Hariri government seems to have been interested in reining Hizbollah's military activities in the Shabaa Farms and in sending enough troops from the Lebanese army there to demonstrate its full sovereignty over all Lebanese land.[220] Since his priority was to revive the moribund Lebanese economy, he had little sympathy for continued Hizbollah operations. His fear that the Israeli retaliation against Lebanon might undermine Lebanese economic confidence became justified. Initially, the international donor' s conference for the South, due to be held in October

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[216] *MEI* February 23, 2001.
[217] *MEI* April 20, 2001.
[218] *MEI* May 18, 2001.
[219] *MEI* August 10, 2001.
[220] According to Gambill, after the Israeli withdrawal, "Damascus permitted the Lebanese government to deploy only a token force of 500 police and 500 soldiers to areas of south Lebanon evacuated by the Israelis." [Gambill (2001-5).]

2000, was postponed.[221] To make matters worse, Hizbollah's February attack came a day after Hariri had reassured international investors in Paris that Lebanon was now safe for investment and would not provoke the destabilisation in the region. A Hariri-owned newspaper openly criticised the April attack, saying that it could reflect negatively on Lebanon's debt-ridden economy.[222] In July, facing UN pressure to decrease the UNIFIL role, the Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Hammoud, asked Syria to support a continuation of the UNIFIL mission at its present strength.[223] This could be interpreted as an alternative Lebanese proposal to facilitate the economic recovery process by stabilising the region with the help of UN, in view of Syria's continued refusal to the Lebanese authorities to extend its full sovereignty in the Shabaa Farms.

In the aftermath of "September 11", the United States escalated pressure on the Lebanese government to act decisively to rein in Hizbollah. However, the government rejected the US demand that it should seek out and freeze Hizbollah's assets in the country. On November 6, Finance Minister Fouad Siniora announced that Lebanon would not follow the US demand, and stated that terrorism should be defined and that those who were trying to liberate their own land were merely practising resistance.[224] His statement was reinforced by the four reasons which the Central Bank offered on November 8 for refusing to comply, none of them political. Firstly, the demand to freeze Hizbollah's assets had come from the US, not the UN. Since the measures to battle terrorism in September were endorsed in UN Security Resolution 1373, the Central Bank stated that Washington's request was not binding on Lebanon. Secondly, the demand did not originate

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[221] *MEI* November 24, 2000.
[222] Blanford (2001) pp.9-10.
[223] *DS* July 30, 2001.
[224] *DS* November 7, 2001.

from the International Court of Justice in Hague. Thirdly, it did not arise from an international criminal investigation, which would have required the Central Bank's cooperation. Fourthly, there was no bilateral agreement between Lebanon and the US detailing a procedure for freezing assets. Later on the same day, the Lebanese cabinet made a statement backing Hizbollah by saying that resistance to Israel was legitimate as long as Israel occupied Arab land.[225]

The cabinet seems to have been given some justification for its statement by the Central Bank. Though it is true that the cabinet made the statement after Hariri had returned from Damascus, where he and Asad had agreed that the distinction between resistance and terrorism should be made clear, and though it seems possible to say that the Central Bank sensed Syrian intentions clearly and helped Hariri by giving him a domestic justification, it seems unjustified to maintain that the Lebanese government merely bowed to Damascus completely in this case, considering that the Central Bank has been fairly autonomous of Syrian influence.[226]

In December, when Hariri was struggling to enter the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement, Britain, supported by the US, initially demanded that the agreement include an explicit Lebanese commitment to combat terrorism. Sensing Lebanon's delicate situation, France, which refused to condemn Hizbollah's military attacks against Israel, proposed a compromise whereby Lebanon could sign a separate letter to the EU secretariat pledging to combat terrorism. However, Syria did not want the Lebanese government to sign a letter to the EU committing it to fight terrorism until the EU released its list of designated individuals and groups linked to terrorism later in the month. Lebanon thus had to say that the signing would be

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[225] *MEI* November 23, 2001.
[226] *DS* November 8, 2001. /Conversation with Jim Quilty (a Canadian Journalist in the Daily Star) by e-mail, April 18, 2002.

postponed.[227] When the list was finally released, it excluded Hizbollah. However, this episode showed both that Syria opposed any kind of implication, not to mention clear expression, that Hizbollah might be a terrorist organisation, and also that Lebanon had no choice but to fall into line behind Syria over the issue of "terrorism".

(6) Abdullah's Peace Plan and the 2002 Arab Summit in Beirut

Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's peace proposal was objected to by President Bashar Asad and President Lahoud in their joint declaration on March 3, on the occasion of Asad's visit to Beirut. The Syrian objection was based on the fact that the proposal implicitly put the Israel-Palestine track before the Israel-Syria-Lebanon track and also on the fact that it did not explicitly mention the Golan Heights, though it did stipulate that the Arab states' recognition of Israel was contingent on full Israeli withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied since the 1967 War. In addition, Abdullah's plan did not mention the right of Palestinian refugees to return home: one of Lebanon's key demands in negotiating with Israel, since Lebanon had 350,000 Palestinian refugees.[228] Thus, though Lebanon had a common stance with Syria, it also had its own reason for working in concert with it.

However, Lebanon's stance ran the risk of worsening relations with Saudi Arabia and, by extension, the Western countries supporting the Saudi proposal, particularly when the Hariri government was struggling to revive the ailing economy. Because of this, Syria offered Hariri some economic concessions, and agreed to remove import restrictions on 14 Lebanese commodities such as dairy products, olive oil, plastic shoes, detergents and salt. Damascus also decided to halve Electricite du Liban's USD 123 million

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[227] Gambill (2001-12).
[228] *DS* March 2, March 3, and March 4, 2002. /*MEI* March 8, 2002.

debt to Syria and to reduce the price of natural gas being sold to Lebanon, and proposed some joint agricultural and industrial projects, including oil refineries in Sidon and Tripoli.[229]

Despite Syrian concern that the forthcoming Arab summit in Lebanon would be preoccupied with the Saudi proposal, which could weaken its role in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the Lebanese, especially Hariri, appeared very willing to hold the conference in Beirut. Though he was worried that Lahoud's support of the Syrian stance might predominate in the summit and that many states would not attend as a consequence of the fierce protest in the Arab world over the Israeli condition put on Arafat's attendance, he may have considered that it was a good opportunity to show the progress made in Lebanese reconstruction to the world. He was also aware that Syria would not openly and vehemently boycott the summit, since Asad was intent on improving relations with Saudi Arabia, to which he even paid a visit. Furthermore, he was trying to improve Syria's image in the Western world, for example by meeting with the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in November 2001. In fact, only 10 among 22 member states of the Arab League attended the summit.[230] However, since the summit finally gave unanimous support to the Saudi plan for a "land for peace" deal and reconciliation between Iraq and Kuwait, it seems fair to say that the summit was successful at a regional level, especially as Lahoud praised it. However, Hizbollah stated its disappointment at the summit and later hit Israeli outposts in the Shabaa Farms, because the "land for peace" deal frustrated the Palestinians in the Lebanese refugee camps who perceived it as a pressure to put an end to their second intifada, which Hizbollah has

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[229] *DS* March 12 and March 18, 2002. /*MEI* March 8, 2002.
[230] *DS* March 6, March 21, March 27, March 28, and March 29, 2002. /*MEI* April 5, 2002. /*The Guardian* March 27, March 28, and March 29, 2002. /*The Independent* March 27 and March 30, 2002.

supported.[231]

As for Lebanon itself, holding the summit in Beirut seemed to be a success, both politically and economically. Firstly, the Lebanese delegation at the summit managed to add a clause to the Saudi proposal which rejected the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in their host countries. Since the presence of Palestinians was still a destabilising factor in Lebanon, the clause had merits for both the economic-oriented Hariri government and the Christian opposition leaders hostile to the Palestinians.[232] Secondly, since the conference was held in the Phoenicia Hotel on the western outskirts of the redevelopment area, Lebanon managed to showcase its progress of reconstruction to Arab heads of state and foreign journalists. Thirdly, in the weekend just before the summit opened, Arab ministers who attended the Arab Economic and Social Council agreed on the creation of an Arab Free Trade Zone, put forward by the Lebanese Economy and Trade Minister, Basil Fulayhan. At the same time, the Saudi Fund for Development signed USD 38 million loans with the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), one for 4 road projects and another for a drinking water project. Later, on March 31, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development signed a 23 million loan with the CDR to finance an electrical project.[233] As a result, the Hariri government benefited financially, initially from Syria and later from regional states such as Saudi Arabia in particular, at the same time carefully watching Syrian diplomacy in the regional/international arena under Asad, particularly his attempts to strengthen Syria's ties with the West and with the Gulf states.

(7) Brief Summary

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[231] *DS* March 30, April 3, and April 5, 2002. /*MEI* April 5, 2002.
[232] *DS* March 30, 2002.

Overall, since the issues of both Hizbollah's military activities in the "security zone" and later the Shabaa Farms, and also the Middle East peace process have been firmly associated with Syria's security interests, the Lebanese government has had to coordinate with Damascus over these issues. The "independence" of its behaviour from Syria has been generally restricted during the post-Ta'if period, despite its efforts to send its army to the South with the aim of receiving financial aid by showing the recovery of full Lebanese sovereignty. However, Lebanon's coordination with Damascus was not solely "imposed" by Syria, especially when Israeli massive attacks brought about both international and local support and sympathy toward Hizbollah. While Hariri has been prevented by Syria from negotiating border issues directly with Israel, his calculation, by hosting the 2002 Arab summit, that (though the Saudi peace proposal would became a dominant issue) Syria would not oppose the summit itself, enabled him to obtain financial support and assistance from the Gulf states.

7. FEATURES OF THE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS

(1) Introduction

As already noted, political, security, and diplomatic aspects of Lebanese-Syrian relations have to some extent been connected with and influenced by economic affairs. In this section, more "purely" economic aspects will be focused.

Lebanon and Syria have signed a variety of economically-oriented agreements and protocols covering areas such as agriculture, industry, health, tourism, science and technology, energy, water, post, communications and telecommunications, and utilities. The aim of these has been to achieve

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[233] *MEI* April 5, 2002.

and develop their alliance and strategic partnership between the two countries that would lead to increased integration.[234] The following four agreements were signed in September 1993: the Social and Economic Cooperation Agreement, the Agreement Regulating the Movement of Individuals and Goods, the Health Agreement, and the Agricultural Cooperation and Coordination Agreement. Three other agreements signed in September and October 1994 were the Orontes River Agreement, the Tourism Agreement, and the Labour Agreement.[235]

At the same time, the Lebanese government struggled to put the "Horizon 2000" plan for economic reconstruction into action.[236] On the positive side, the plan emphasised the construction and financial sectors, and the rehabilitation process both needed and attracted a cheap labour force, mainly composed of Syrians. On the negative side, scant attention was paid to agriculture and industry, and the neglect of agriculture revitalised narcotics cultivation in the Beqqa Valley. As both positive and negative dimensions were to some extent connected with Syrian interests, the following topics will be discussed: the priority of the construction and banking sectors, the presence of Syrian workers in Lebanon, the neglect of agriculture and revival of narcotics cultivation, and the failure to protect Lebanese industry.

(2) Prioritising the Construction and Banking Sectors

As the Syrian Law No. 10 in 1991 put Syrian, Arab, and foreign capital on an equal footing in order to facilitate investment in Syria, both Lebanese entrepreneurs and Syrian expatriate entrepreneurs operating from Lebanon were able to acquire economic assets and significant leverage in Syria,

[234] Saidi (1999) p.365.
[235] Tinaoui (1994) p.101.

largely owing to their personal and family ties as well as their geographical proximity.[237] However, the Syrian strategy to very gradually liberalise its economy, so as to adapt to the new economic order after the end of the Cold War and not cause the internal turmoil, made the economic liberalisation process relatively slow.[238]

Many Syrian companies and Lebanese companies of Syrian origin became involved in reconstruction projects in Lebanon. Some of the biggest contractors in Lebanon, such as Abdel Rahman Hourieh, which built most of the roads, are of Syrian origin. The village of Rabiyeh, a successful Lebanese real estate project, had Shukri Shammas as its main investor, who was originally from Homs. The Syrian Sharika Khumasiyya also heavily invested in real estate projects in Lebanon.[239]

More importantly, the reconstruction project itself was associated with transstate Syrian-Lebanese political clout. In fact, members of the parliament openly criticised both that the companies which had been contracted to build a coastal road from Beirut to southern Lebanon were charging for the project and also that the contracts had been awarded without competitive bidding. A local company, Ittihad Contacting, owned by Nabih Berri's wife Randa, and a Syrian company, Mount Qassioun, in which the Khaddam family had a stake, were to build one stretch of the road, while a local firm, Geneco, owned by Rafiq Hariri's brother Shafiq, was to build another stretch.[240] Mount Qassioun was also awarded a USD 206 million contract to build a road between the southern towns of Zahrani and Qena.[241]

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[236] For the details of plan and its effect, see Najem (2000) pp.57-212.
[237] Nasrallah (1994) p.137.
[238] For the details of Syrian calculated strategy, see Hinnebusch (1994b) pp.97-113.
[239] Nasrallah (1994) pp.137-138.
[240] *EIU* 3rd quarter, 1996. /Najem (2000) p.146.
[241] Najem (2000) p.147.

The above cases suggest that though these companies were "partners" in these projects, Hariri sought to push through the "Horizon 2000" plan by co-opting his political rivals, especially those who were pro-Syrian, companies of Syrian-origin in Lebanon, and Syrian companies, while at the same time maintaining his own economic stakes.

Also, the reconstruction project sometimes required a lengthy bargaining process. Elysser, a public agency which was established in the summer of 1995 for the redevelopment of Beirut's southern suburbs, was the product of three years of negotiations between the Lebanese government and Shi'ite groups. The initial government plan to redevelop the area by private companies was rejected by both Hizbollah and Amal, which were backed by Syria, since the plan threatened to weaken their patronage networks in the region and thus to decrease the power of pro-Syrian allies in Lebanon. Finally, a compromise deal was reached to give the Shi'ite leadership a major say in Elysser, while Speaker Berri supported in the parliament the government's revision of the Beirut Central District Plan.[242]

However, both Shi'ite groups continued to take an uncooperative attitude to Elysser because they still feared that it would threaten their patron-client networks. When Elysser stressed the importance of bidders' experience in expanding the project close to Beirut International Airport, representatives of Hizbollah expressed hostility to the plan in talks with Hariri.[243] Also, a close ally of Berri, MP Mohammed Beydoun, threatened to bring a no-confidence motion against Hariri and Siniora if they did not withdraw a grant of USD 9.4 million to Elysser by claiming that the grant contravened the budget law.[244] The tender process was delayed and the government became involved in lengthy negotiations with the inhabitants of the area

[242] Najem (2000) pp.173-175.
[243] *MEED* February 9, 1996.
[244] *MEED* April 4, 1996.

over their relocation and compensation.[245] In fact, this project was stalled for more than five years because no agreement could be reached between the representatives of poor Shi'ites and the government over purchase prices for the land and levels of compensation. Earlier in 2001, the government announced a new compensation package, but with Amal and Hizbollah competing to receive as much compensation for their clients as possible from the state, the negotiation process was difficult and resulted in their rejection of the new government offer in July.[246]

As for the financial sector, Lebanon's banking system has traditionally been highly regarded. Although Syrian Law 10 aimed at rapid economic growth by facilitating investment in Syria, one of the difficulties faced by potential investors was the absence of foreign banks there.[247] This situation in Syria could have given opportunities to Lebanese banks, but the state-owned Commercial Bank of Syria was the only commercial bank licensed to operate in the country until April 2000, when the government finally passed a decree allowing international banks to set up branches in the free trade zones on condition that they invest at least USD 11 million in equity.[248]

In late 2000, five Lebanese banks, one of which is said to be closely connected with Hariri, were granted licenses to establish operations in the zone, and several indeed established offices there. The banks were confident that over time they would be allowed to operate in Syria itself, since the Ba'th Party Regional Command in December stated that permission would be given for the establishment of private banks in Syria. The Syrian decision seems to have been motivated by the fact that, because of Lebanese expertise and knowledge of the local market, many Syrian businesses and wealthy

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[245] *MEED* December 5, 1997 and March 6, 1998.
[246] *EIU* October, 2001.
[247] Tinaoui (1994) p.99.
[248] *MEED* July 7 and July 21, 2000.

individuals had long been using banks in Lebanon to meet their financial needs, and it made sense to open such facilities in Syria itself.[249] Since the strengths possessed by Lebanese banks could appeal to international banks preparing for investment in Syria, they could also have the merit of enhancing the value of Lebanon in the world financial community. Regarding this point, Hariri is struggling to return the Beirut's former status as the financial centre of the Middle East.[250]

(3) The Presence of Syrian Workers in Lebanon

October 1994 saw the signing of a Syrian-Lebanese agreement on labour which aimed to legalise the status of the large number of Syrian labourers working illegally in Lebanon. There has been controversy over the actual numbers of Syrian workers in Lebanon, since the rapid influx of these workers into Lebanon began immediately after the end of the Lebanese conflict. The Lebanese Minister of Labour, Abdllah Amin, a prominent ally of Syria and the former head of the pro-Syrian Ba'th Party, stated in October 1994 that the number of permanent Syrian workers in Lebanon was 16,000, in addition to a maximum of 50,000 Syrian seasonal workers.[251] However, at the same time, a Lebanese newspaper, Nahar, reported that according to the Lebanese General Security Directorate, the number of Syrian workers exceeded 900,000.[252] Furthermore, Marwan Iskander, a former adviser to

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[249] *DS* December 5, 2000. /*EIU* January, 2001.
[250] Najem (2000) p.181. /As for the details of the banking sector in the post-war period, see Najem (2000) pp.181-188.
[251] *MEED* October 28, 1994. /Tinaoui (1994) p.108. /According to another source (*EIU* 1st quarter, 1995.), he had put the figure at some 150,000 at first. Afterwards, he sought to play down the figure, estimating the number to total no more than 50,000. It seems that his behaviour intended to lessen Lebanese criticism against the presence of Syrian workers.
[252] Tinaoui (1994) p.108.

Hariri, estimated the number at about 1,4 million.[253] A study by the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council estimated that comparatively higher potential earnings in Lebanon had attracted about 253,000 Syrian nationals.[254] In sum, there seems to have been a tendency for anti-Syrians to overestimate the number to emphasise the "occupation" of the Lebanese labour field by the Syrians, while pro-Syrians have played down the number to lessen Lebanese criticism over their presence.

For Damascus, the presence of Syrian workers in Lebanon has brought some advantages. Firstly, it has contributed somewhat to the decrease in the unemployment rate in Syria. Secondly, the billions of dollars in remittances transferred from Lebanon to Syria every year has constituted the largest or second largest single such source for the country. For Lebanon, there have been both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the Lebanese commercial elite who own businesses that require unskilled labour have preferred to hire Syrian workers willing to work for wages that have been extremely low by Lebanese standards.[255] Lebanese employers have also been able to lessen the difficulties in finding workers for menial jobs by employing Syrians, as Lebanese have generally scorned these kinds of jobs.[256] In addition, the Lebanese government, especially Hariri, has not appeared to be determined to stop the influx, as it has both shared the interests of the business community and seen the presence of Syrian workers as necessary for the progress of the reconstruction project. Though the presence of Syrian workers has both raised the unemployment rate in Lebanon to around 30% for the Lebanese labour force as a whole and given Syrian officials in

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[253] Gambill (2001-2).
[254] Saidi (1999) p.363.
[255] Syrian workers earn, on average, about USD 50 at home, compared to monthly wages of some USD 200 in Lebanon. [Tinaoui (1994) p.109.]
[256] Gambill (2001-2).

Lebanon the opportunity for intervention to protect Syrian workers, the Lebanese government has not seriously regulated their presence on the basis of the above-mentioned economic interests.[257]

While the government seems to have considered the merits of allowing Syrian workers into Lebanon for both the business circle and itself, the presumed "sensitive" nature of this issue appears to have influenced its decisions. There appears to be evidence that Syrian residents in Lebanon, mainly workers, were before the parliamentary elections naturalised and registered in the electoral districts in order to be able to support pro-Syrian figures such as Michel Murr.[258]

(4) The Neglect of Agriculture and Revival of Narcotics Cultivation

Since the Lebanese government has emphasised construction and banking, agriculture has been generally neglected, although it carried out three major projects in the agricultural sector with external support from the World Bank and the United Nations.[259] Despite the fact that rural farmers have represented 40 % of the total Lebanese population, only 3 % of the government's annual budget has generally been allocated to this sector.

Apart from this predilection which arised from internal factors, there have been two external factors reducing the Lebanese government's control over agricultural development. Firstly, the smuggling of agricultural products into Lebanon from Syria has continuously flourished, and Lebanese farmers have bitterly complained of being undercut by smuggled Syrian fruits and vegetables.[260] In fact, this situation actually led to a rural protest in Sidon on May 2, 2000. Moreover, the pending formation of a customs union with Syria

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[257] Gambill (2001-2).
[258] Khazen (2001) p.49. /Malik (1997) pp.40-44.
[259] Najem (2000) p.129.

agreed in February 1998 was likely to lead to more Syrian agricultural products entering into Lebanon and cause more serious social unrest. Secondly, the water resources, vital for agriculture and originally plentiful in Lebanon, have not been under full Lebanese control, especially the Orontes River. The water accord in September 1994 allocated Lebanon 22% of the Orontes flow to irrigate about 60 millions square meters of land in the dry and poor Baalbeck-Hermel region of northern Beqqa. By comparison, a Lebanese proposal in the 1950s had suggested that Lebanon exploit 40% of the river's flow.[261]

In addition to these internal and external factors, the economic recession in Lebanon after 1998 has affected Lebanese farmers, especially in the Beqqa Valley, and they have pursued, as a result, narcotics cultivation, although the amount of production started decreasing after 1991 as a result of international pressure. In 1994, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) agreed with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Drug Control Program to seek alternatives to drugs.[262] In 1996, Lebanon joined in the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, with reservations about the convention's provisions for bank secrecy.[263] Lebanon's actions were intended to boost the country's image in the international field while retaining its traditional financial advantage of bank secrecy, which would facilitate foreign investment in Lebanon.

However, the recent revival of drug cultivation by Lebanese farmers seems to have received tacit approval from the Lebanese government in order to appease their complaints, because of its inability to stop agricultural

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[260] *EIU* 4th quarter, 1998 and 1st quarter, 2000.
[261] Tinaoui (1994) p.109.
[262] *EIU* 2nd quarter, 1994.

smuggling from Syria. In fact, the Higher Coordination Authority for Agricultural Cooperatives complained, on June 20, 2001, that hundreds of tons of various fruits and vegetables entered into Lebanon and damaged its market and economy. Despite this, Damascus has been unwilling to halt the flow of smuggled produce.[264] Also the Lebanese government appears to have been worried that such complaints would get out of control and become part of Lebanese criticism of the Syrian presence.

(5) The Failure to Protect Lebanese Industry

Article two of the Social and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1993 underlined the necessity for Syria and Lebanon to coordinate their industrial development policies.[265] In August 1997, the two side agreed on a gradual and free exchange of industrial commodities and agricultural produce.[266] In February 1998, Syria and Lebanon agreed to form a customs union by the start of 2002, reducing tariff rates on all products by one-quarter from January 1999. However, as a result of Lebanese objections to reducing rates on agricultural products, the rate was applied only to industrial goods.[267] It is worth considering why this situation took place, in view of the possibilities that Lebanon would become flooded with cheap Syrian industrial products which received subsidies from the government and that the process of the rehabilitation of Lebanese industry would possibly be hurt.

It seems reasonable to say that Lebanon was forced to admit it in exchange for the exemption of agricultural products. However, the following internal factors appear to have influenced the Lebanese approval. First of all, the

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[263] Joffe (2000).
[264] *DS* June 21, 2001. /Abdelnour (2001).
[265] Tinaoui (1994) p.107.
[266] *MEED* August 29, 1997. /*SWB* August 21 and August 22, 1997.
[267] *MEED* February 20, 1998. /*EIU* 4th quarter, 1998 and 1st quarter, 2000.

Hariri government lacked a coherent policy toward the industrial sector which accounted for 20 per cent of GNP between 1993 and 1997.[268] The Minister of the Economy and Foreign Trade, Yassine Jaber, favoured lowering tariff rates to stimulate commercial activities and to attract shoppers from the Arab countries, while the Minister of Industry, Nadim Salem, advocated increasing customs duties on imported products which had local substitutes. These policy difference also reflected the competing interests between the BTA (Beirut Traders Association) and ALI (Association of Lebanese Industrialists).[269] The ALI had connections with state officials, but this did not ensure that its demand would seriously be taken into consideration.[270] Since Hariri was supported more by the BTA than by the ALI and since he gave more priority to the former, he seems not to have intended to protect Lebanese industry, as he initiated no increase in the customs rate.

After Hoss took power in December 1998, his government vowed to reverse many of Hariri's policies and to give more attention to the development of Lebanese industry. In fact, both the Minister of Finance, George Corm, and the Minister of Industry, Nasser Saidi, who was also the Minister of Economy and Trade, made statements in support of developing national industry.[271] However, as mentioned before, the reduction of tariff rates on industrial goods was actually started in January 1999. Syrian permission to exempt agricultural products seemed to be based on its calculation: if the reduced tariff rate was applied to them against a backdrop of flourishing smuggling and against Lebanese farmers' strong protests, it would badly affect the status of Minister of Agriculture, Suliman Franjieh, one of key

[268] Najem (2000) pp.194-195.
[269] Baroudi (2001) p.89.
[270] Baroudi (2000) p.46.
[271] Baroudi (2001) p.91.

allies in Lebanon. In addition, although Hoss clearly had interests in protecting the national industry, he did not have enough power to re-negotiate with Syria over the customs duties. Fortunately for Lebanon, however, the importing into Lebanon from Syria of manufactured goods, such as cars, has been limited by economic declines in both countries.[272]

(6) Brief Summary

Overall, while taking into consideration the economic stakes held by Syria and its allies in Lebanon, the Hariri-led government has implemented its economic vision and also secured his own interests as well as those of the business circles supporting Hariri, especially construction, banking, and trade, while sacrificing agriculture and industry.

8. PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL FREEDOMS

(1) Introduction

Under the indirect rule of Syria, social freedoms in Lebanon have been curtailed so as not to upset stability in Lebanon, which has been a priority of both Lebanese and Syrian governments. Restrictions and occasional violations to social freedoms have been carried out by the Lebanese government under clear or tacit understandings with Syria. This section will consider labour movement, free expression, and the detention of Lebanese citizens.

(2) The Issue of the Labour Movement

The end of the militia economy in Lebanon after 1989 did not bring about economic revival for the majority of Lebanese, and the economic conditions

[272] *EIU* 1st quarter, 2000.

further worsened in 1992. In response to hyper-inflation and the sharp decline of the Lebanese lira, the General Confederation of Labour (GCL) called for a one day strike on May 6, 1992, which finally forced the Karami government to resign.[273] Although labour leaders later denied they had any intention to bring down the government, these protests were seen by many not just as a response to the poor economic management under Karami but more as popular rebellions against the government itself and, by extension, the Syrian-dominated political order in Lebanon.[274]

Since the next Solh government also failed to tackle the deterioration of economic conditions, Syria may have felt the legitimacy of its presence in Lebanon to be further threatened. Afterwards, since Solh's successor, Hariri, continued to give priority to putting through his economic recovery plan, Lebanon and Syria agreed to prevent labour movements from spreading and intensifying, and they adopted a number of means to do so.

For example, the post of Lebanese labour minister was occupied by a succession of pro-Syrian allies. Abdullah Amin was a head of the Lebanese branch of Ba'th Party prior to his appointment. Assad Harden was a high level official in the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP), which has advocated the unity between Lebanon and Syria. Another former labour minister, Michael Moussa, has been a close ally of Speaker Berri. The current minister, Ali Qanso, is also a former head of the SSNP.[275] Even though the Lebanese government was pressured by Damascus to install these pro-Syrian figures as the head of the ministry of labour to prevent labour movements from escalating into anti-Syrian demonstrations, it seems clear that their firm cooperative attitude in defence of social order served the economic-oriented Lebanese government, especially under Hariri.

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[273] Baroudi (1998) pp.534-535. /*MEI* May 15, 1992. /*SWB* May 8, 1992.
[274] Baroudi (1998) p.535. /Najem (2000) p.35.
[275] Gambill (2001-2).

More directly, Syria interfered to directly restrict the labour movement itself. When the GCL planed to launch a general strike on December 1993, it finally called off the strike after a Syrian-backed deal with the Lebanese government. The compromise deal was the product of talks between the Lebanese government on the one hand and the Syrian Labour Union, Syrian Vice-President Khaddam, the Lebanese leadership of the Syrian Ba'th party in the presence of the Labour Minister Amin, and the GCL leaders on the other hand. This episode indicates that the Syrian leadership sponsored efforts to reach an agreement, in a bid both to avert the strike and to give a fair deal to the working class.[276] In July 1995, in an attempt to force the government to remove the gasoline surcharge, the GCL called a strike and mass demonstration. In an immediate response, the government banned all demonstrations and public gatherings and ordered the internal security forces and army to implement this decision. These actions were supported by the Syrians. In fact, Hariri went to Damascus to seek Syrian support for the use of its security services against his own people. As a result, thousands of Lebanese soldiers and police, backed by Syrian troops, fanned out in Beirut and other cities to enforce the government ban on demonstrations.[277]

Faced with a continuing pattern of confrontation between the Lebanese army and security forces, supposedly backed by Damascus, and Lebanese demonstrators, Hariri, Berri, and the majority of other ministers came to the conclusion that the GCL leader should be replaced by a more cooperative figure.[278] The government, and in particular the pro-Syrian minister of labour, began a campaign to defeat the GCL leader, Abu Rizq, in the April 1997 GCL elections. The government helped engineer a split in the

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[276] *MEM* December 15, 1993.
[277] Baroudi (1998) p.538. /*MEM* July 18, July 20, and July 21, 1995. /*SWB* July 19, July 20, and July 21, 1995.
[278] For the details of their relations which led the government perception, see

organisation, and in the second election, which was held with the participation of the five recently licensed federations loyal to Berri, 35 delegates out of 54 elected a list of 12 candidates headed by a pro-regime candidate, Ghanim Zughbi. The entire election process was marred by serious irregularities, and it was said that security officers were present in large numbers and were trying to prevent pro-Rizq delegates from entering the GCL building.[279] Although Syria was not directly involved in this case, it seems that its primary goal of containing social unrest in Lebanon was secured through its active clients, such as the minister of labour and the speaker.

During the post-Ta'if period, Syria has generally sided with the Lebanese government on the basis of their common interest in the stability of the social order. However, Syria's behaviour had the potential to hurt its image as a "socialist" state. To prevent this happening, one of its client sub-state groups in Lebanon, Hizbollah, made statements in 1995 about its support for the GCL's strike call and for the people's right to demonstrate.[280] Though Syria supported the effort by the Lebanese government to maintain social order by using its troops, the statements by Hizbollah seemed not only to represent the party's political stance but also to indicate the delicate Syrian position. After Abu Rizq managed to regain the GCL presidency in July 1998, he did not revert to his pre-April 1997 confrontational stance.[281] As a result, the Hariri government managed to contain the labour movement—with Syrian help—in order to facilitate his economic revival efforts and also to secure the interests of the business circles supporting him.

Baroudi (1998) pp.540-543. .
[279] Baroudi (1998) pp.543-544. /*SWB* April 26, 1997.
[280] *SWB* July 20 and July 21, 1995.

(3) The Issue of Free Expression

Since Lebanon has long prided itself on its respect for free expression, the mass media, on which it has depended, will be the main focus here. In the post-Ta'if period, there have been two main constraints on the mass media: "the self-censorship that curtails any criticism of the president or his counterparts in the Arab world; and traditional curbs on dissent and protest."[282] These restrictions seem to have been preferable not only for the Syrians but also for the Lebanese government.

In Lebanon, as the publisher of Nahar, Gebran Tueni, explained, the media law itself was formulated on the model of that of France, and thus theoretically there has been no problem for free expression. Rather, the main problem has been the pressure on mass media exerted by the Lebanese government.[283] There have been two ways by which this has occurred: by directly influencing the content of broadcasting, in the case of the official Tele-Liban, or by indirectly influencing it through pro-Syrian figures in the government. A "red line" has excluded topics such as sectarianism in Syria and the drug smuggling between Lebanon and Syria, although other "taboos", such as the issue of the Syrian presence in Lebanon, were recently removed as a result of increasing discussions across the Lebanese political spectrum calling for a reconsideration of Lebanese-Syrian relations.[284] In practice, self-censorship in order not to offend the Syrians has been commonplace, as Tueni stated, but recently less in evidence.[285]

The printed press has been relatively free compared to the broadcast media,

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[281] Young (1998) p.6.
[282] Mallat (2000) p.159.
[283] Conversation with Gebran Tueni (the Publisher of Nahar), June 28, 2001.
[284] Conversation with Michael Young (a British journalist residing in Beirut), June 21, 2001.
[285] Conversation with Gebran Tueni (the Publisher of Nahar), June 28, 2001.

because most Lebanese have got their news from television and radio.[286] In fact, political news on TV programs has been severely regulated, more so with regard to anti-Syrian demonstrations than to pro-Syrian demonstrations.[287] Although it appears that Syria has not been directly involved in the issues surrounding free expression, it is likely that the Lebanese government has acted in collaboration with Syria, whose main interest has been to contain the criticism of its presence and of the Lebanese government on which its Lebanese policy has relied.

Instances of this collaboration appeared clearly in 1994 and 1996. In 1994, their target was the printed press, and the Lebanese government, backed by Syria, tried to introduce stiff penalties on journalists and newspapers. However, faced with a storm of protest from journalists and parliamentary deputies, the government backed down from this confrontation, and also toned down the tough proposed punishments.[288] In 1996, the Lebanese government, with Syria behind it, pronounced that only four television and eight radio stations, other than official Tele-Liban and Radio-Liban, could use Lebanon's airwaves. It then licensed only those stations in which the leading political figures had stakes. Of the four TV stations to which licenses were granted, one was controlled by the Prime Minister, Hariri, one by the Speaker, Berri, one by a close associate of the President, Hrawi, and one by a close associate of the Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Murr. The most remarkable case was the TV station belonging to Berri, which was granted a license despite the fact that it was not yet operational. Hizbollah, which had initially been given a license for its own Manar Television, but which was later cancelled, accused the government of dividing the spoils,

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[286] Young (1998) p.6.
[287] Conversation with Michael Young (a British journalist residing in Beirut), June 21, 2001.
[288] *MEM* March 29, April 7, and April 12, 1994.

though Manar Television continues to operate "illegally".[289] The change of treatment toward Hizbollah by the government seemed to reflect its concern over mass religious radicalisation of the Lebanese, which was also an anxiety for Syria. In addition, even though it seems true that Hariri had to bargain with staunch pro-Syrian political rivals, he also managed to take a share of the cake by holding the license to his own Future Television.

Despite the hard times for the mass media, they have still played an important role in the political field. As Hassen Krayen in the AUB pointed out, the 2000 parliamentary elections were called "media wars". The authorities utilised public media such as Tele-Liban, while opposition candidates made use of private media, including Hariri's Future Television.[290]

(4) The Issue of the Detention of Lebanese Citizens

An unknown number of Lebanese citizens have been imprisoned in Syria, some of them kidnapped in Lebanon during the civil war and others abducted there after the end of the conflict. In both cases, it is said that they were transferred to Syria by Syrian security forces which have maintained a powerful presence in Lebanon and have had the cooperation of the Lebanese security forces. These abductions have had no legal basis, and the Beirut Bar Association actually reported to the UN Human Rights Committee in April 1997 that there was neither existing legislation nor a bilateral treaty to permit such conduct.[291]

Initially, the Lebanese government did not openly admit the presence of any

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[289] Hudson (1999) pp.31-32. /*SWB* September 19, September 20, and September 21, 1996. /Young (1998) p. 6 .
[290] Conversation with Hassen Krayen (a lecturer in the American University of Beirut), July 4, 2001.
[291] Sherry (1997) p.31.

Lebanese in Syria, though President Hrawi privately acknowledged in September 1992 that there was nothing he could do to help or release the detainees.[292] In October 1996, Prime Minister Hariri, visiting Washington DC, publicly denied their presence. His denial seems to have been motivated by the following factors. Hariri went to Damascus before his departure to the USA, and it is possible that he was pressured by the Syrians not to make the Lebanese detainees in Syria an agenda item. However, there seemed to be another important factor: as Hariri's relations with Syria were strained over Netanyahu's "Lebanon First" plan, he seems to have hoped to prevent their relations from further worsening, as this had the potential to destabilise Lebanon and, as a result, to affect his struggle to attract foreign investment and support. In fact, he was eager during his visit to secure foreign contribution to the reconstruction of Lebanon, and succeeded in doing so.[293] As usual, he gave priority more to the economic recovery than to his people.

Initially, most relatives of Lebanese detained in Syrian prisons remained silent. In 1997, however, a group of parents broke their public silence on this issue by forming the Committee of Parents of Lebanese Detainees. Other Lebanese human rights groups, such as MISRAD and SOLIDE, also became active in this campaign.[294] Finally, pressured by the anti-Syrian mood in Lebanon, even pro-Syrian Berri declared on Radio Lebanon in November 2000 that he would obtain a list of Lebanese detainees held by Syria and would work to secure their release, though Syrian officials quickly denied their existence.[295] In December, when Syria released 46 Lebanese detainees, the Hariri cabinet denied that large number of prisoners were to be released by Syria, and dispersed a rally by the families of detainees, though the

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[292] Sherry (1997) p.31.
[293] *SWB* October 15 and October 22, 1996.
[294] Gambill (2001-1).
[295] Gambill (2000-12). /*SWB* November 27, 2000.

Director of SOLIDE, Ghazi Ad, said that there were more prisoners still held in Syrian jails.[296]

(5) Brief Summary

Overall, the Lebanese government has generally taken, in collaboration with Syria, a tough stance toward labour movement and free expression. Also, it has not seriously taken up the issue of Lebanese detainees. Though these governmental measures have hurt Lebanese "democracy", there have been obvious advantages not only for Damascus but also for the Lebanese government, which has been eager to stabilise the country and focus on rapid economic reconstruction.

9. LEBANESE DISCUSSION OF THE SYRIAN PRESENCE AND ITS EFFECTS

(1) Introduction

As mentioned in the previous sections, Syria has been deeply involved in Lebanon's political, diplomatic, economic, and social life. Though it is true that Lebanese state officials have exploited Syrian presence in their favour and have managed to secure their interests, the Lebanese state as a whole has been in an unequal position with regard to the Syrians. Increasingly, the Lebanese have come to express their grievances against the unequal Syrian-Lebanese relations, and this trend was accelerated in the aftermath of the statement on September 20, 2000 by the Maronite Patriarch, Nasrallah Sfeir. This section will be divided into two parts, following the different Syrian reactions to the sequence of events: firstly, Sfeir's statement and the first Syrian army redeployment; and secondly, the "August 7" incident and the

[296] Gambill (2001-1). /*SWB* December 13, December 15, and December 18,

second Syrian army redeployment.

(2) Sfeir's Statement and the First Syrian Army Redeployment

The statement made by Sfeir was in line with previous Lebanese anti-Syrian expressions, one of which was "An open letter to Dr. Bashar Assad" by Gebran Tueni, published in the newspaper, Nahar—owned by him—on March 23, 2000. In this article, Tueni stated to the then heir-apparent of the ailing Syrian President Asad that many Lebanese were not satisfied with Syrian policy in Lebanon and its military presence there, and demanded the establishment of equal Lebanese-Syrian relations.[297] While Sfeir's statement also generally expressed Lebanese dissatisfaction against Syrian rule by focusing on parliamentary elections, economic conditions, and political conditions, it explicitly called for the Syrian army to redeploy in Lebanon in preparation for its full withdrawal as stipulated in the Ta'if Agreement. It is probable that Sfeir's action was instigated by the following two factors: the transition period in Syria from the death of Asad to the election of his son during the summer, which was thought to weaken Syria's ability to respond; and the decreased legitimacy of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon caused by the Israeli withdrawal from the "security zone" in May without a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement.[298]

Immediately after this statement, President Lahoud made a statement defending the Syrian presence.[299] However, political leaders were soon divided over this issue into pro-Syrian figures and anti-Syrian figures,

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2000.

[297] My description is owed to the English transcription of the letter which Tueni himself gave to me, when I met him on June, 28, 2001.

[298] *DS* September 21, 2000. /*MEI* October 13, 2000. /Rabil (2001) pp.35-36.

[299] *DS* September 22, 2000.

mainly along sectarian lines.[300] In other words, while most Muslims defended the Syrian presence as the pillar of a Lebanese sovereignty still threatened by Israeli military attacks, most Christians rallied around Sfeir and supported his statement.[301] In reaction, the staunch pro-Syrian President, Lahoud, further maintained that only the Lebanese government should deal with the Syrian issue.[302] At the same time, Syria for the first time acknowledged that it was holding 50 Lebanese prisoners.[303] Its aim, to calm the anti-Syrian trend, did not succeed, and Sfier continued to criticise Syria's role throughout October 2000.[304]

In November, Lebanese public disaffection toward the Syrians assumed cross-sectarian proportions, though the former Shi'ite Speaker, Hussein Husseini, had already criticised Syria's arbitrary application of the Ta'if Agreement.[305] To counter this trend, then newly-appointed Prime Minister Hariri carefully defended the Syrian role as temporary and necessary—his nomination to the premiership arguably being owed to Lahoud.[306] However, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who temporarily had reconciled with Lahoud during the 2000 parliamentary elections in order to secure his seat, began to call for a reexamination of the Syrian security role in Lebanon. Though Syria initially responded to the Sfeir's statement by saying that it would only listen to the Lebanese government, it was upset with Jumblatt's demand and finally barred Jumblatt and his PSP members from entering Syria.[307] Despite Syria's harsh stance toward Jumblatt and the pro-Syrian stance

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[300] *DS* September 22, September 23, September 25, 2000.
[301] Rabil (2001) p.37.
[302] *DS* September 26, 2000.
[303] *DS* October 2, 2000. /*MEI* October 13, 2000.
[304] For example, see *DS* October 2, October 5, and October 25, 2000.
[305] *DS* October 21, 2000.
[306] *MEI* November 10, 2000. /*SWB* November 4, 2000.
[307] Rabil (2001) pp.37-38. /*SWB* November 9, 2000.

taken by government figures such as Lahoud and Hariri, Sfeir stepped up the debate over Syria's presence in mid-November, and this finally led to a violent clash between the Lebanese security forces and anti-Syrian demonstrators on November 22, Lebanon's Independence Day.[308] After the clash, Speaker Berri tried to reconcile the differences between Damascus and the patriarch, but this failed because of Sfeir's firm demand for the redeployment of Syrian forces.[309]

At the beginning of 2001, Hariri began to disassociate himself from the other two figures in the "Troika" over the Syrian presence, though he had defended it after the incident on Lebanon's Independence Day.[310] As mentioned in the "Troika" section, he made a statement in January permitting Awn to return to Lebanon without being liable to any punishment. This was arguably both a result of his soured relations with Lahoud and of the resumption of Hizbollah's military operations in the Shabaa Farms, which damaged his economic recovery efforts. At the same time, his cabinet itself was divided over the Syrian issues. The pro-Syrian but Maronite Health Minister, Suliman Franjieh, met Sfeir and other prominent anti-Syrian figures such as Amin Jumayiel and Carlos Edde, the son of Raymond Edde who had died in exile. He encouraged a "national dialogue" between the government and the Maronites, but his real aim was to firm up the status quo in Lebanon that favoured the Syrians.[311]

Despite Franjieh's efforts, the debate over Syria gained further strength in the spring and thus deepened the political and communal divide among the Lebanese. On March 14, the Free National Current, composed of Awn's followers, organised a political rally to protest against Syria's presence and

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[308] *MEI* November 24, 2000. /*SWB* November 9, November 10, November 11, November 13, November 14, November 20, and November 23, 2000.
[309] *DS* November 27 and November 28, 2000.
[310] *SWB* November 27, November 28, and November 29, 2000.

commemorate Awn's "War of Liberation" in 1989. In response, the Lebanese government permitted only a sit-in, and ordered its army to prevent demonstrations outside Syrian army centres in Beirut.[312] Later, on March 20, both a pro-Syrian rally and an anti-Awn rally composed of Amal, Hizbollah, and the SSNP were organised.[313] Hariri may have considered that the situation might escalate out of control and further destabilise Lebanon, and so reiterated, in line with Berri, that the Syrian presence was temporary and necessary.[314]

The anti-Syrian current continued throughout April.[315] On April 25, a leftist and former Marjayoun MP, Habib Sadiq, formed the Democratic Forum, an inter-sectarian group of politicians, including figures such as Walid Jumblatt and the former Ambassador to USA, Simon Karam, and called for dialogue among the Lebanese and also reassessment of Lebanese-Syrian relations.[316] A few days later, some 30 Christian figures such as Amin Jumayiel, Metn MP, Nassib Lahoud, Batroun MP, Butros Harb, Gebran Tueni, and members of the National Liberal Party and the Phalange Party formed the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, which was to be dedicated to the renegotiation of Lebanese-Syrian relations, and whose founding statement reiterated well-known nationalist themes: the necessity for national dialogue on the Lebanese-Syrian relationship; Lebanese army deployment to southern Lebanon; and Syrian army redeployment in accordance with the Ta'if Agreement.[317] By May 16, the Democratic Forum prepared a new document

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[311] *MEI* February 23, 2001.
[312] *MEI* March 23, 2001. /*SWB* March 15 and March 16, 2001
[313] Rabil (2001) p.38.
[314] *SWB* March 16, March 22, and March 30, 2001.
[315] For the details of Lebanese situation especially around the anniversary of outbreak of the civil war, see *MEI* April 20, 2001.
[316] Conversation with Simon Karam (a key figure in the Democratic Forum), on July 4, 2001. /*MEI* June 15, 2001.
[317] *DS* May 1 and May 2, 2001. /*MEI* June 15, 2001.

complementing that of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, and most of the latter's membership and other figures across the political and confessional spectrum, whose total number was more than 1400, signed the document.[318]

Under mounting opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon, Damascus took the following steps in June. President Bashar Asad, who had already taken over the "Lebanon File" in 1998 from Vice-President Khaddam, made the decision to include him once again in Syria's Lebanese policy, especially anticipating that his close connection with Jumblatt improve relations with such key Lebanese political figures. Under Khaddam's mediation, Jumblatt and then Sfeir met Lahoud.[319] In addition, on June 14 Syria pulled its troops stationed in Lebanon out of the area adjacent to the presidential palace in Baabda and the defence ministry in Yarze, and moved to the western Beqqa and the eastern region. Within 5 days, some 6,000 of the 25,000 Syrian troops evacuated a dozen major bases in and around Beirut, especially those located in largely Christian areas and near government buildings, though Syria continued to hold some strategic points. The Syrian redeployment was intended not only to appease the opposition movement against its presence, but also, by this partial withdrawal, to strip them of a powerful weapon to attack the Syrians and thus to shore up the power of its allies in the Lebanese government, especially Lahoud.[320]

(3) The "August 7" Incident and the Second Syrian Army Redeployment

The political response to the Syrian redeployment in mid-June was largely positive. Among the key members of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering,

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[318] For the contents of this document and the name of signatories, see *DS* May 17, 2001.
[319] *DS* June 7 and June 8, 2001. /*MEI* June 15, 2001.
[320] *DS* June 15, June 16, June 18, June 19, June 20, and June 23, 2001. /*MEI* June 29, 2001.

Nasrallah Sfeir, Nassib Lahoud, Butros Harb, and Walid Jumblatt cautiously regarded the Syrian move as a first step toward the full implementation of the Ta'if Agreement.[321] Carlos Edde and Simon Karam also took the same stance.[322] In contrast, Dory Chamoun condemned the redeployment as insufficient and still criticised the Syrian presence in Lebanon.[323]

By tapping the positive mood among the vocal critics of the Syrian presence, Lahoud and Berri tried to resume ties with Sfeir, Jumblatt, and Sadiq and to contain the power of more intransigent opposition figures.[324] Franjieh also supported their efforts by meeting with Sfeir.[325] However, these attempts by pro-Syrian figures in the Lebanese government hardly seemed to be successful. In mid-July, Nassib Lahoud launched a new grouping, the Movement for Democratic Renewal, which included 50 founding members and would presumably focus on such issues as the Shabba Farms, the Syrian role in Lebanon, and political reform. As for Lebanese-Syrian relations, he held that the Syrian military strategic role should be defined by the Ta'if Agreement, though he stressed the importance of harmony with Syria.[326] In addition, Sfeir reiterated that the Syrian "hegemony" was still a reality.[327] Finally, Sfeir visited Shuf, Jumblatt's hometown, to further strengthen their ties and reconciliation, since their relations had been severely damaged during the 1983-1984 "Shuf War".[328]

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[321] *DS* June 15, 2001.
[322] *DS* June 25, 2001. /Conversation with Simon Karam (a key figure in the Democratic Forum), July 4, 2001.
[323] *DS* June 22 and June 27, 2001. /Conversation with Dory Chamoun (the National Liberal Party leader), July 9, 2001.
[324] *DS* June 28, June 29, June 30, July 5, and July 21, 2001.
[325] *DS* July 13, 2001.
[326] *DS* July 16 and July 17, 2001. /*MEI* August 10, 2001.
[327] *DS* July 20, 2001.
[328] *DS* August 4, August 6, and August 7, 2001. /*MEI* August 10, 2001.

The formation of a strong Maronite-Druze alliance calling for further Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon made the pro-Syrian figures in the Lebanese government increasingly nervous. Taking advantage of Hariri's trip to Pakistan, Lahoud ordered the security forces to crack down on supporters of the Lebanese Forces and the Free National Current. Beginning on August 7, about 140 people were detained.[329] Immediately after the incident, Jumblatt, Sfeir, members of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, and some Christian MP denounced the arrests while Lahoud praised the security forces.[330] Lahoud tried unsuccessfully to mend fences with Sfeir.[331] In fact, Sfeir continued to demand the complete Syrian redeployment to the Beqqa in accordance with the Ta'if Agreement.[332] The Qornet Shehwan Gathering was still active,[333] but its power and unity were somewhat eroded by the following factors. Firstly, with Lahoud recovering his power among the "Troika", Jumblatt, acting pragmatically, improved his relations with Lahoud in late October.[334] Secondly, the internal dispute among the Maronites, the backbone of the movement, seemed to badly affect the situation; specifically there were verbal attacks between Awn and Sfeir over the tactics and power struggles in the Phalange Party.[335] In addition, Hariri, who originally condemned the arrests, was forced to cooperate with Lahoud to make progress on economic recovery, which had been severely damaged by the "August 7" incident, and finally blamed Sfeir in mid-March 2002 for being an obstacle to his reconstruction efforts, since he came to see Sfeir's actions as a destabilising

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[329] *DS* August 8, 2001. /*MEI* August 31, 2001.
[330] *DS* August 14, August 15, August 23, and August 24, 2001.
[331] *DS* August 22 and August 23, 2001.
[332] *DS* October 31, 2001. /*MEI* September 14, 2001.
[333] The movement criticised Hizbollah's activities in the Shabaa Farms. [*DS* December 28, 2001.]
[334] *DS* October 27, October 28, and October 29, 2001.
[335] *DS* August 29, August 30, September 1, September 8, 2001.

factor in Lebanon.[336] By keeping a distance from the leading opposition figure, Hariri may have expected cooperation from Syria on the forthcoming Arab summit in Beirut.

The weakened power of the opposition movement and Hariri's reentry into the Syrian orbit brought about the second Syrian army redeployment in April, though some Christian university students and the Free National Current still protested against the Syrian presence around the time of Lebanon's Independence Day and the Arab summit in Beirut.[337] Unlike the previous redeployment, this Syrian decision was probably influenced by the following calculation: since the opposition to its presence was largely curtailed both at government level and at a social level, the reduction of its military presence would not affect its status and thus would not damage its allies in Lebanon. In other words, the Syrian move seemed to result not from its "weakness" but from its "strength".

(4) Brief Summary

Overall, even when the Lebanese discussion over Syria's presence reached its peak by assuming cross-sectarian dimensions, pro-Syrian state officials, especially Lahoud and Berri, continued to defend Syria's role in Lebanon. Since Lahoud's continuous alignment with Syria hurt his popularity among the Maronites, he had to rely on Syria to maintain his power. Also, since Berri has not had enough power of his own to compete against Hizbollah, he has needed the Syrian presence. As regards Hariri, though he sometimes aligned with the anti-Syrian current, he generally contained the tide so as not to harm his economic reconstruction, which has been his main asset to secure his legitimacy as prime minister. Finally, the societal current did not

[336] *DS* March 16, 2002. /*MEI* March 22, 2002.
[337] *DS* March 21, March 29, April 4, April 5, April 6, April 8. /*MEI* December 7,

succeed in pressuring the state officials among the "Troika" to change their attitudes. There appear to have been two main reasons for this: firstly, the strong tendency of the "Troika" members to protect their own power and status under Syrian indirect rule; and secondly, the disunity among the big figures in the anti-Syrian movement, particularly Jumblatt's opportunistic behaviour toward Lahoud and the differences of strategy between Awn and Sfeir.

2001, April 5, and April 19, 2002.

V. CONCLUSION

This chapter firstly aims to answer the three questions posed in the introductory chapter: (1) Why has Lebanon generally "bandwagoned" with Syria, a country which has managed to intervene in and subdue it? (2) How have Lebanese state officials, along with other political actors, tried to manipulate Syria for their own interests, whether to defend Lebanese sovereignty, to maintain and increase their status, or to contain and appease their rivals and opponents? (3) Parallel to the discussions generated by these two questions, which kinds of theory are relevant to or best explain Lebanese relations with Syria? In doing so, the chapter will summarise the Lebanese state's dealings with the Syrians during the civil war and post-war periods respectively in order to answer the first and second question and, based on the summary of each period, the third question can be answered. Secondly, by extending the Lebanese case study, more wide-ranging and philosophical/methodological issues will be addressed.

1. THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD : LEBANON UNDER SEMI-ANARCHY

(1) Summary

Although the civil war semi-anarchy stripped the presidency of much real power, the power of the president was still superior to that of his counterparts, the prime minister and the speaker of parliament, and it was primarily the president who directed the Lebanese state. Presidents, being Maronites and occupying the office which institutionalised Lebanese sovereignty, had, by virtue of their communal and state roles, an interest in resisting Syria's encroachment on Lebanon; yet, lacking reliable coercive power, they had also to appease Syria while still trying to use Syrian power

on behalf of their own power positions. Given the pivotal role of the president, this section will primarily summarise his actions by looking at each presidential term.

Franjieh: After the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon, President Suliman Franjieh faced heavy attack from the LNM-PLO forces. While Syria forced Franjieh to accept Rashid Karami, who was supported by the Sunni establishment and the LNM-PLO coalition, as his counterpart, Franjieh probably considered that by supporting the Syrian-backed Karami he could both appease Syria and also Muslim and Palestinian groups with transstate ties to Syria, and thus maintain his status. Though Syria's imposition of Karami somewhat worsened relations between Asad and Franjieh, they maintained their contacts, even in this tense period, on the basis of their shared political interests. Syria, for its part, did not want to antagonise the Lebanese president and also needed to construct broad support in the Lebanese government in order to get acceptance of its increasing involvement in Lebanese affairs. Later, in the spring of 1976, when Franjieh retracted his earlier resignation against Syrian wishes, Syria ultimately permitted him to stay in office until the expiration of his official term, calculating it would be able to exert more influence through such a well-known figure. Syria's needs, in turn, made it possible for Franjieh, by using his external patron, to defend his power against his rivals in the community, Camille Chamoun and Pierre Jumayiel, who were increasing their power by forming the Lebanese Front. Also, Franjieh's long-term reliance on Syria, and especially the Asad family, made his *sensitivity* toward Syria higher, and seemed to encourage his continuous alignment with Damascus.

Broad Maronite support for aligning with Syria in order to prevent further losses to the LNM-PLO coalition, resulting from the severe battlefield fighting during late 1975 and early 1976, enabled Franjieh, along with

Karami, to associate himself with the Syrian-initiated "Constitutional Documents" which aimed to preserve the status quo in Lebanon, the confessional system, with some modifications. Since Syria secured Sunni communal interests in the document by preserving the post of prime minister for the Sunni community against Kamal Jumblatt's demands, relations between Karami and the Syrians were further consolidated. After Jumblatt criticised the "Constitutional Documents" and escalated military attacks against the government and the Maronites, both of which were now backed by Syria, Franjieh asked for the Syrian army to protect them from the LNM-PLO coalition supported by the LAA. His request matched with the interests of Karami and Syria, both fearful of the increasing power and popularity of the Jumblatt-led "radical" forces among the Muslims. Asad decided to send Syria's regular army to Lebanon in June 1976 in order to contain the LNM-PLO forces, in part so as not to give Israel a pretext for intervention in Lebanon. Once its troops settled down in Lebanon, Syria inevitably became a pivotal player in Lebanese politics.

Sarkis: Indeed, Syria succeeded in having Elias Sarkis elected as the next president. Although the election of Sarkis to the presidency was owed largely to Syrian influence and although his inauguration was performed under Syrian guidance, he tried, as a Shihabist, to keep his policy as "neutral" as possible during his term. Firstly, Sarkis nominated Salim Hoss as prime minister, and formed a cabinet without representatives from warlord factions, at the same time deferring to the Syria's opposition to LNM participation in the cabinet.

However, Sarkis gradually distanced himself from Syria and by 1978 had become closer to the Lebanese Front, mainly as a result of the worsened relations between Syria and the Maronites, especially the Lebanese Front, and also because of Syria's passive attitude toward the implementation of

the Shtura Agreement concluded in July 1977. While he had anticipated Syrian help in containment of Palestinian activities in southern Lebanon and a deployment of the Lebanese army there, changes in regional circumstances gave Syria an interest in keeping a Palestinian military presence there. To counter this shift in Syrian policy, Sarkis tried to build inter-Arab support in order to deal with the PLO's military presence in southern Lebanon and enable the Lebanese army to be dispatched there. These efforts were ultimately disrupted by both the polarisation between Arab states, resulting from the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq War, and also by Syria which needed a Palestinian armed presence in southern Lebanon to counter Israel's provocative attitude under the Begin-led Likud government.

At the same time, Sarkis still tried carefully not to alienate the Muslims and the Syrians. He continued to support his Sunni counterparts, Hoss and Wazzan. When Hoss threatened to resign in May 1979, he actually asked Hoss to form a new cabinet. Also Hoss, who gave priority to economic reconstruction, continuously backed Sarkis's regional policy of seeking inter-Arab support to stabilise the South. Later, after the "Missile Crisis" in mid-1981, Sarkis and Wazzan cooperated to propose a joint peace program. Ultimately Sarkis deferred to Syrian interests in Lebanon, in that he continued to extend the ADF mandate at its periodic expirations, and even after he finally decided to let the ADF mandate expire in July 1982, he later agreed at the September Arab League summit in Fez that the implementation of the Syrian withdrawal would be contingent on Lebanese-Syrian negotiations and on Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

It seems probable that some occasional Syrian appeasement, notably Syria's partial redeployment of its troops from Christian-dominated areas of northern Lebanon and East Beirut to Beqqa in January 1980, and also

Sarkis's recognition of growing Shi'ite power and of Shi'ite close relations with Syria, encouraged his deference to Syria. However, Lebanese-Syrian economic interdependence, which his Sunni technocrat counterparts may have more clearly recognised, seemed to be another important factor behind his alignment with Syria, especially considering the priority he gave to cooperation with them. In the fall of 1976, the Syrian-led ADF created conditions in Beirut for the banking sector to be able to re-operate, which made it possible for Syrian investors to once again use banks in Lebanon. At the same time, Lebanon exported a variety of goods to Syria itself and the Gulf states through Syria. In addition, under the flourishing militia economy and the illegal economic activities that occurred as a result, even one of the most important lifelines in Lebanon, electricity, was being imported from Syria.

Jumayiel: Sarkis's successor, Amin Jumayiel, elected at a juncture when both Israeli and Western forces had intervened in Lebanon, countering Syrian power, was initially aligned with the USA and Israel against Syrian and Muslim forces, and indeed concluded the May 17 Agreement with Israel in 1983. He could do this because of weakened Syrian and Muslim-PLO power, the newly established Israeli hegemony in Lebanon, and the revival of the Cold War context in the Middle East that brought the US in on his side. However, his actions provoked heavy opposition from the Syrian-led National Salvation Front (NSF) forces, and led to the fierce "Shuf War", a disintegration in the Lebanese army, and also a succession of heavy Shi'ite attacks on the Multi National Forces (MNF). While he tried to rely on the USA and Israel to contain the NSF, their large numbers of casualties led both governments to cut down their presence in Lebanon.

Under these circumstances, Jumayiel recognised the danger of neglecting Lebanon's Arab identity, and resumed ties with Syria to protect himself from

fierce Druze and Shi'ite attacks. In exchange for his abrogation of the May 17 Agreement, Syria pressured Jumblatt and Berri to soften their attitude toward Jumayiel. However in the Lausanne conference in mid-March of 1984, Syria's allies, Jumblatt and Berri, still thrust (what he saw as) unreasonable demands on him, and because the Syrian leadership was racked by internal conflict between pro-Asad and pro-Rifat factions, Syria could not persuade them to moderate their demands. Later in April, as fragmentation within Lebanon mounted, Jumayiel asked Syria to persuade its allies to cooperate with him. However, Syria did not want to strengthen the position of the president at the expense of its traditional allies.

Although these Syrian attitudes would have frustrated Jumayiel, he still paid attention to Berri's economic interests, anticipating that this would lead to the latter's cooperation with his government. In fact, the Ministry of the South was created, and an aid program and the revival of the highway project for southern Lebanon were agreed. Though the "Tripartite Agreement" in December 1985 and its resulting military conflict between the factions of the Lebanese Forces led by Elie Hubayka and the Lebanese army caused Jumayiel to be further disappointed with the Syrians, he reopened dialogue with Asad in the fall of 1986. Syria's efforts to contain Hizbollah and the PLO by using Amal in order to prevent the radicalisation of Lebanon could well have appeased him. However, the Syrian condition that dialogue should be based on the spirit of the "Tripartite Agreement" was not acceptable to Jumayiel, and he became increasingly reliant on the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese army. In fact, he rejected the Syrian demand in March 1987 that the Jumayiel administration and the Lebanese army should clear the Lebanese Forces militias from the streets of East Beirut. Syria refused to pressure Amal and the PSP in September 1986 to cooperate with the government over the closure of illegal ports, although the Syrian

army sided with Jumayiel in late August 1987 when poor Shi'ites demonstrated against the government decision to cut subsidies to basic goods. Although Syria occasionally cooperated with Jumayiel, his Maronite-oriented behaviour continued until the end of his presidential term.

(2) Theoretical Applications

Lebanese presidents' alliances with Syria could be partially explained by a theory of complex realism. As Harknett and Vandenberg explained, interrelated threats require state officials to cope with internal and external challenges that reinforce one another. During the civil war, Maronite presidents in Lebanon were challenged by interrelated threats from Syria: its violation of Lebanese sovereignty by interfering in Lebanese political affairs and by sending and stationing its troops and its support of the powerful opposition forces in Lebanon, the Muslims and Palestinians, though it occasionally opposed them. Simple realism would expect Lebanon to balance against Syria. However, except in a brief period after the Israeli invasion in 1982, the Maronite presidents nevertheless aligned with Syria, on the basis of the following factors.

Franjieh managed to contain the greater internal threat, powerful LNM-PLO coalition, by aligning with the lesser threat, Syria. Franjieh was not balancing against Syria as simple realism would expect, but took the strategy of "omni-alignments" with the lesser threat to deal with the greater internal threat, as the theory of complex realism predicts. Sarkis initially tried to contain Palestinian activities by using Syrian power as explained by complex realism, though this resulted in failure because of the fragmentation in the Arab world. Jumayiel initially tried, by using the weakness of the sub-state groups, specifically Arab-oriented Muslim forces, in Lebanon in the context of the Cold War intensification in the Middle East,

to be a rational actor and to defend Lebanese sovereignty by aligning with the USA and Israel against Syria, as the theory of simple realism would expect. However, as the Syrian-led NSF forces soon became powerful, the prerequisites on which simple realism is based disappeared and the disastrous results for Lebanon led him to improve relations with Syria in order to win support from Syria's allies in Lebanon, particularly the Druze and Shi'ite forces, as the theory of complex realism suggests.

It is probable that Maronite presidents were prepared to cooperate with Syria as a result of Syria's support for Lebanon's domestic status quo. For example, the "Constitutional Documents" in February 1976 which gave the Christians disproportionate number of seats in the parliament and the Syrian army siding with the Lebanese government in late August 1987 during the uprising of poor Shi'ites, may have appealed to Franjieh and Jumayiel. Also, Syria occasionally appeased Lebanese presidents; thus for example, its partial redeployment of its troops in January 1980 may have softened Sarkis's perception of Syria despite strained Maronite-Syrian relations.

However, as the theory of constructivism suggests, the identity factor also played a key role in determining the presidents' policies towards Syria. The presidents' Maronite identity theoretically perceived Syria as a threat to Lebanese sovereignty. However, the fact that the majority of Lebanese held Arab identity and that the Arab-oriented forces were generally powerful during the civil war, along with each president's peculiar circumstances, constrained their possible strategies. Presidents were thus caught between the identity of their own community and that of the Muslims who, as president, they also had to satisfy. This in turn forced them to take greater account of Syria.

In the case of Franjieh, he seemed to balance between representing a

Maronite identity and appeasing the Arabism championed by Syria and the LNM-PLO forces. In fact, he both preserved the Maronite prerogatives by signing the Syrian-initiated "Constitutional Documents" and nominated Syrian-backed Karami as prime minister. Even after Sarkis distanced himself from Syria, Sarkis did his best not to antagonise the Muslims and worked through the Arab League in his attempts to pacify Lebanon. In other words, as a Shihabist he avoided exclusive identification with non-Arab notion of Maronite identity and instead accommodated the Arab identities of many Lebanese, and by using Arab support, attempted to appease both Syria and Muslim-PLO coalition, though this was not successful. His continuous extension of the ADF mandate also had the same aim. In the case of Jumayiel, his initial alignments with the USA and Israel were also influenced by a Maronite identity which saw the West and Israel as their protectors. Even after his policies brought about strong opposition from the Syrian-backed NSF forces, he tried to rely on the USA and Israel to contain Syria's allies in Lebanon, but this failed. As Syrian hegemony in Lebanon was restored by the NSF's military offensive, he finally learned the importance of Arab identity among the Muslim Lebanese and began to improve relations with Syria. This shows that balancing in complex realism is not just a response to internal threats, but takes account of identity. Indeed, as constructivism argues, "threats" are not self-evident but shaped by one's identity.

In addition to complex realism and constructivism, pluralism is an important theoretical construct that can be used to make sense of Lebanese-Syrian relations. There were not only shared economic interests but also shared political interests between the two countries. As regards the former, their interdependence through financial affairs, trade, and smuggling, along with the Shihabist Sarkis's high priority to keep on good terms with the

economic-oriented Sunni prime minister, could explain why he never tried to sever relations with Syria. As regards the latter, there was an interdependence of political interests between Franjieh and Syria in maintaining his presidency. By using Syria's need for his support to legitimise its Lebanese role, Franjieh not only maintained his status and contained his rivals within the Maronite community but also managed to defend Lebanese sovereignty. Also, Franjieh's long-term personal relations with Asad were another factor in influencing his perceptions of Syria. In other words, his interests in aligning with Syria carried more weight than his identity as a Maronite. As pluralism holds, the variety of actors, state and sub-state, shaping Lebanese-Syrian relations and the resulting complex interdependence contributed to the cooperation between Lebanon and Syria.

As we have seen, presidents' actions could be explained on the basis of three theories: complex realism, constructivism, and pluralism. Which theories are applicable to other political actors? In terms of their Arab-oriented identity, Sunni prime ministers were a natural ally of Syria. In addition, Karami and Syria had a common political interest: to contain the LNM-PLO forces. Karami needed Syrian help in order to maintain his status among the Muslims, and Syria needed his support among the community. Hoss and Wazzan seemed to recognise the importance of economic interdependence between Lebanon and Syria. In effect, identity (constructivism) and shared interests (pluralism) could explain the cases of prime ministers.

In the case of Jumblatt, it is possible to say, considering his continuous alliances with the Palestinians, that he actually had an Arab-oriented identity. However, another reason why he opposed the "Constitutional Documents" and finally confronted the Syrian forces was that the Syrian-initiated plan neglected his communal-based desire to assume the premiership or speakership, which decreased his interest in aligning with

Syria. As a result, constructivism and pluralism could explain the cases of prime ministers and Jumblatt.

2. THE POST-WAR PERIOD : LEBANON UNDER INDIRECT RULE

(1) Summary

This section will primarily summarise the actions of Rafiq Hariri, since, in addition to the increased power of the prime minister stipulated in the Ta'if Agreement, he has occupied the post during most of this period and also has tried to behave "independently" despite the strong influence of indirect Syrian rule.

Karami and Solh: The first post-Ta'if government led by Omar Karami was largely at the mercy of the Syrians. First of all, Syria played an important role in forming the cabinet. Secondly, though the Defence Minister, Michael Murr, ordered in March 1991 all Lebanese and Palestinian militias to disarm, Lebanon was forced to accept Hizbollah's military presence in the South in accordance with Syria's strategy toward Israel. Furthermore, the May 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination established Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. The treaty consequently came in for severe criticism in Lebanon, especially from the Christians. Under these circumstances, though the Karami government tried to improve the economic conditions, they continued to be poor and finally brought about a mass riot in May 1992. Since the incident had the danger of escalating into opposition against the Syrians, Damascus decided to replace him. The succeeding government under Rashid Solh was also in a weak position toward Syria. In fact, Syria's firm intention to hold parliamentary elections in the summer of 1992 overrode strong Lebanese, especially Maronite, opposition.

Hariri: In contrast to these figures, Hariri, supported both internationally and domestically, was generally in a stronger position toward Syria,

especially before 1996 when the Lebanese began to criticise his economic policy. Indeed, considering himself to be an indispensable figure for Syria which anticipated, through Lebanon's economic improvement, the strengthening of its legitimacy there, Hariri used the strategies of either threatening to resign or actual resignation four times in total during his first term, August 1993, May 1994, December 1994, and May 1995. By doing so, he forced Damascus to pressure its clients in his cabinet and the pro-Syrian Speaker Nabih Berri (his opponents) to cooperate with him, in order to push through his "Horizon 2000" plan.

However, his political power as prime minister has been considerably constrained not only by that of other two figures in the "Troika", especially Berri, but also that of Syrian-backed Hizbollah which has carried out military operations in the border areas with Israel. In effect, Hariri's eagerness to stabilise Lebanon and facilitate investment and economic reconstruction has required him to take into consideration Hizbollah's stakes in Lebanon. Anticipating the need to win cooperation from Amal and Hizbollah for his economic efforts, he continued to pay attention to the economic interests held by these Shi'ite forces, while he himself secured his own interests. Representative of this was the project to build a coastal road from Beirut to southern Lebanon, as was the case of Elysser.

Moreover, Hariri has generally cooperated with Syria over its security concerns, in order to benefit from Syrian control over Hizbollah. When Israel launched massive operations against Lebanon ("Operation Accountability" in 1993 and "Grapes of Wrath" in 1996), Hariri pursued diplomatic efforts mainly in Europe to reach agreements on southern Lebanon, aiming to minimise the damage for economic reconstruction, while showing solidarity with Hizbollah and organising a compensation program for the displaced. Though Hariri initially showed interest in the possibility of Israeli unilateral

withdrawal from the "security zone", he later opposed the separation between the Lebanon-Israel and Syria-Israel tracks, as proposed in Netanyahu as "Lebanon First" proposal. After Hariri assumed his second premiership following the Hoss government (1998 – 2000), Hariri has generally defended the Syrian presence in Lebanon against demands for Syrian withdrawal led by Maronite Patriarch Sfeir. Also, he has never criticised Hizbollah, amidst a succession of Hizbollah military attacks against Israeli forces in the Shabaa Farms, in the context of the US war against terrorism after "September 11". By continuously deferring to Syrian interests in Lebanon, he has especially expected that in return Syria would contain Hizbollah's military operations in order to minimise the economic damage to Lebanon. In fact, Syria has occasionally pressured Hizbollah to halt its military activities and given economic concessions to Lebanon, for example by removing import restrictions on Lebanese commodities before the 2002 Arab summit in Beirut.

While Hariri has aligned with Syria in order to deal with the "threat" posed by these Shi'ite groups, there have also been shared economic and political interests between Lebanon and Syria. As regards the former, he has accepted the presence of Syrian workers in Lebanon, which decreased the unemployment rate in Syria and brought about huge remittances for Syria and which also gave the Hariri-supported business community the cheap labour force necessary for reconstruction projects. Also a Syrian decree allowing foreign banks to operate in the free trade zones attracted Lebanese banks in which Hariri had his own stakes. Generally, both Hariri and Syria have given priority to stability in Lebanon. While Hariri's motivation has been to create the condition for facilitating foreign investment in Lebanon, Syria has feared the radicalisation of Lebanese would develop into the opposition movement against its presence. Thus, Hariri, with Syrian backing,

restricted the mass media: he tried to introduce stiff penalties on journalists and newspapers in 1994, and actually reduced the number of television and radio stations in 1996. Also, when the General Confederation of Labour (GCL) called a strike and mass demonstration in 1995, Hariri banned all demonstrations and public gatherings, and later in 1997 defeated Abu Rizq, a hostile chairman of the GCL. Syria, overtly or tacitly, supported Hariri's actions against the GCL.

As we have seen, Hariri's bandwagoning with Syria has occurred mainly because of his eagerness to make progress in economic reconstruction and also to defend his own economic interests. But what factors have affected other political figures' attitudes toward Syria?

The president and speaker: The other two figures in the "Troika" have generally been in a weak position. In contrast to the opposition figures who boycotted the parliamentary elections, Hrawi did not have strong support among the Maronites, which forced him to rely on Syria in order to maintain his status. Though his successor, Lahoud, initially obtained broad Lebanese support, his consistent support for the Syrian presence in Lebanon and for Hizbollah's military activities in Lebanon, as well as Patriarch Sfeir's growing popularity among the Maronites, also increasingly led him, like Hrawi, to count on Syria. Berri also has generally taken a pro-Syrian stance in order to maintain, with Syrian power, his status in the Shi'ite community, especially since Hizbollah has been more popular than Amal among the populous. Syria, for its part, has had its own interest in maintaining the power of these figures in order to construct broad support in the Lebanese government for its presence. Also it has counted on Berri to contain "radical" Hizbollah.

The deputies: Lebanese deputies have tended to manipulate Syria to secure their seats, regardless of their sects. To this end, they have generally taken

cooperative attitudes toward Syrian-supported gerrymandering and also joined Syrian-initiated electoral lists. In southern Lebanon, candidates from Amal and Hizbollah and Bahiyya Hariri, in spite of their conflicts with each other, formed a single electoral list under Syrian urging. Also there were "strange" electoral alliances between Hizbollah and the Phalange Party. In addition, the number of Maronite politicians participating in the elections increased, since they feared their marginalisation and loss of power in the political institution if they abstained. In the long run, Lebanese political figures have continuously aligned with Syria under indirect rule.

This did not change after Bashar Asad began to take the "Lebanon File" from Syrian Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam in 1998 and succeeded to his father's office in 2000. Though Bashar Asad initially tried to stabilise the Israeli-Lebanese border by dispatching Syrian intelligence officers to the South, he later sought a pretext for keeping Hizbollah's military attacks against Israeli forces in order to pressure Israel over its occupation of the Golan and stated the Shabaa Farms was still-occupied Lebanese territory. In addition to Hizbollah's continuous guerrilla activities, Bashar's close ties with President Lahoud have further posed a "threat" from Syria to the Hariri government. Since Hariri's close ally in the Syrian regime, Khaddam, retreated from Lebanese affairs and his position among the "Troika" was weakened, Hariri has become more dependent on Syria in his second term (2000—) in order to push through his economic plan and also to control Hizbollah.

(2) Theoretical Applications

Theoretically, as simple realism suggests, the initial broad support for Hariri not only from the international community but also from the majority of Lebanese made it possible for him to behave as a rational actor to defend

Lebanese sovereignty by balancing against Syria. In fact, he occasionally attempted to get Western support and negotiate with Israel in order to calm the border areas in southern Lebanon and to establish governmental authority there, and also pressured Syria, backed by international and domestic support for him, to make its allies in Lebanon cooperate with him. However, his position as prime minister has been challenged not only occasionally by the dominant Syrians but also regularly by Berri and Hizbollah, both supported by Syria. In other words, Hariri has been placed under interrelated threats from Syria as complex realism suggests: despite its constrains on Lebanese sovereignty he has had to appease Syria in order to ward off challenges from Syrian-supported Shi'ite forces. Specifically, in order to prevent turmoil in Lebanon and to facilitate foreign investment, he has had to rely on Syrian support to control Hizbollah's military activities in the South, whose militancy seemed to somewhat increase after Bashar Asad took power in Syria. He has also taken into consideration the economic interests of Amal and Hizbollah, aiming to soften their opposition to him. Thus, his alignment with Syria could be explained by the theory of complex realism.

In addition to Syria's occasional appeasement of Hariri (by restricting Hizbollah's military activities in southern Lebanon and by lifting economic restrictions), identity and shared interests also seem to have affected his attitude towards Syria. First of all, although Hariri is a Sunni, he has viewed the Syrian presence in Lebanon and Syrian-backed Hizbollah's military activities in the South as "threats", since these factors have actually obstructed his economic reconstruction efforts by limiting Western aid and investment. In this respect, his economic interests appear to have overshadowed his Sunni identity. However, it seems that, as a Sunni politician elected from Sunni-dominated West Beirut, he has needed to take

account of the Sunnis' Arab-oriented identity, their sympathy toward Syria, and their support for resistance to Israel. In fact, he occasionally showed his solidarity with Hizbollah's resistance, especially when Lebanese sympathy toward the group mounted after Israel's massive attacks. As constructivism suggests, the Arab-oriented identity of his constituents has affected Hariri's policies.

Secondly, while it seems possible to say that the identity factor surrounding Hariri has forced him to take appeasement policies towards Syria, there have been more "positive" factors linking Hariri and the Syrians: their shared interests which have led to their mutual cooperation as the theory of pluralism suggests. The two issues of Syrian workers in Lebanon and Syria's permission for Lebanese banks to operate in its free trade zone, being beneficial to both states, seem to have reinforced their economic interdependence. In addition, they have had common political interests in preventing Lebanon from becoming radicalised. Syria has feared that radicalisation would develop into Lebanese mass opposition to its presence, and Hariri has never wanted turmoil in Lebanon to obstruct his economic reconstruction efforts.

As we have seen, Hariri's actions can be explained on the basis of three theories: complex realism, constructivism, and pluralism. Which theories have relevance to other Lebanese political actors? Both the president and speaker have generally been unpopular in their own community. Although both Hrawi and Lahoud, as a Maronite, may have seen Syria as a threat violating Lebanese sovereignty, their weak position forced them to rely on Syria in order to maintain their presidency and to contain their communal rivals, especially popular opposition leaders such as Patriarch Sfeir. In other words, their Maronite identity was overridden by their power interests, but this seems to have been considerably affected by the Syrian need to have

Maronite allies in the government in order to construct broad support to its presence, since most Maronites have not welcomed the Syrians. Thus Syria has had an interest in protecting their presidencies, and the Maronite presidents, in turn, have received Syrian support. In effect, the interdependence between the presidents and Syria has led to their mutual cooperation as pluralism suggests.

In the case of Speaker Berri, not only his Shi'ite identity but also his eagerness, by counting on Syria, to maintain his power in the Shi'ite community against popular Hizbollah seems to have affected his close ties with Syria. At the same time, the containment of Hizbollah's power has also benefited Syria, since it has feared the radicalisation of Lebanon. The relation between Berri and Syria could be thus explained by both constructivism and pluralism: his Shi'ite identity and their shared political interest to contain Hizbollah.

In addition, Lebanese deputies and the Syrians also have had common political interests. The deputies have given priority to securing their seats, and by guaranteeing it through gerrymandering and the formation of electoral alliances Syria has acquired influence in Lebanon through these deputies. Since shared political interests have generated their interdependence, pluralism could explain the above cases of Lebanese political actors: the presidents, speaker, and deputies, though constructivism might partially apply to the case of Berri.

3. FROM THE LEBANESE CASE STUDY TO THE MORE WIDE-RANGING AND PHILOSOPHICAL/METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

This case study demonstrates the behaviour of a penetrated weak state, like Lebanon, toward a regional middle power, like Syria, cannot usefully be explained by simple realism's state-to-state power balancing model but only

by a combination of factors identified in a variety of theories, namely "omni-alignments" against interrelated threats (complex realism), identity (constructivism), and interest interdependence (pluralism).

Simple realism is useful in understanding Syrian behaviour. Since Syria managed to subordinate its domestic groups under Asad, its foreign policy has been relatively freed from domestic constraints and it can be treated as a unitary rational actor. In effect, external factors, that is the regional dynamics in the Middle East, have largely shaped its foreign policy, including its Lebanese policy, and it has continuously given a top priority to securing its national defence against Israel. By contrast, the Lebanese state cannot be seen as a unified actor and thus it is necessary to differentiate the multitude of state (office-holders) and sub-state actors. In practice although the regional system has affected Lebanese attitudes towards the Syrians, they have been more strongly influenced by domestic factors. Specifically, as sub-state actors, especially ones backed by Syria, have been generally powerful, these circumstances have required state officials to take account of domestic threats. Specifically, when they face both internal and external threats at the same time, they use the lesser threatening force to appease and contain the greater threat, as complex realism would suggest, which is generally internal.

For Lebanese political leaders, unlike the Syrians, "threat" does not automatically mean a particular state, either Israel or Syria even though both are more powerful contiguous states and even though both, especially Syria, have threatened Lebanese sovereignty. In spite of this, Syria has not necessarily been seen as an unmitigated threat because Lebanon has not been a national state with a shared identity differentiated from Syria, but has incorporated communities sharing trans-state identities with Syria. On the one hand, the specific communal identity of sub-state actors has affected

which country is perceived as the greater threat. On the other hand, Lebanese actors' economic/political interests have sometimes overshadowed their communal identity in shaping perceptions of threat. Concretely, since Muslims having Arab identities have constituted the majority of Lebanese, state officials have had to take account of their sympathy towards Syria, sometimes regardless of their own identity, in order to secure their power and status. At the same time, the various actors have developed economic and political interdependence with Syria. From this Lebanese-Syrian case study, it seems possible to say that perceptions of "threat" are strongly connected with and/or influenced by identity and interests and are not given from power or location as neo-realism imagines.

Though each of these three theories (complex realism, constructivism, and pluralism) specialises in highlighting different aspects in international relations, they have a common assumption that state is not a unitary actor and they are also interconnected at the sub/trans-state level which largely influences state's foreign relations. Thus, the combination of three theories is not only reasonable but also essential to allow a full comprehension of the various dimensions of Lebanese-Syrian relations. In other words, the employment of a single analytical approach is insufficient as a framework for this case study. In sum, it shows that while simple realism could explain the behaviour of a consolidated or coherent state, the combination of complex realism, constructivism, and pluralism is more applicable to a penetrated weak state like Lebanon. Since this conclusion results from a specific case, the wider validity of the argument for international relations theory would have to be tested by examining other penetrated weak states' cases under similar circumstances. This might become a basis for a new more widely applicable theory of international relations in Third World states.

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ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations below refer to newspapers, periodicals, information services, and documents cited in the text.

DS The Daily Star (Lebanese Newspaper)
EIU Economic Intelligence Unit Country Report : Lebanon
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FCO Foreign Commonwealth Office documents in the British Public Record Office
MEED Middle East Economic Digest
MEI Middle East International
MEM Middle East Mirror
SWB BBC Summary of World Broadcasts